

# THE PROSPECTIVE REVIEW.

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## ART. I.—HEBREW HISTORY.

*A History of the Hebrew Monarchy, from the Administration of Samuel to the Babylonish Captivity.* London: John Chapman, 1847.

WE heartily welcome the appearance of this book. Its bold views and unreserved statement of facts will doubtless give offence in some quarters: but for the sake of truth and reason, and not least of a pure and spiritual Christianity, we rejoice that so able and vigorous an attempt has been made to supply a deficiency in our historical literature, which Mr. Milman's work, liberal and enlightened in many respects, no longer adequately meets. It gives expression, we are persuaded, to surmises that have haunted many a thoughtful mind; and any one acquainted with the present state of knowledge and inquiry, might have safely predicted, that a work of this description under some form or other must ere long have been given to the public.

In the volume before us, traces of the new spirit imparted to historical inquiries by Niebuhr, are very perceptible. Great minds bursting with some prolific idea, scatter far and wide the seeds of thought which light and fructify on regions far remote from that where the original fruit was matured. They spread around them a crop of kindred products, and give the age in which they flourish, a colour and fragrance of its own. Niebuhr's was one of these potential and self-multiplying minds. He put a new life into history. His doubts were the provocatives of fresh knowledge. And whatever may be the judgment of posterity on the soundness and absolute worth of his own

researches, his spirit will live in the results of manifold inquiries which but for his quickening influence would never have been instituted. Here is the evidence of his genius: this is the true basis of his fame.

We take it to be the special function of the historical school which Niebuhr created, to trace out the great parallelisms of manners, institutions and opinion in the different periods of civilization, and to show men how the records of the past may be translated intelligibly into the conceptions of the present—to convert history, as it were, into a series of moral equations, where the unknown symbols are collected on one side of the operation, and rendered into their known equivalents on the other. Principles strictly identical are disguised from us by the changing forms in which they are clothed. A law, an usage, a mode of action, a form of speech—then becomes intelligible to us, when we are made to see what it corresponds to, in the state of society to which we ourselves belong. We are then able to *realise* it, when we can trace it up through the mass of dead words in which it is enveloped by the lexicographer or the antiquary, to some living experience of our daily life or universal principle of our common humanity. We must read the past in the light of the present; and as that light increases, the past will need to be continually re-read. The past is a dim page—and dimmer the more remote—on which remain but a few of the characters with which it was once inscribed, hard to decypher, as well from their strange and uncouth shape, as from the frequent absence of the connecting signs. We encounter only relics and fragments, which we cannot read off at once into their modern equivalents, but must attack in repeated trials, till with the occasional aid of conjecture and divination, we can piece together the disjointed members into the coherence of their original structure. This remark does not of course apply with the same strength to those periods which possess abundant contemporary records; but it is true more or less of the whole of history. It is a work of interpretation, and will be read differently by different minds. We are not however to suppose, that truth is unattainable: it may be reached by successive approximations. For the laws of nature are unchanging; and the mind that has familiarised itself by science with the constant se-

quences of events, has acquired a vast power for recovering the lost knowledge of former ages. As it can infer from a single fact, the certain co-existence of many other facts, it will often read an entire history where the less instructed would discern but a solitary event. The principles already ascertained of Morals and Social Economy, and those still more remarkable which are daily evolved by the inquiries of Statistics—to say nothing of the demonstrated truths of Physical Science—furnish powerful implements for the cultivation of the field of history, which will obtain richer results the more their use is perfected; and, applied to periods hitherto exempted from the scrutiny of a rational criticism, must lead to some conclusions for which the general reader is not prepared.

The author of the *History of the Hebrew Monarchy* has brought a very acute mind, familiar with knowledge that lies beyond the range of ordinary scholarship, to the task of combining and interpreting the antique and fragmentary records, which contain the only materials for his work. The facts so elicited, he has read in the clear light of modern intelligence and humanity, and without hesitation or disguise has estimated at their just moral value. He judges the civilisation of the Hebrews, as he would that of any other people, by a Christian standard. Perceiving distinctly the important part assigned to this remarkable race in the general development of human progress, sympathising deeply with the spiritual wisdom and earnestness of their prophetic teachers, and, in a striking passage at the commencement of his book, emphatically declaring his conviction, ‘that pure and undefiled religion is the noblest, the most blessed, the most valuable of all God’s countless gifts,’\*—the writer has nevertheless clearly seen, that this most ancient and curious history, to be understood, must not be read with a blind subjection to the religious views of its immediate authors, and that in interpreting their language, we must constantly make allowance for the religious prepossessions which give a colour to their representation of facts.† A small criti-

\* Preface, p. vii.

† The Author throughout his work gives numerous examples of the spirit of sacerdotal prejudice and exaggeration which pervades the Books of Chro-

cism may take exception to certain of his statements and views: but a work should be tried by the soundness of its general principles and the truth of its final conclusion; and in regard to these, the ground which he has occupied, seems to us unassailable. We do not by this mean to insinuate, that his work is wanting in accuracy of detail. On the contrary (and we speak after an attentive perusal, and a constant comparison of the Biblical passages criticised) we should say, it is distinguished by its accuracy, and the singular clearness and penetration, with which inconsistencies in the original narrative are brought out, and minute points of chronology discussed.\* But so bigottedly are the minds of most persons inured to a literal acceptance of the Old Testament record, and so ready is the imputation of inaccuracy, rashness, levity to any deviation from it, not supported by the fullest and most undeniable proof, that it becomes necessary to claim beforehand for every earnest inquirer in this field, that privilege of conjecture and free combination, which is admitted in all other history, and without which the entire truth can never be known.

A great assumption is involved in the popular prejudice on this subject. It must first be shown, that the literal interpretation, taking the naked facts just as they are given us—necessarily secures the truth, and that any other would certainly involve error. To insist on the Biblical history being exempted from criticism, implies a suspicion that it cannot endure the test. Where the business is, as in all ancient history, to construct an intelligible whole out of fragments, the free play of enlightened theory is indispensable to the discovery of truth. Some failures, some mistakes must be pardoned in the eager pursuit of it.

nicles, and is the more conspicuous when compared with the calmer statements in those of Samuel and Kings. The peculiarity of Chronicles must always have struck an attentive reader:—but we believe the first writer in modern times, who subjected it to a careful critical analysis, and traced it to its probable cause, was De Wette, in his 'Kritischer Versuch über die Glaubwürdigkeit der Bücher der Chronik, etc.'

\* The Author has elaborated the chronology of his subject, we might almost say, with a superfluous care: for the chronological data of the Old Testament are exceedingly loose and uncertain, and hardly afford a basis for the construction of a consistent scheme. In an Appendix to Chapter IV., he has proposed a method of getting rid of the two *interregna*, which are generally assumed to have elapsed, one between Jeroboam II. and Zachariah, the other between Pekah and Hoshea.



They may be expected to diminish with each repetition of the restorative process. Had the study of Greek history been burdened with the same restrictions as that of the Bible, our Author well remarks, that 'neither Thirlwall nor Grote could have produced their valuable works.'\*

It is the prominent idea of this History of the Hebrew Monarchy, that the Levitical institutions which the books of the Old Testament, read in the order in which they actually stand, would lead us to suppose had been fully established from the time of Moses, came gradually into existence, and did not assume their complete development till a comparatively late period; and that the state of the nation under their Judges and Kings is only intelligible on this supposition.—To read Hebrew history in the spirit of our author, we must imagine the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua which is closely allied to it in spirit,† cut off from the beginning of our Bibles, and carried down among the more recent writings, which exhibit the belief of the Israelites respecting their forefathers at a period of considerable civilisation, when they freely intermingled the religious and political ideas of their own day, with the myths and legends, the old laws and old traditions, and the relics of earlier chronicle and song, which had come down to them from a remote antiquity:—and we must date the proper history of the race from the first records of their settlement in the land of Canaan, fighting with its previous inhabitants, and gradually spreading themselves over it as the lords of the soil.—This general conception admits of many modifications. It requires minute and patient study—considering the imperfect nature of the documents with which we have to deal—to be reduced, if it ever can be reduced, to a clear and consistent theory of all the phenomena of the case.—But ever since we read the historical books of the Old Testament with any attention, it has been our firm persuasion, that such a conception under some form or other must be entertained; and that the existence of a

\* Preface, p. vi.

† Ewald (*Geschichte des Volkes Israel*) includes the Pentateuch and Joshua in the first of the three books into which he divides the historical records of the Hebrews. They form together what he calls 'das grosse Buch der Urgeschichten.' Their reduction to their actual form he supposes long subsequent to the events of which they speak, and to many of the materials which they contain.

national priesthood and ritual, such as the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy imply, is irreconcilable with the facts of the whole history down to the very eve of the Captivity.—In this view, then, we are entirely in accordance with our author, and feel convinced that he has got hold of a true principle.

On the mythical and legendary period of Hebrew Story, prior to the occupation of Canaan, he ventures no opinion—simply admitting the historical existence of Moses, and the transmission under his name of some elementary laws and institutions.\* He commences his narrative, as if no Levites, incorporated as an order and exercising territorial jurisdiction, existed. Certainly the incidental notices of Levites in the book of Judges, represent them as having yet neither settled habitations nor fixed revenues, and, as it would seem, not necessarily of one tribe.† Ewald (*Gesch. des Volk. Isr.* ii. 303-307, 339-46) differs in some points from the author.—He admits that the Levites in the time of the Judges, were wanderers in the land, and dependent for their support on the voluntary contributions of private persons:—but still he regards them as a sacred caste from the first, invested with peculiar privileges by the original Mosaic constitution; and supposes the state in which they are described during the heroic age, to be the breaking up of a previous system of greater regularity, occasioned by the violence and disorders consequent on a protracted warfare of conquest. One is inclined to ask, at what time in

\* The Commandments inscribed on the Two Tables were probably the nucleus of the Levitical legislation, as the Twelve Tables formed the basis of Roman Law.—The author has noticed a fact overlooked by divines, that in the book of Exodus, we have two versions of the Decalogue, and probably the rudiments of a third: Ch. xx. (where the recognised form occurs) compared with Ch. xxxiv. & xxiii. 10-19.—By a fortunate result the most spiritual version has prevailed and is adopted in Deuteronomy.—May we conjecture, that a number of insulated precepts bearing the name of Moses and embodying the first principles of duty and a monotheistic worship, were originally in circulation among the people, which were afterwards collected and systematised in tables; and that in this way different collections arose, of which some have perished, others subsist in an imperfect state, and only the best, that which is most adapted to the feelings of a more advanced period—has survived in authority? It is remarkable, that in all the versions the Commandments are for the most *prohibitory*—‘Thou shalt not, etc.’—as if intended for a rude and impetuous race, that needed constant restraint under the high sanctions of religion.

† Judges xvii. 7. The Levite here mentioned is said to be of the *family or stock of Judah*.

the long passage from Egypt to the banks of the Jordan, it is conceivable, that such a system should ever have been in force.

Samuel is quite a hero with the author of the present work, who views his whole conduct, and his relation to Saul and David, in a very different light from some previous writers.\* In the earlier stages of the rationalistic reaction there was certainly too great a disposition to suspect the working of priestly craft and ambition in every earnest religious character.† In the main we think our author's estimate just. Samuel marks the transition from a state of intestine feud and ceaseless warfare to that ascendancy of legal rule which it is the prerogative of great minds to assume over their barbarous contemporaries. All the refining and tranquillising influences of society, regular courts for the administration of justice, and the schools of the prophets, commenced with him. If we except the half legendary Deborah, he was the first *civil* judge in Israel. The rest were like all the early heroes of mankind, renowned for bodily strength and a rude valour, and raised into temporary eminence by successful exploits against the hereditary enemies of their race.—Abimelech grasped at royalty, but failed to secure it.—‘Samuel the prophet,’ says our author (p. 27), ‘may with no small justice be called a second Moses. The results of his ministry were greater than any which can be traced to Moses, and his institutions far more permanent.’ Under him the national civilisation settled into some consistency.—Ephraim long remained its centre. West of the Jordan (for the tribes on its eastern bank retained the nomade character of their ancestors) the Hebrew population consisted of a number of small proprietors, with no class much raised in wealth and dignity above the rest.—Particular families were distinguished. The tribes spread over the country, acting for the most part independently, and attached to local sanctuaries, yielded a sort of traditional respect to their elders or heads, and only on extraordinary occasions coalesced for common objects. Into this state of society Samuel infused a stronger spirit of religious zeal.—The habitual enemies of

\* G. L. Bauer, in his ‘Geschichte der Hebräischen Nation, &c.’ 1804 (ii. p. 134), whose views have been adopted by Heeren.

† See an excellent remark of Gesenius on this subject, in his Commentary on Isaiah, Einleit. § 5. n. 43.

the Hebrews, dangerous from their close vicinity and odious on account of their peculiar worship and usages, were the Philistines, who at the commencement of Samuel's ministry had obtained many advantages over Israel and even held it in partial subjection.—Roused by Samuel and putting their trust in Jehovah, the nation made a vigorous effort and shook off the degrading yoke.—It was a war at once of religion and of independence. Prophetic influence early became a powerful agent in the Hebrew civilisation. The rise of the prophets as a class is one of the events most deserving of notice at this time, as determining the future character of the nation.—‘From the time of Samuel,’ says the History under review, (p. 37)—speaking of the prophets—

... “they were gradually to assume a higher national importance. Their advice was asked on topics of great public moment, nor did they refuse it; but their mode of seeking for a divine reply was not ceremonial or superstitious, however tinged with a high enthusiasm. The prophet either played on the lyre himself or (oftener perhaps) called for a minstrel to do so, and wrapped himself in pious meditation on the subject of inquiry; until, gaining an insight into its moral bearings and kindled by the melody, he delivered a response in high-wrought and generally poetical strain.”

We cannot pretend to give a summary of the history as expounded by this interesting and intelligent work; but we may briefly notice a few of the more important crises, which the author has developed in their moral and social bearings, as indicating the successive stages through which the Hebrew mind passed on to the distinctive character which it finally transmitted to Judaism.—We omit all reference to the reign of Saul and the early career of David, during which the nation grew in military strength and acquired compactness and unity—though the narrative abounds with romantic interest—to call attention to the important consequences of founding a capital in Jerusalem and establishing there a fixed centre for the national religion.

We will first, however, as a specimen of the author's mode of ~~teaching~~ his subject, give his estimate of the character of David:—

“David was not indeed an Antoninus, an Alfred, or a Saint Louis; yet neither was he one of the vulgar herd of Kings. The

*teaching*

polygamy in which he indulged so injuriously must in part be laid to his personal weakness, when we observe how restrained (in comparison) was his predecessor Saul. Nevertheless, as a man, he was affectionate and generous, sympathetic and constitutionally pious: as a King, his patronage of religious persons was highly judicious, and his whole devotional character of permanent importance to the best interests of his people and of mankind; as a warrior, he taught Israel a mutual confidence and common pride in Jehovah their God; and first elevated his countrymen into a ruling and leading race, whose high place it was to legislate for and teach the heathen around. His career may serve to warn all who are wanting in depth of passion or enlarged knowledge of human nature, that those on whose conduct society has relaxed its wholesome grasp are not to be judged of by their partial outbreaks of evil, but by the amount of positive good which they habitually exhibit. Compared with the great statesmen of the educated nations of Europe, David's virtues and vices appear alike *peurile*; but among Asiatics he was a truly great man; and of his own posterity, though several, who were happily subjected to greater restraints, were far more consistent in goodness, there is none who more attracts our interest and our love than the heroic and royal Psalmist."—Pp. 112-113.

A prominent feature in the character of David was ardent devotion to Jehovah worship. The Tabernacle or migratory Sanctuary of Curtains—the Sacred Tent as we might call it, had been stationed at different points since the first conquest of the country, and appears latterly to have remained at Gibeon. The Ark was still at Kirjath-jearim, to which it had been brought when recovered from the Philistines. At Jerusalem David erected another Tabernacle, and placed in it the Ark; and with this new sanctuary associated a regular system of religious services, which contributed to perfect the national psalmody in honour of Jehovah. From this time the ministers of religion in Jerusalem fell unavoidably under the influence of the Court, and became more or less, during the height of the Monarchy, servants of the crown. A superior reverence now naturally attached to the Jehovah worship of the Capital; where it was exercised probably in the greatest purity.—But the local sanctuaries—'high places,' as they are called—were still resorted to; and as they were not yet prohibited, but allowed to subsist along with the more splendid worship of the Capital, it is reasonable to conclude, that in a ruder and more antique form, they were dedicated to

the service of the national God, Jehovah.—This popular Jehovah-worship in early times seems not to have been wholly unaccompanied by idolatry. Beyond a doubt *teraphim* or household gods—the penates of the ancient Jehovahists—formed a part of the domestic worship.—In the temple itself, soon after erected by Solomon, we find visible representations of sacred objects—symbolic forms, like those of other ancient religions—not excluded.—These facts may startle some readers, but they are clearly made out by our author; and his statement is confirmed by the high authority of Ewald.\*

Solomon completed the religious institutions of his father by substituting for the tabernacle a solid temple of wood and stone at Jerusalem. The work indicates a change in the condition of society. It was such a mark of outward homage as a wealthy and magnificent Prince would delight to offer to the national God. Vanity probably divided his feelings with devotion: at least the latter was not so strict and exclusive, as to forbid his acknowledging in an inferior sense the gods of other nations. A kind of *syncretistic* sentiment seems at length to have taken possession of his mind. While the precincts of Jerusalem were reserved for the worship of Jehovah, beyond its walls he erected 'high places'—a sort of private chapels—which subsisted till the reign of Josiah, for the use of the ladies of different faiths who formed his Harem. The example must have been corrupting to the worshippers of Jehovah; while the riches and luxury which foreign commerce poured into Israel during his reign, destroyed the ancient simplicity, exposed the higher classes to idolatrous seduction, and called forth the strong reaction of the prophets. The author traces the probable extent of Solomon's commercial relations, and taking a leaf from the book of modern science, has some excellent remarks on the mis-

\* Gesch. d. V. I. iii. p. 110. His words are most distinct. Speaking of the 'high places' or local sanctuaries in the time of Solomon, he says, 'they consisted of a symbolical Cone, an altar, a holy tree or grove, or even in some cases of an image of the one God' (oder auch noch einem Bilde des einzelnen Gottes).—In a curious note he compares the Cone with a similar form in the Phœnician worship. It was sometimes decked out in variegated garments, like the early idols of the Greeks. See K. O. Müller's *Archæol. der Kunst.* § 69. Ewald refers among other passages to Ezekiel xvi. 16.—But compare the very decisive passage, Hosea iii. 4.

chievous effects of the royal monopolies. He imputes the embarrassments of the later years of Solomon, to his all-grasping cupidity and the expense of maintaining the royal entrepôts on the north western frontier, which the profits of the trade did not replace.—Heavy taxation was needed to supply the deficiency: and Solomon with all his wisdom and his magnificence, left the kingdom poor, burdened, and demoralised.

We must not pass over a fact, alluded to by our author and coming out in the accounts of the reign of Solomon, which throws light on the social relations of the period, and could not have been without its influence on the state of morals and religion;—that a large part of the original inhabitants of Palestine had been reduced by the conquering race to a condition of serfdom, resembling that into which the earlier occupants of the Peloponnesus were brought by the Dorian invaders—and that these people were compelled to perform the same kind of work for Solomon in the erection of the edifices with which he adorned his capital, as had been exacted from his own ancestors under the Pharaohs in Egypt. The confiscated lands of these serfs probably became the territorial domains of David and Solomon.\*

The discontents that pervaded the nation during the last years of Solomon's reign, did not break out into any open result till the accession of his son, when the ten northern tribes were abstracted from the house of David and formed into a separate kingdom by Jeroboam. We notice this event only in relation to its effects on the state of religion, which are fully exhibited in the work before us.—It cannot be doubted, that a sacerdotal influence was growing up in connexion with the Court at Jerusalem. The successful usurper at once saw, that his security lay in shaking himself free from it, and creating a free and independent ministry throughout his dominions. The head and front of his offending, as stated by the later compilers of the history who looked back on these transactions with a strong Jewish feeling—was his disowning the exclusive sanctity of the Levites, and making priests of the lowest of the people.†

\* It appears that *all* the Canaanitish tribes were not subdued. Mention is made of Hittite Chiefs among the purchasers of the horses and carriages, that were imported by Solomon's agents from Egypt. 1 Kings x. 29.

† ' Whosoever would, he consecrated him, and he became one of the priests



It is true, that he sanctioned idolatry, and to this the more refined monotheism of a subsequent age might justly take exception. But it is not alleged against him, that he introduced any *foreign* deities; the names of Baal, Milcom, Chemosh, Ashtaroth nowhere occur. Abijah the Shilonite, partaking of the higher religious views which belonged to the better prophets and priests, rebuked him for making 'other gods and molten images' (1 Kings xiv. 9): but there is no evidence, that the images which he set up at Bethel and Dan, were not connected in a gross way by the popular mind with the worship of Jehovah. Our author (p. 156) is convinced, that Jeroboam's idolatry was meant to be monotheistic. The words of Jeroboam in dedicating these images are identical with those ascribed to Aaron, when he made the golden calf in the wilderness.\* After the erection of the calf at Bethel, we find a prophet residing there, whom the narrative intends us to regard as a true prophet, by telling us that 'the word of the Lord came unto him' (1 Kings xiii. 20).† In short, we find no such general outbreak of prophetic resistance against Jeroboam, as afterwards attended the establishment of Tyrian rites under Ahab. Jeroboam, we may suppose, was a prince of no strong religious sensibility, who for political ends took under his patronage the old popular worship connected with the 'high places,' instead of the more spiritual views which were gaining ground in the seat of priestly and prophetic culture at Jerusalem.

Ahab's marriage with a Tyrian princess and the introduction through her influence of Baal worship into Israel, are circumstances familiar to every reader. We are only concerned, on the present occasion, with the intense reac-

of the high places.' 1 Kings xiii. 33. The statement in 2 Chron. xiii. 9, with a deeper sacerdotal colouring, is substantially the same.

\* 1 Kings xii. 28. Exod. xxxii. 8. De Wette renders the phrase 'thy gods' אֱלֹהֶיךָ in the singular.

† Jeroboam's residence in Egypt and the protection afforded him by Shishak during his exile (1 Kings xi. 40) may have had some influence in determining him to the adoption of this particular form of idolatry. To similar influence we must perhaps ascribe the calf of Aaron and the brazen serpent of Moses. The serpent was a symbol of healing agency among the Egyptians. Gesenius has rendered it probable, that it entered into the form of the Seraphim, and that from the idea of beneficence associated with it, it was adopted by the Gnostic sect of Ophites. Jesaia, Comment. vi. 2.

tion of Jehovistic zeal which they called forth under the ministry of Elijah and Elisha. A true prophet might regret the low ideas and superstitious practices connected with the 'high places,' and seek to promote their gradual abolition. He might also feel, that they were so deeply fixed in the popular attachment, that any attempt to root them up violently, would be productive of more evil than good. And he had always the consolation, that this popular worship, gross as it was, contained within it the germs of a better system; that it was the first stage of Jehovistic development; and affording many points of access to a higher truth, might be reasonably expected to grow up into it at length under better culture and faithful prophetic teaching. But the innovations attempted by Ahab and Jezebel appeared in a very different light. Between the religion of Baal, and that of Jehovah in any form—between the worship of strangers and that of their fathers—there could be no assimilation or compromise. It was not a matter of time or degree—a simple case of transition. It was a question of life or death for the one true religion: and the commanding genius of Elijah threw himself into it with all the energy and some of the ferocity, which we might expect from the intense action of religious zeal in an age so comparatively barbarous.

The ministry of Elijah and his successor forms an episode of a peculiar character in the history. Our author thinks a large part of it must have been taken from some ancient book of the Acts of Elijah.—It is wild and grand—and, breaking into a narrative quite as much on the level of ordinary reality as that of Herodotus, presents us all at once with a rich display of the marvellous. The Acts of Elisha, as we find it justly remarked p. 282, are recorded in a lower tone of feeling and with an enfeebled imagination: but the story of Elijah is a noble legend, gleaming with imaginative lightnings that break with a terrible splendour through its dark and stern sublimity—whose power to thrill and exalt they alone can appreciate who have heard its high poetry wedded to the loftiest music by the genius of Mendelssohn. It is a record from the hand of some impassioned Jehovist, recalling the martyr age of the prophets of Israel.

It may be remarked, that almost universally the impression of periods of high religious excitement is trans-

mitted to posterity by a devout and reverential age, blended with a strong belief in the miraculous. In the wild fervour awakened by the first Crusades, supernatural powers were ascribed to St. Bernard. The same were supposed to exist among the Camisards: and we find them perpetually claimed for the leaders of the great religious movements during the Middle Ages. This remark is not meant to insinuate the impossibility of miracles,—i.e. the occasional intervention of powers different from those which ordinarily operate among men.—God works by many deep-lying laws, which only at times break through the uniform surface of the world's affairs. When men cast off their habitual conventionalisms and are thrown back on the primary principles of their nature in direct communion with God, the effects are strange and startling. The bounds of the spirit's influence on outward things are far from being yet ascertained. But the simple fact that we have mentioned, deserves, we think, more attention than it has usually received, as opening a deeper insight into the religious psychology of man.

The remonstrances of the prophets were not without effect in Israel, and produced a bloody retaliation. Roused by the strong exhortation of Elisha, Jehu seized the throne, and destroyed every member of the family of Ahab within his reach. Some of the adherents of the royal house sought protection with Athaliah, the daughter of Ahab and Jezebel, who was at that time the Queen mother of Judah, and united with her to crush the rigid Jehovists in Jerusalem. Massacres affecting both kingdoms were the direct consequence of the unrelenting zeal of Elisha.—The following reflection on these transactions is as just in itself, as it is eminently called for by the present state of religious opinion.\*

• The prevalent notion of regarding Scripture as the vehicle of a definite religious system enforced by miraculous sanction direct from God, occasionally blinds the moral perception of the most enlightened and religious men. We read with astonishment the following observation of Mr. Norton on the account (1 Kings xviii.) of the miracle ascribed to Elijah in his contest with the priests of Baal. (*Genuineness of the Gospels*, vol. ii. 2nd edit., note on the Old Testament, p. 502.) 'Elijah, then, was a prophet of God; and as a prophet of God, his mission had been sealed by miracles; and what miracle can we imagine more suited to his character, as a teacher and restorer of true religion among the idolatrous Israelites, than that described by the historian?' Mr. Norton has omitted all notice of the sequel, recorded by the historian in immediate connexion with the miracle, and clearly forming part of the original account. 'And Elijah said unto them, Take the prophets of Baal;

"That Jewish writers can gloat over such funereal events so deadly to their own people, is sufficiently wonderful. That men called Christians can read them with calm approbation, is still more melancholy; for this is the training of mind which steeled all Europe to cruelty under the name of religion. This has lit up hell-fires in Christendom; this has perpetrated perfidious massacres unknown to Paganism; this has bequeathed, even to the present age, a confusion of mind which too often leads those who are naturally mild and equitable, to inflict hardship, vexation, degradation and loss on the professors of a rival creed. Until men learn that Jehovah neither does, nor ever did, sanction such enormities as Elisha commanded, and Jehu executed, they will never have a true insight into the heart of Him, who is the God of the Pagan as well as of the Jew."—P. 210.

The sacerdotal spirit in connexion with a more spiritual monotheism had been strengthening itself in Judah since the days of Asa and Jehoshaphat; and the temporary reaction under Athaliah, consequent on the religious convulsions of the northern kingdom, only aided its development. The long minority of Jehoash under the priestly regency of Jehoiada, was an event of similar tendency.—Nor were the tranquil and prosperous reigns of Uzziah and Jotham less favourable to the growth of a pure Jehovism, though they introduced some elements of future corruption. Jerusalem was a centre of religious culture. Priests and prophets as yet worked together in harmony. Joel, the oldest prophet whose oracles have been recorded, breathes a spirit that we may even call sacerdotal.—The next great decisive step in this direction was the removal of the 'high places'—which had been tolerated under the most religious of previous sovereigns—by Hezekiah. There was policy as well as zeal in this measure. It tended to increased centralization of the powers of government and the temple-priesthood, by compelling the people from the country districts to resort to the capital at particular seasons for attendance on the great religious festivals. But the result was not pure gain. It produced a complete social revolution. It must have displaced a large body of inferior priests attached to the local sanctuaries, who were at once converted into beggars and vagabonds, and diffused through society, especially among the less educated classes, a dan-

*let not one of them escape* (they were four hundred and fifty). And they took them: and Elijah brought them to the brook Kishon, and *slew them there.*' Did the sanction of the miracle extend to this also?

gerous and excitable element of discontent. The Assyrian officer, Rab-Shakeh seems artfully to touch on this subject, as a chord that might possibly find response among some portion of the inhabitants of Judah—in the remarkable words (2 Kings, xviii. 22), ‘If ye say unto me, we trust in Jehovah our God: is not that he, whose high places and whose altars Hezekiah hath taken away, and hath said to Judah and Jerusalem, Ye shall worship before this altar in Jerusalem?’—One consequence of this act might be, as our author supposes (p. 310), the introduction of what he calls territorial Levitism—the settlement of functionaries, combining the sacerdotal with the legal character, and exercising all the higher intellectual offices of society, in direct connexion with the temple at Jerusalem, at different points over the country, where the ‘high places’ had once been, and where Levites now succeeded the ejected priesthood.—These, we may infer, became henceforth the Levitical towns, of which we read in the Pentateuch and in Joshua. The writer can find no other crisis in the whole history, for the origin of a state of society which is distinctly recognised in those books, but of which not a trace exists in the records of the early kings. We give the theory (for the author only offers it as such) just as he states it. We shall presently have a few more words to say on Levitism and its probable relations with prophecy.

So violent a revolution might be expected to bring on a reaction; and this followed in the next reign under Manasseh. He not only set up again the ‘high places,’ but connected with them the foreign idolatry of Baal. There are various indications in the original history, that the old popular Jehovism of the local sanctuaries had been already corrupted by infusion from extraneous sources. The friendly intercourse with the family of Ahab in the reigns of Jehoram and Ahaziah, with the direct influence of Athaliah, must inevitably have insinuated even into Judah some elements of the Baal worship, which had produced deeper and more extensive mischief in Israel. These the priesthood at Jerusalem, jealous of the exclusive purity of their national religion, would sensitively repel. But the case was different with the simple husbandmen of country districts and their rustic priesthood as gross and ignorant as themselves. Such people would be open to the seduc-

tive influence of the emissaries of Baal: and when persecution was directed against themselves, and their altars were pulled down, a sense of common danger and wrong would destroy whatever little alienation might have yet remained between the votaries of native and foreign superstition, and force them into close coalition. The ejection under Hezekiah would particularly have that effect. It fused down the most diverse elements of popular superstition into one mass.—In our own country, before the Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, religious disabilities united Nonconformists of every grade in one firm band to resist the usurpations of the dominant Church; and we saw the representatives of the Roman Catholics and the Unitarians acting together with perfect cordiality.—The sympathy, in the case described, must have been of a deeper and a grosser kind. Manasseh sided with the excluded party; and a fierce warfare ensued between them and their persecutors, which strengthened each in their previous tendencies.

These events must have made the strict Jehovists feel the importance of some fixed standard for the support of their opinions. The authority of Moses—a great name coming down to them from the remotest past—had hitherto been left to the vagueness of traditions, a few venerable precepts, and the influence of laws and institutions grounded in popular usage and hallowed by popular association. But their conflict with the adherents of the ‘high places,’ like that of the early Apostolic Christians with the Gnostics, suggested the idea of a Canon—a written rule—from which should lie no appeal: and the result in both cases was the *commencement* of a Scripture.—The thought would naturally take strong possession of their minds under the persecutions of Manasseh, during which some of them are supposed to have sought refuge in Egypt. The alleged discovery of a copy of the law in the temple by the High Priest Hilkiah in the reign of Josiah, the effect of reading it on the mind of the young king, and the unanimous recognition of its divine authority by the party connected with the temple—correspond with the tendencies to which we have adverted, and render it highly probable, that we have here the earliest indication of the reduction of the Mosaic traditions and precepts to a form approaching that in which we now possess them. In the four first books of the Pentateuch

the original documents appear to be generally left in their primitive state, cemented merely by an interpolation of more recent matter. Deuteronomy, on the other hand, seems to embrace with a continuous mental effort a comprehensive retrospect of the ministry of Moses, in a style rather rhetorical and didactic than historical, and stands therefore in the same relation to the earlier books, as the gospel of John to those of the other evangelists. This is not the place for examining at any length the various points of a question of criticism. For a lucid summary of them we must refer our readers to the ninth chapter of the present work. Let it, however, be remarked, that the conclusion at which the author arrives, is now very generally adopted with some modification by learned men of different countries who have dispassionately investigated the subject. Ewald (*Gesch. d. Volk. Isr.* iii. pp. 381-87) thinks that Deuteronomy was written by an exile in Egypt during the reign of Manasseh.—We may assume, then, in accordance with these views, that the Mosaic law began to assume a written form and consistency about the middle of the seventh century before Christ, or between eight and nine hundred years after the date usually assigned to Moses. Our author states one fact, (p. 336,) the evidence of which lies open to every inquirer, and which, to any one who perceives its bearing, must fix the limit beyond which the origin of the Pentateuch in its actual form cannot be pushed back into antiquity—and that is, that its prophetic intimations show an exact acquaintance with events which occurred *before* the reign of Josiah, but cannot be interpreted with certainty of any that took place *after* it.\*

\* One of the first, we believe, who endeavoured by reasoning to connect the discovery of the book of the law by Hilkiah with the origin of the Pentateuch, was Volney in his '*Recherches Nouvelles sur L'Histoire Ancienne.*' We speak from memory, as it is many years since we saw the book.—We have not yet been able to read, with the close attention which it merits, the long note on the Old Testament which Mr. Norton has appended to the second volume of his work on the Genuineness of the Gospels. There are some reasonings in it which we do not think sound; but he unhesitatingly adopts the conclusion, that the Pentateuch is of comparatively recent origin; and the accession of so learned, accurate and cautious a writer must be allowed to add great weight to this side of the question. We perceive, that he thinks the Pentateuch, as we have it, must be subsequent to the Captivity; and without denying the force of some arguments which plead for an earlier origin, we confess that the principal phenomena of the case seem best reconcilable with this supposition. But works of this description grew in ancient times;



With the existence of a written law, the priesthood acquired a vast increase of power; and under its influence that state of things commenced which, modified by the accession of fresh elements during the captivity, led to the new phasis of Judaism, with the cessation of prophecy, and the substitution of a learned Rabbiniism in its place. This interval down to the birth of Christ, less interesting and attractive in every sense, is still of immense importance for the right understanding of Christianity. Now arose that system of artificial theology, derived partly from Babylonian and partly from Greek sources, with its subtle interpretations of Scripture and its more distinct shaping out of the Messianic age and a future world of retribution—which tempering in no small degree the whole popular belief of Judaism in the age of Christ, lies as a deep and hidden substratum of thought beneath the reasonings of the instructed and argumentative Paul. Our imperfect knowledge of this rabbinical theology has led to a thousand fruitless controversies among Christian divines, who generally ignore the connecting links between the simple monotheism of the old Hebrew Prophets and the fresh outburst of a religious life in Christ. We are not acquainted with any satisfactory work on this subject in English, though there are many materials for it in the results of the laborious researches of our German neighbours.—We wish the author whose labours we have now been reviewing, with his extensive knowledge, his acuteness, and his love of truth, would throw his mind into this new

and we must distinguish between the completed form of a work, and its incipient state.—Dr. Geddes has noticed the non-observance of the precept Exod. xxxiv. 23, that all males should appear three times in the year before the Lord, and expresses his surprise, that from the time of Joshua in Gilgal to that of Josiah towards the very close of the Monarchy, not a single instance should be recorded of even the Passover being kept.—Critical Remarks *in loc.*—The old argument for the antiquity of the Pentateuch was its adoption by the Samaritans. But too much stress has been laid on it. They accepted the Pentateuch and Joshua, from their reverence for Moses and his immediate successor, and because the matter contained in those books, related equally and impartially to Judah and Israel. Tribes to this day in the East, notwithstanding strong religious differences, cherish with common veneration the memory of Abraham. The other books of the Old Testament—the prophets and the histories—are decidedly *Jewish*, and express a feeling often hostile to Israel; and were therefore naturally rejected. The Pentateuch moreover was the only book that bore the character of a Sacred Law emanating from a common ancestor. For a similar reason the old alphabet was retained. The Chaldaic was a *Jewish* innovation.

field of inquiry, and give us, as a sequel to his 'History of the Hebrew Monarchy,' a history of the Jewish State, in its moral and spiritual as well as in its political relations, as it existed successively under Persian, Greek, and Roman influence.

In the preceding remarks we have expressed a general concurrence in the conclusions of the author, interweaving as we went along, such observations as occurred to us, confirmatory of his views. We shall not essentially differ from him, in venturing, on one or two points, to offer a few additional remarks of our own. He has left the origin and primitive condition of the Levites undetermined (p. 17). We do not undertake ourselves to furnish a satisfactory theory: but we will simply state how it appears to us, that the different facts of the case may be most naturally combined.

At the outset, let us notice a singular fact.—In the earliest description of the twelve tribes, forming the subject of Jacob's death-bed address, Simeon and Levi are spoken of together in terms of strong execration; and it is foretold of both, that they shall be divided in Jacob and scattered in Israel (Gen. xlix. 5—7). The subsequent history is in accordance with this primeval malediction. Neither tribe had any share in the territorial partition of the land of Canaan. Simeon, indeed, had a lot assigned, of which he was unable to obtain possession; and his name soon vanishes from the history altogether.\* In a farewell song of a similar description, put into the mouth of Moses (Deut. xxxiii.), which clearly embodies the idea of a later age—all mention of Simeon is omitted; but we find Levi already exalted to great eminence, and distinguished by peculiar blessings, as separated from the rest of his brethren and consecrated to Jehovah. At the time, then, of the composition of Deuteronomy, which was probably in the latter years of the monarchy, the Levites were regarded as a sacred class, and their origin as such, referred to the commencement of the national existence.

Our author (p. 31) regards the priests and the prophets as constituting from the first two distinct classes of men. We see no clear evidence of this. On the contrary, all

\* A tradition is preserved 1 Chron. iv. 41—43, that the Simeonites emigrated under their Chiefs into the southern wilderness, where they massacred the remnant of the Amalekites and took possession of their lands.

the facts of the early history seem rather to show, that the two characters were originally confounded, and, growing out of a common root of religious feeling in the heart of the nation, were only gradually discriminated and opposed by influences that sprung up with the course of events.—The earliest ministers of religion among the Hebrews, when their religion under higher guidance was slowly emerging from the grossness of primitive fetichism, appear to have resembled the *Schamans*, or free unincorporated priests of other rude nations. When the twilight of history first dawns on the nation in the time of the Judges, we find them in a state of transition to something like fixity and organization in their religious usages and institutions. In the centre of the several tribes, there were local sanctuaries or 'high places' where the worship of the neighbourhood was offered, under the conduct usually of a stationary priesthood. These in all probability had been sanctuaries to the earlier occupants of the country; for the religious feelings of mankind quickly attach themselves to spots already encircled by religious associations, and these 'high places' had gathered round them many venerable traditions, and were the subject of myths and legends that had settled on them from time immemorial.\* But although there was in this way an approach to a ceremonial service at certain fixed spots, administered by a resident ministry—circumstances which enter undoubtedly into the nature of a proper priesthood—there does not seem as yet to have been any strict line of separation between the unfixed wandering ministers of religion, and those who were stationed at a particular locality. Such differences were mere *accidents* in the condition of one and the same class. For any thing that appears from the History, they might, at this early stage, have passed from one state to the other and back again, without renouncing their character, or materially changing their functions.—Their offices and influence were of the same kind. They represented and expressed, with many superstitious adhesions, the awakening spiritualism and intelligence of the nation.—Whatever there was of

\* In the same way the earliest Christian Missionaries of Western Europe usually planted their Churches and Convents on the seats of the old superstition.

superior knowledge or incipient science belonged to them. Religion in their hands was the organizing principle of society. Civilisation went forth with them from the sanctuary. — They performed sacrifices; they offered up prayers; they chanted hymns; they delivered oracles; they were consulted in difficulties; they prescribed remedies for disease; they administered justice. If we attend to the context where the names of 'high places' occur—Ramah, Mizpeh, Gilgal, Beersheba, Bethel, &c.—we shall find them all connected with the various functions of an incipient *religious* ministry. We need not remark, that every high exercise of thought, every manifestation of extraordinary knowledge and wisdom, was ascribed in ancient times to the inspiration of God. When knowledge was reduced to an art, or assumed a scientific form, then the belief in its inspiration ceased:—the free outpouring of religious feeling subsided within the limits of hereditary usage and prescribed routine; the earlier prophet gradually became a priest, and the spontaneous prayer and unpremeditated hymn were transformed into the fixed liturgy.

There were however some elements in the old religious character, that repelled the tendencies to sacerdotal fixation, and moved about in a free and volatile state among the consolidated results of a settled priesthood.—These free elements subsisted in various forms and with corresponding degrees of worth and dignity, from the mere soothsayer or seer, resorted to by the vulgar for the satisfaction of their superstitious curiosity, to the rapt and elevated sage who beheld the world in a higher spiritual light, and denounced the faithlessness and crime which thwarted its divine end.—Happily for posterity they took their most exalted form and exercised their strongest influence in connexion with a pure and true religion, under the Israelitish monarchy.—But the attachment of oracles to particular temples among the Greeks, and the perpetuation of Urim and Thummim in the person of the Jewish high-priest, are evidence to a late period of the original affinity between the priestly and the prophetic character.\* — As these spiritual endowments which commanded the reverence of early times, were not

\* The remark of the Evangelist (John xi. 51) shows, that in his mind there was still a belief in some connexion between the spirit of prophecy and the office of high-priest.

confined to one sex, we meet, as might be expected, with accounts of prophetesses and priestesses.—Deborah delivering her oracles beneath the palm-tree and Huldah resorted to in the college at Jerusalem, were personages of the same character and influence, as Veleda immured in her lofty tower, who was consulted in their difficulties by the ancient Germans, and might be said in Scripture phrase “to judge” the tribes that dwelt on the Rhine.

That the separation which finally took place between the prophetic and the sacerdotal character, had not begun as soon as the time of Samuel, we think is clear from recorded facts.—From early childhood he ministered in the sanctuary at Shiloh, ‘girded with a linen ephod.’—Consulted like an ordinary seer about the lost asses of Saul, and exercising at appointed times and places the duties of civil magistracy, he nevertheless combined with these offices functions properly sacerdotal, and so conferred on them a sacred character. He assembled the people to a great feast at Mizpeh, and having offered burnt-offerings and put up prayers, he inspired them with a religious enthusiasm which resulted in the defeat and expulsion of the Philistines. He presided at the sacrifice in the high place (1 Sam. ix. 12, 13), to bless the sacrifice, for without his blessing, the people would not partake of the feast.\* It can hardly be doubted, that among the causes of his displeasure with Saul, was his presuming to erect an altar and ask counsel of Jehovah, without the sanction or interposition of the man of God.—He resided at ‘a high place’—Ramah. The places where he administered justice—Bethel, Gilgal, Mizpeh—were the seats of sanctuaries.—The schools of the prophets, which he is supposed to have instituted, are also mentioned in connexion with a ‘high place’ (1 Sam. x. 5). His sons held courts in his name at Beersheba, which was undoubtedly a sacred town.† Seer, Prophet, Man of God, were different names for one and the same character, many of whose functions were ceremonial and afterwards attached exclusively to the proper priest. Nevertheless down to a comparatively late period, more probably that was purely ceremonial formed a part of the occasional duty of a prophet, than we are accustomed to admit.—When the Shunamite proposed (2 Kings iv. 23) to go and visit Elisha, her husband inquired with surprise:

\* See also 1 Sam. xvi. 5.

† 1 Kings xix. 3. Amos v. 5.

'Wherefore wilt thou go to him to day? it is neither *new moon* nor *Sabbath*.'

It is no impeachment of the general purity and uprightness of Samuel's character, to suppose that he wished to keep the government of society in the hands of a religious class.—He might very sincerely believe, that only in the hands of such a class could the interests of civilization and morality be safe.—We cannot read his history without perceiving that the Hebrews had now arrived at that stage of national development, in which some collision between the spiritual and material forces of Society becomes inevitable.—Under Samuel the elements of a theocratic constitution were already in process of formation; and had not this tendency been broken up by events which he could not control, and had his sons maintained the high character of their father, it seems to us not improbable, that a sacerdotal form of government might have become hereditary in his family. It may be asked, if this be the true interpretation of Samuel's character and position, why it is not more distinctly expressed by the authors of the history, who are never backward to discover their regard for sacerdotal claims in connexion with the religion of Jehovah.—We can only account for it by their perceiving the evident contrariety of some actions imputed to Samuel, with the stricter and more definite notion which they had acquired in later times of the character of a priest: and it may be remarked, that in the more sacerdotal narrative of Chronicles, the administration of Samuel is passed over without notice.

We suppose the proper priestly character at this period, not *formed* but *forming*.—Individual ministers of religion still owed their influence rather to personal qualities than to the reverence entertained for their class; and up to this time they probably stood in the same relation to the military chieftains of their age, as Calchas in the Iliad to Agamemnon.—Samuel's authority arose from the commanding force and superiority of his mind.—Under him the religion of Jah or Jehovah, associated with the venerable name of Moses,\* struck a deeper root and acquired

\* In Exodus (vi. 3) the introduction of this *national* designation of the deity is specially referred to the time of Moses.—The Almighty appeared to the patriarchs by the general name *God* (אלהים), but by the name *Jehovah* he was not known to them.

new strength in the Hebrew mind.—With the true insight of a prophet, Samuel discerned the higher spiritual tendencies of this religion, and disengaging it from the confused mass of Semitic beliefs, put forth all the energy of his character to give it exclusive ascendancy among his countrymen. In confirmation of this view, we may adduce the remark of Ewald, that, whereas in the older names from the patriarchal times—such as *Penue!*, *Israel*—we observe predominant the element *Al* or *El* (God) common to the Hebrews with the surrounding nations — after Samuel we find this element more frequently superseded by some form of *Jah*, as *Jehoshaphat*, *Jeremiah*.—The author of the Hebrew Monarchy (p. 52) has noticed the occurrence of *Jah* in the name of Saul's eldest son, *Jonathan*, and of *Baal*, clearly indicating heathen influence, in that of his youngest, *Eshbaal*.\* The fact is significant.—While Saul acted in harmony with Samuel, he shared his devotion to the religion of Jehovah: when they were alienated by the conflict between the royal or military, and the religious, powers, Saul may be supposed to have thrown himself for support on an ancient and popular superstition, as a counterpoise to the theocratic authority which Samuel was organising in the name of Jehovah.

With the distinct and especially the exclusive recognition of a particular object of worship, an *esprit de corps* inevitably springs up among the ministers of religion.—In ancient times, when religion was the actuating principle of society and its influence proportionally strong, such associations, surrounded by rival or adverse faiths, constituted very close fraternities, that submitted themselves to a common discipline, observed the same rites, and placed at their head some mythic name from which they deduced their imaginary lineage, though they might, in fact, be

\* We need hardly remind our readers, that most nations have discovered a strong propensity to insert in their proper names, some reference to the objects of habitual faith and worship,—at first probably from the superstitious feeling, that this divine element would operate with talismanic virtue to protect the individual life so designated, from evil.—Classical antiquity abounds with examples.—The names of favourite saints so frequently borne by Roman Catholics, and the predilection for names either taken from Scripture, or framed to express some prominent relation of the spiritual life, so common among the ancient Donatists and the Huguenots and Puritans of more recent times, bear witness to the existence of the same deep feeling among Christian nations.



gathered out of different families. Analogy would suggest, that the Levitical order must have had a similar origin. The earliest notices indicate them to us, as connected officially with Jehovah-worship and the few simple institutions that bore the name of Moses—their order tending towards hereditary perpetuation, though renewed occasionally by the co-optation of suitable individuals from the community at large, and traced back genealogically in the popular tradition to the one patriarchal name, to which no territorial inheritance had been assigned. Samuel would naturally avail himself of such a body to work out his theocratic designs. In the schools of the prophets, which date their origin from him, and were devoted to the celebration of Jehovah with music and song, we probably witness one of the earliest positive results of the tendency to incorporation among the Levites. We read of a company or chorus of prophets coming down from the 'high place' (1 Sam. x. 5); and later in the history, of the 'Sons of the Prophets that were at Bethel' (2 Kings ii. 3). To these 'high places' or sanctuaries, we may imagine that a society of religious persons was generally attached, who with oracle and sacred song and occasional sacrifices, kept up the reverence and worship of Jehovah. In the influence of such institutions on Hebrew language and literature, we are reminded of the poetical *γῆνῃ* or guilds of the ancient Greeks, like the Homeridae—described by Otfried Müller,\* as 'a society of persons, who followed the same art and therefore worshipped the same Gods, and placed at their head a hero from whom they derived their name.'† In their religious relations they rather resembled the composers of hymns, associated with the worship of different Greek divinities, or more nearly still the families of Seers, connected with the worship of Apollo, like the Jamidae of Olympia or the Branchidae of Miletus, in whom the spirit of divination was hereditary. Gesenius has compared the expression 'Sons of the Pro-

\* History of Greek Literature, ch. v. §. 1.

† We read in like manner of *guilds* or *fraternities* distinguished by some mythic patronymic—*Dædalidae*, &c.—in the early history of the formative arts of Greece. See K. O. Müller, *Archæologie der Kunst*, p. 49. In general we may remark, that the tendency to incorporation appears to have always operated extensively in the early stages of social progress.

phets' with the 'filii Magorum' of the old Persian religion: in both cases it denoted a religious corporation.

Should it excite surprise, that these prophetic institutions are not more distinctly connected in the history with the Levitical order—let it not be forgotten, that the compilers of the history were only acquainted with that order in its subsequent state of development at Jerusalem, when the prophetic and the sacerdotal characters were already strongly discriminated,—and that therefore they could hardly have recognised its identity at an earlier period.—Had it not been for an incidental notice here and there, wrought into the very texture of some old tradition, it is probable, that the name Levite might never have been preserved at all in the early history.—Ewald contends that Samuel himself was a Levite, and that the men who consecrated Eleazar a priest at Kirjathjearim, must also have belonged to the same class.\*—It may also be objected, that the man Micah, of whom we have the curious account (Judges xvii.), built himself a sanctuary and made an ephod, and consecrated one of his sons a priest; circumstances, which seem obviously to imply the non-existence of any religious order. But the necessities of religious feeling break through all conventional forms. In extreme cases, Roman Catholics admit the efficacy of lay baptism. We find in the sequel of the story, that Micah rejoiced, when he could obtain a Levite for his priest, and promised himself a divine blessing from having him in his household.†

David, as we have seen, allied himself with the religious class, whether we call it prophetic or priestly, and was a zealous Jehovist. Under him Jerusalem became the chief seat of Jehovah-worship, and the Levites, stationed there, acquired an organisation and an influence, which soon threw their less favoured brethren, who still lingered at the 'high places,' into shade. In time, they monopolised the title of Levites, and were exclusively devoted to sacerdotal

\* *Gesch. d. Volk. Isr.* ii. p. 429 and 433, with the note. He admits the absence of direct testimony. His inference must be drawn from the general analogy of the history.

† Some ceremonies seem to have been used on the appointment of an officiating priest. Micah consecrated his son; and afterwards consecrated the Levite. These ceremonies marked perhaps a transition from the *general* sacred character to the exercise of *special* functions; and they who had engaged, and were to benefit by, these functions, would naturally take some part in the ceremonies.

routine. But at first sacred song was cultivated by them to high perfection in the holy city. Priesthood and prophecy still flourished amicably side by side. Our author himself remarks (p. 133); 'in the Sacerdotal and Levitical system of Jerusalem we see the nidus, in which the germs of prophetic genius were fostered, expanded and preserved.'—The Levitical class, from whom the earliest divine hymns had proceeded, and who had impressed on these productions a traditional type of form and style, became at length after they were settled in the temple and engaged in the routine of daily service—simply the chanters and transcribers of the poetry of an older day, and sank by degrees into the rigid formalism of the sacerdotal character: while the free prophetic element, which happily still survived, resisted the crystallising tendencies of the priesthood and worked with all the energy of a living spirit in the oracles of Micah and Isaiah. Discord at last broke out between the prophet and the priest: but not till the acquisition of a Scripture, did the sacerdotal power prevail. Then a dry and verbal scholasticism seized the whole Jewish mind. Theology and jurisprudence entered into strange alliance. The source of old poetic productiveness dried up; and the last expiring gleams of prophetic inspiration went out.

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In speaking of the oppressions of the rich and powerful, and the miseries of the inferior classes, in the last stages of the national existence of the Hebrews, we do not remember that our author has noticed a social phenomenon, precisely analogous to the *latifundia* of the Romans, which is plainly indicated by Isaiah (v. 8.) in the words: 'Woe unto them that join house to house, that lay field to field—that they may be placed alone in the midst of the earth!' We recal Livy's allusion to extensive tracts of Italy, once thickly peopled with industrious inhabitants, but in his own day redeemed from solitude only by gangs of predial slaves.\* In both cases, exhausting

\* Hist. vi. 12.—Lucan's description may be compared (Pharsalia. i. 167-70).

—'tunc longos jungere fines  
Agrorum, et quondam duro sulcata Camilli  
Vomere, et antiquos Curiorum passa ligones  
Longa sub ignotis extendere rura colonis.'

wars and consuming taxation were the cause, and the complete extermination of an ancient race of small free proprietors, the result. A few great men, enriched with the spoils of warfare or a monopoly of commerce, bought up the lands of the ruined cultivator. The enforcement of a year of Jubilee and the strong prohibition of usury in the Pentateuch, may have had reference to this state of things in the last years of the monarchy, and aimed at preventing its recurrence.

We would suggest whether the author has laid sufficient stress on the ancient rivalry between the two leading tribes of Ephraim and Judah, in his exposition of the vicissitudes of the Israelitish state. We have sometimes thought we could trace its influence, working with other causes, in the final dismemberment of David's kingdom—possibly even in the still later feud between the Samaritans and the Jews.

The general plan and execution of this *History of the Hebrew Monarchy*, would in our opinion have been improved, if the author had prefixed to it a somewhat fuller and more exact account of his sources, and of the mode in which they must be used, than is contained in the passing and cursory notice of the preface (p. v.).—The preliminary disquisitions of Ewald's recent *History of the Israelitish People* furnish an example of what we mean. As it is, criticism and history are too constantly intermixed in the course of the work. English readers unacquainted with the results of continental research, will not always very clearly perceive, on what principle the narrative is constructed—why some things are rejected and others retained—and be disposed in some cases to regard the actual conclusions of the author, however just, as fanciful and arbitrary. The legendary and traditional character of a large portion of ancient history, even where some public records already existed, and the tentative processes devised by modern criticism for extracting from such sources results of historic truth—are very imperfectly understood in this country. An attempt to rectify prevalent misconceptions on the subject, would have been a service to the public intelligence, which no one could have better rendered than the enlightened author of the work before us.

Of a book so rich with instruction and so full of thought

as this, we will not stay to specify minutely a few blemishes of expression and an occasional hastiness of statement, to which a strict and fastidious criticism might possibly object.\* The style is clear, vigorous and lively, flowing freely and naturally from the full impulse of an ever-active intellect; deficient perhaps in the power of picturesque effect and a certain glow of imaginative colouring; and therefore better adapted to disquisition than to narrative.

On one important subject we must briefly notice the author's ideas. He regards the Hebrew prophets—if we rightly understand him—as the exponents and assertors of the great general principles of religious wisdom, flowing from the inspirations of a pure monotheism, which have their unfailling fulfilment in the uniform workings of divine providence and the human heart through all ages and among all nations—but as limited in their own view of the specific application of those principles, to the immediate circumstances of their time and country—in other words, as not *foreseeing* the *particular* events and *individual* personages of a distant futurity. He believes, that is to say, in the *moral* and *spiritual*, but not in the *historical*, completion of prophecy. The divine spirit put a great universal truth into the prophet's soul; and while it penetrated to his inner consciousness, and gave a religious hue to his whole conception of the world, his human understanding grasped it according to the extent of its capacity, and by such light as it directly yielded, applied it earnestly and faithfully to the men and things that were about him. As this view, which we hold to be just, differs much from the ordinary one, we are glad to fortify it by an extract from a living author, who combines in a very remarkable degree, freedom of thought and immense learning with great depth and tenderness of Christian feeling—the pious and orthodox Neander of Berlin. Speaking, in his life of St. Bernard, of the Abbess Hildegard, a contemporary of that Saint's, he thus notices corresponding manifestations of the

\* The figure in the passage about Nathan (p. 112) is painfully harsh. The opening words of ch. vii. hardly sound to our ears like English. In p. 229, the assassination of Joash is with great probability ascribed to sacerdotal vengeance. But this is only an inference. Our author seems too broadly to assume it as a fact. In the note p. 200, the transactions between Hazael and Elisha are too summarily disposed of. We miss an ampler criticism of the sources. The English reader is disposed to ask, why the whole tale is treated as apocryphal.

prophetic spirit in different periods of the world's history, and traces them to a common source in the laws of the spiritual world.—‘An interior feeling of the affinity of the human spirit with the Deity, and an earnest aspiration after moral and religious ends, marked all the effusions of Hildegard. She fearlessly rebuked even in the highest quarters the vices of the clergy; and while she thus drew on herself the hatred of a portion of that body, she exhorted all men to the duties of an active piety. From lamentations over the corruptions of the Church, prophecies naturally sprang forth. The idea of a continuous, ever-thickening conflict between good and evil, with a glorious victory at last on the side of good, consequent on the highest growth of evil—pervades the whole history of mankind. Among the Jews, under the special leadings of Providence, it acquired its most vivid influence as a national idea. From Judaism it passed into Christianity, and was by that religion diffused in its highest significance of universal application among the human race. But the idea has a deep foundation in the very essence of the human spirit. From that inner root all great prophecies have their issue. In the case of Hildegard, the sight of waxing corruption in the Church caused the expectation of the near approach of a still hotter strife between good and evil, of a purification thence arising in the Church, and of a final catastrophe in the triumph of good and the annihilation of evil. Vivid images come at length before the soul as actual sights and visions; and so prophecies arise, which may be looked upon as the announcements of a coming genius, and which therefore recur with increasing vividness, till the great day of manifestation breaks. A great truth lies at the bottom of these views. Error results solely from the application of such images in detail, from the attempt to determine them within the limits of a particular time. In the language of Platonism we might say, it is not the *Noûc*, receptive of *ideas* and soaring above all the limitations of time, that errs—but the *ψυχή* with whose aspect of things these higher ideas intermingle.\*—The application of this general view to the oracles of the Hebrew prophets, every one who has read them with attention, and in an unbiassed spirit, will at once perceive.

\* Der Heilige Bernhard, pp. 213, 14.

There are doctrines advanced in the History of the Hebrew Monarchy, and in the foregoing review of it—which will appear, we cannot but apprehend, to some excellent persons whose sympathy we value and would not lightly discard—startling and even presumptuous, wanting, according to their conception of the subject, in a due spirit of religious caution and reverence. But the true bearing of these obnoxious views cannot be fairly judged, except in connexion with the whole theory of religion of which they form a part : and in that connexion they approve themselves to us as deeply religious, far more so indeed than any other views. In the popular theory, the direct working and manifestation of the Divine Spirit are limited to one particular series of human development. With us, on the contrary, all history, like all nature, is *full of God* ; and all the highest forms of human wisdom and virtue, with that mysterious access of spiritual power which breaks at times into the affairs of men and produces such wonderful effects—are to us inexplicable, except on the supposition of some intimate communion between the human and the divine mind, and without a clear recognition of the essential affinity and mutual sympathy of all spiritual natures. These manifestations of a higher influence are mixed indeed in their actual results, from the unavoidable constitution of things, with much error and collateral evil ; but preponderant good is continually evolved out of the enduring strife. And if, in one important particular, we claim for the prophets of Israel an exemption from blindness and corruptions, which darkened the fairest forms of heathen civilisation, and joyfully own in this a provision of the Sovereign Intelligence, fraught with incalculable results of good to the latest generations of mankind,—yet in other respects we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that the growth and unfolding of the Hebrew mind, as recorded in its history and literature, was limited by the invincible conditions of our ordinary humanity, and that ferocity, intolerance and superstition have had their share of influence in the most decided, and ultimately the most beneficent, developments of a sublime Monotheism. In this wider view, if we give up on one hand, we gain on the other. We plant the interests of religion on the broad ground of universal history, and identify them with the unchanging laws of thought



and moral sentiment. We abate the exorbitant demands of the Biblical zealot, but render powerless, by the same course, the irritating shafts of the narrow-minded infidel. The whole Past is one continuous lesson—the expression under endless forms of one great fundamental idea which the prophet's insight discerns, and according to his place and function in the world's history, variously applies. Our present amount of spiritual wealth comes not from a single fountain, but has flowed down to us through divers channels. To the wise and eloquent words with which the author of the 'Hebrew Monarchy' concludes his work, we yield our full assent of mind and heart.

"If Greece was born to teach art and philosophy, and Rome to diffuse the processes of law and government, surely Judea has been the well-spring of religious wisdom to a world besotted by frivolous or impure fancies. To these three nations it has been given to cultivate and develop principles characteristic of themselves; to the Greeks, Beauty and Science; to the Romans, Jurisprudence and Municipal Rule; but to the Jews, the Holiness of God and his Sympathy with his chosen servants. That this was the true calling of the nation, the prophets were inwardly conscious at an early period. They discerned that Jerusalem was as a centre of bright light to a dark world; and while groaning over the monstrous fictions which imposed on the nations under the name of religion, they announced that out of Zion should go forth the Law and the word of Jehovah. When they did not see, yet they believed, that the proud and spiteful heathen should at length gladly learn of their wisdom, and rejoice to honour them. In this faith the younger Isaiah closed his magnificent strains, addressing Jerusalem:—

'Behold, darkness covereth the earth,  
And thick mist the peoples;  
But Jehovah riseth upon thee,  
And his glory shall be seen on thee:  
And the Gentiles shall come to thy light,  
And Kings to the brightness of thy rising.' "

ART. II.—RECENT GERMAN POETS. FREILIGRATH AND HERWEGH.

*Gedichte von Ferdinand Freiligrath.*

*Ein Glaubensbekenntniss. Zeitgedichte von Ferdinand Freiligrath.*

*Ca Ira! Sechs Gedichte von Ferdinand Freiligrath.*

*Gedichte aus dem Englischen von Freiligrath.*

*Gedichte eines Lebendigen. George Herwegh.*

To the thoughtful mind there can hardly be presented a spectacle of graver interest than the present aspect of the Prussian monarchy, where we see, on the one side, a noble and reflective people, bent upon the extension of their political rights, and on the other an absolute government, grudgingly acknowledging the popular claims, and hesitating to fulfil the solemn pledges given to the nation at the time of the great national struggle in 1813. In a country so enlightened as Prussia, and where consequently the force of public opinion must eventually prevail, we can entertain no doubt as to the ultimate issue of the conflict; meanwhile the great danger to be apprehended is, that the people, exasperated by the unmerited jealousy of their rulers, which, penetrating into the innermost recesses of society, persecutes those who are even suspected of liberal sentiments, should finally lose their patience and plunge the country into the horrors of revolution. Under these circumstances it is the duty of those to whom is entrusted the sacred privilege of influencing the popular mind, to aim at the formation of a lofty tone of national feeling,—at the generation of that spirit, which, while insisting with unconquerable stedfastness upon the establishment of the right, will not suffer itself to be betrayed into the commission of the wrong;—a spirit, which if once universal no government could resist; for rulers would cease to offer bribes to servile compliance, where none could be found base enough to accept them. With these feelings we perceive with regret the revolutionary tone which pervades many of the political poems of Ferdinand Freiligrath, a

man of undoubted genius, and one of the most popular living poets of Germany. To us the term revolutionary poem seems an anomaly: spiritual not physical force is the heaven-sanctioned agency for the regeneration of mankind; and when the poet, who is its appointed minister, descends from the lofty sphere of moral influence to the turbulent arena of political warfare, he appears to us to forget his true vocation, and to resign his peculiar position as the guide and prophet of the age.

Much however as we regret the tone of many of these poems, we cannot withhold our admiration from the man, who, at great personal sacrifice, and in obedience to what he believes to be a sacred call, has come zealously forward as the champion of the popular cause, and who is now suffering expatriation as the penalty of his bold defiance of the ruling powers. His poems too, many of which are of a high order, possess an interest quite independent of their literary merit. The songs which are taken to a nation's heart are the surest indication of national feeling: hence the productions of our exiled poet, which have been received with unexampled enthusiasm by a portion of his countrymen, especially in the Rhenish provinces, become invested with a peculiar interest as the expression of the national mind. Happy will it be for all parties, if the popular feeling which is thus forcibly expressed, reach the ear of the rulers, and induce them, ere too late, to accede to the just demands of their subjects.

We shall lay before our readers a few specimens of the political poems of Freiligrath, before proceeding to give a more detailed notice of the earlier, and, as it appears to us, the happier productions of his genius. The two following poems are selected from a volume, entitled, "*A Confession of Faith*," the publication of which was the immediate cause of his banishment. Our first specimen is interesting as being the poem which brought him into collision with the Cologne censor. "The second stanza," we are told, "as containing a reflection upon a power in friendly relations with Prussia, was struck out of this piece when sent for publication to the Cologne journal; and the protest on the subject which the author addressed to the supreme court at Berlin was declared unfounded." Independent of this source of interest, we value it as the poetical expression of

an important truth. Nothing more stamps the divine origin, both of Nature and Christianity, than their character of progressiveness. The tender germ bursts from the swelling seed, and passing without convulsion through each stage of gradual development, grows at length into the giant tree; and sacred truth, typified by the grain of mustard seed, planted in Palestine eighteen centuries ago, was left by its divine author to develop itself by its own indwelling power, free from the withering influence of unexpanding forms. Happy will it be for society when the arrangements of civil governments are also constructed in harmony with the great principle of progress: when forms, so soon as they cease to develop the national mind, are no longer permitted to retard its growth, but are cast aside like the sapless and withered bark; and when new institutions are suffered to spring up and to adapt themselves with plastic energy to the requirements of each succeeding age.

Still is the human tree with blossoms crown'd;  
By laws eternal is their birth controll'd;  
When pale and wither'd one bestrews the ground,  
In blooming pride another doth unfold.  
Perpetual coming and perpetual going,  
With no cessation, no unfruitful stand;  
We see them fading and we see them blowing,  
And every blossom is a state, a land!

Even we ourselves, on unworn feet who wander,  
Have seen full many a rifled blossom fade;  
The Polish rose by Russia's vulture yonder  
All torn and trampled in the dust was laid.  
And ruthless fate the leaves of Spain among,  
Holds on her stern career;—must she too sink?  
And yon foul growth, whose rotten boughs o'erhang  
The Bosphorus, fall crashing on its brink?

But near these blossoms, which Time's ruthless hand  
Is shaking rudely from the branch—we see  
New germins to the genial light expand,  
Full of exuberant sap, bright eyed and free.  
Oh what a shooting and how rich a growth!  
What vital impulse stirs in every bough!  
How many blossoms we have seen bud forth!  
How many germs are bursting even now!

And God be thank'd, within the German core,  
 There 's stirring something which must soon expand;  
 From Wartburg Luther marked it once before,  
 And Hermann hailed it from the Weser's strand.  
 An ancient impulse; upwards still aspiring,  
 For light still thirsting and for genial power,  
 Dreaming of spring-time, freedom still desiring—  
 Oh! will the bud at length become a flower?

Ay! a full chalice! If that none restrain  
 What should expand in freedom and in joy!  
 If none presume, what nature hath ordained,  
 As noisome and superfluous, to destroy!  
 If no rank mildew with untimely blight  
 Mar the young leaves, the tender germs consume!  
 If ligature and shears be cast aside!  
 Then—and then only—'t will unfold in bloom!

Oh balmy spring! thou whose soft breathing first  
 Unfolds the tender buds, breathe hither too!  
 Oh liberty, whose breath doth open burst  
 The nations' sacred germs, on ours too blow!  
 Within its deepest, stillest sanctuary  
 To glory wake her and to odorous bloom;  
 Lord God in Heaven! what a flower of glory  
 May this our Germany, 'fore all, become!

Still is the human tree with blossoms crown'd;  
 By laws eternal is their birth controll'd;  
 When pale and wither'd one bestrews the ground,  
 In blooming pride another doth unfold.  
 Perpetual coming and perpetual going,  
 With no cessation, no unfruitful stand;  
 We see them fading and we see them blowing,  
 And every blossom is a state, a land!

The following poem is of a less philosophical character.  
 It is founded upon the superstitious legend of the White  
 Lady, whose apparition is still believed in by the vulgar,  
 who regard the appearance of the phantom as the harbinger  
 of death to some member of the royal family of Prussia.

#### THE WHITE LADY.

'Tis said thro' paths of upper air  
 Once more the bodeful spirit walks,  
 Once more through many a palace home,  
 With pallid visage, nightly stalks.

In vesture white, through pictur'd walls,  
Noiseless she glides across the floors ;  
Palsied with terror stand the guards  
Who pace the stately corridors.

What may the apparition bode  
Which thus distracts the realm with fear ?  
To warn the royal house of death,  
Doth she, as is her wont, appear ?  
It may be so !—I cannot tell !  
'Tis rumour'd that a deeper woe  
Forth from her dark sepulchral vault  
To upper air impels her now !

Through halls and chambers gliding on  
Her course the phantom now arrests  
Before the silken couch, whereon  
The monarch, with his consort, rests.  
She murmurs low :—' What, still asleep ?  
Could'st thou but see my bitter woe !  
Thine eyes fast closed, thy senses seal'd—  
Still must I ever find thee so ?

Awake my son !—Hark, far and wide  
A cry, thyself hast rais'd, resounds !  
A ringing cry, it pierced my heart  
E'en through my coffin's leaden bounds !  
The people's cry it is, who claim  
Their right—their faith not yet forgot !  
Heavy indeed must be thy sleep,  
When such a cry disturbs thee not !

The dead it wakens in their graves—  
Lord God, and can the living sleep !  
To warn, to waken, to reprove,  
I cast aside death's mouldering heap !  
No rest I have and no repose—  
Awake, my son, awake at last !  
Death's solemn voice doth summon thee  
To seize on life with earnest grasp !

'Twould more become thy royal hand  
Her ample banner to unfold,  
Than to the worn brocade to cling,  
Which shrouds my coffin, damp and cold !  
Resign thy grasp, ere 'tis too late !  
For surer props look round at last !

A peasant's jerkin of to-day  
 Warms more than ermine of the past !

My castle walls at Orlamünde  
 Witnessed my crime—a direful sight !  
 Alas ! for that dark deed alone  
 Am I thus doom'd to walk the night !  
 O horror ! there I slew my child,  
 My gentle child, so full of joy !  
 Thou slayest too a laughing child,  
*Thy people's trust* thou dost destroy !

Forbear—it lifts its trembling hands !  
 Forbear—attend the voice divine,  
 Nor stain with new infanticide  
 The ancient glory of our line !  
 Believe me : dreadful is the curse !  
 It weighs like mountains on the breast !  
 It scorches like Heaven's thunderbolt !  
 Enough !—I seek once more my rest !

Then from my coffin I shall see,  
 Above me flowers and waving grass !  
 The tomb, the dark o'ershadowing vault—  
 I see through them, as they were glass !  
 O might I but behold the flowers  
 Twin'd as a chaplet round thy head !  
 Ne'er may I see them wet with blood—  
 Blood, through thine own misconduct shed !

She bows her head, she wrings her hands,  
 As with forebodings dire oppress'd,  
 Through bolted doors, through solid walls,  
 Poor ghost ! she passes to her rest,  
 In vesture white, with pallid face,  
 She glides the pictur'd forms before ;  
 Palsied with terror stand the guards  
 Who pace the lofty corridor !

The solemn warning having been neglected, we have now to contemplate Freiligrath as the determined though unwilling advocate of revolutionary measures ; the two following poems are selected from a little volume entitled *Ca Ira*, in which he assumes a position of direct hostility to the Government. In our first selection, entitled *Free Press*, we see with what reluctance he has relinquished his spiritual weapons for the rude instrumentality of



physical force. There must surely be something very unsound in the condition of a people among whom such poems can receive a hearty welcome.

FREE PRESS.

The master, with determined tone, thus to his workmen said :  
 ' To-morrow 's the decisive day, and muskets must have lead ;  
 Come then, my men, our leaden types shall aid the great decision !  
 From metal alphabets to-day, we 'll cast our ammunition !

Here are the moulds, the crucibles ! the smould'ring fires I blow,  
 And barricadoed are the doors, to keep out every foe ;  
 To work, then, ye who set and press ! attend my summons, presto !  
 Help me to publish to the world this freedom's manifesto !

He spoke, and in the crucibles the leaden types he flung.  
 Soon melted by the fiery heat, seethe pearl and diamond ;  
 Seethe colonel and corpus too ; while fractur here, antiqua there,  
 Defy the censor, and give forth their bubbles freely to the air.

Glowing and hissing in the moulds the melted masses boil ;  
 Thus through the long autumnal night the printers ply their toil.  
 The flames they blow, the coals they rake, and work without repining,  
 Until the types are cast anew in bullets round and shining.

In pouches gray, the leaden store reposes on the ground,  
 Ready, as soon as dawns the day, to be delivered round !  
 An independent bold gazette ! e'en from this ancient office,  
 There 's none been known to issue forth so daring and so fearless !

The master with a gloomy brow, doth thus his grief express :—  
 ' That it must come to this doth me and others sore distress,  
 But what resource—what means are left—what measures can we  
 try ?

As bullets only can the types achieve their liberty !

Not rude material force should rule—but thought and thought alone !  
 But thought is chained, is trampled on, is in the dungeon thrown !  
 So be it then ! in muskets now, ye types, ye must be rammed ;  
 Within this novel printing-press, together firmly stand !

Thence soar, ye winged messengers, to yonder castle fly !  
 And as ye soar, in whizzing tones, sound freedom's battle-cry !  
 Strike down the slaves, strike down the troops, and strike down also  
 those  
 Who with blind folly this free press on their own necks impose !

Then to construct a true free press return from that dread fight :  
 From heaps of ruins and of slain we'll bring you forth to light ;  
 Once more to letters well defined these leaden balls we'll cast ;—  
 Hark ! there's a knocking at the door ! I hear the trumpet's blast !  
 A shot, and now another, friends, the signal guns resound !  
 The streets are throng'd with trampling feet—hoofs ring and clarions  
     sound !  
 Here are the bullets ! Here are we, each ready with his gun !  
 Now the first volley rattles ! lo ! the revolution's come !

The doom reserved for those rulers who obstinately refuse to relax the shackles of despotism, and to allow free course to the progress of the national mind, is imaged in the destruction of the celebrated ice-palace, erected by command of the Russian Empress on the frozen waters of the Neva. The idea of the poem is borrowed, as the author informs us, from a political fable of Thomas Moore.

## THE ICE-PALACE.

## I.

Methinks ye all have doubtless heard of that strange palace built of  
     ice !  
 Upon the Neva's frozen stream uprose the wondrous edifice !  
 To gratify an empress' whim, to humour her capricious mood,  
 Of solid ice-blocks high uprear'd, complete the massive structure  
     stood.  
 Cold round the gables blew the wind, and round the shining  
     window-rows,  
 Within, the balmy breath of spring wafted the perfume of the rose !  
 Glad music cheer'd the festal scene, while gorgeous lamps their ra-  
     diance threw,  
 And, the rich coloured halls around, in mazy whirl the dancers flew !  
 Thus till within the month of March, mortals the stately structure  
     saw :  
 But—e'en in Russia comes the spring, e'en Neva's icy masses  
     thaw !  
 Soon as there breathed the first mild airs from southern climes, the  
     mighty heap  
 Together sank into itself, and headlong plung'd into the deep.  
 A joyful roar the Neva gave ! Ay, tho' with fetters bound before,  
 Tho' e'en a palace yesterday, with all its foolish pomp it bore,  
 Tho' grievous burdens it endur'd in passive silence, and allow'd  
 A haughty empress on its back to plant her foot, with bearing  
     proud.

This very Neva roar'd aloud ! Its eddying current proudly leapt,  
 'Midst snow and blocks of floating ice, chafing, the angry billows  
     swept !  
 The reliques of its shame it crushed to atoms—then uncheck'd and  
     free,  
 Roll'd on its waters great and calm, until it join'd the boundless  
     sea !

## II.

Ye who the people's sacred flood dam up from freedom's glorious  
     sea—

Soon like the Neva will it rush, with joyful clamour, great and free !  
 Shake from its neck the winter frost of tyranny, with scornful  
     strength,  
 And despotism's icy walls, which long it bore, engulph at length.

But ye with fatal arrogance, still revel in the shining thing,  
 As if the ice would never melt, nor ever come the genial spring !  
 But gradually the sun ascends, and milder breezes now are blowing,  
 The ceilings drip, and swim the floors,—oh, perilous and slippery  
     going !

But ye ! ye wish to be engulph'd ! ye stand the threatening stream  
     before,  
 Capitulating with the ice, whether it will not—freeze once more !  
 Ye fools ! the spring must come at last ; in vain with frost ye  
     treaties make.

Trust me, if once the ice has crack'd, 't will very shortly also break !

Then once again the cry will be :—The eddying current proudly  
     leapt,  
 'Midst snow and blocks of melting ice, chafing the angry billows  
     swept !  
 The reliques of its shame it crushed to atoms—then uncheck'd and  
     free,  
 Roll'd on its waters great and calm, until it joined the boundless  
     sea !

Politics are however, as Goethe truly observes, a troubled element for art, and we gladly turn from them to contemplate our poet in a higher circle of poetical activity. We shall previously institute a comparison between his genius and that of George Herwegh, another German poet, who has also rendered himself obnoxious to the Prussian government by the expression of liberal sentiments, and who, like Freiligrath, is paying the penalty of his of-

fence by expatriation. The volume entitled "*Gedichte eines Lebendigen*" contains several political poems, some of which evince considerable power; to us, however, his genius appears to have found its happiest expression in his sonnets, and we shall therefore confine our attention to this portion of his compositions.

In endeavouring to estimate the productions of these two writers, we must briefly glance at the nature of poetical genius, which may, we think, be regarded as consisting of two distinct elements; the one subjective, the other objective: under the former, we include the capacity for lofty thought and profound emotion; under the latter, that combination of faculties which leads its possessor to delight in the vivid realisation of external objects. When united they constitute the highest form of poetical genius, that wonderful power which enables the poet to arrest, and "clothe in answerable grace of outward favour," the most evanescent feeling and the subtlest thought.

To the mind which is thus endowed, nature is not a succession of lifeless pictures, but the manifestation of a living spirit, in earnest communion with whom, not without a thrill of sacred awe, the poet lingers, till his whole soul is filled with the reflection of nature, as the heaving bosom of the deep is tinged with the gorgeous hues of the setting sun. Hence, not from any direct process of discipline, but from earnest sympathy with the spirit which animates the forms of nature, his mind becomes so imbued with her splendours, that his allusions to her phenomena seem the result rather of intuition than of observation: he speaks as one admitted within the veil of nature's temple, to whom it is given to decipher the mysterious characters, emblazoned on the heavens and the earth, and to expound to our mortal ears their deep and solemn meaning. Nor is his penetrative insight limited to the volume of external nature. "The marvel of the everlasting will" lies before him, "an open scroll," and in the apparent perplexities and contrarieties of life, he discerns the operation of eternal laws. "Thus he not only," as Shelley truly observes, "beholds the present intensely as it is, but discovers the future in the present, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of latest time." Nor is he merely the expounder of nature and of life: to him it is also given

to reveal the mysteries of our complicated being. The vast compass of his mind comprehends every form of spiritual existence, and his poetical creations, being the idealised embodiment of his own consciousness, are necessarily in harmony with the laws which govern the spiritual world: hence they, whatever may be the sphere of their activity, inspire us with a conviction of their reality. Hence, too, each individual is startled to find on his page the record of his own experience, and the poet is taken to the heart of humanity, and becomes the friend and brother of the race, because he thus ministers to the love of sympathy which dwells in every human bosom.

Such is our conception of the genuine poet; true it is that such spirits rarely tabernacle among us: when they do visit this earth, however, they take their place among "the choir of ever-enduring men," and their songs, like the unceasing melodies of nature,

"Still as succeeding ages roll away,  
Make music to beguile life's toilsome way."

Though we cannot claim for either Herwegh or Freiligrath a place among these select few, we nevertheless esteem them both, as gifted with no small measure of the faculty divine. The genius of the former we should characterise as essentially subjective, while the objective element is most prominently exhibited in the productions of the latter.

In the sonnets of Herwegh we meet with many fine thoughts, strikingly illustrated by corresponding aspects in the material universe. The varied scenery of nature, however, appears to possess interest and significance for him, only when associated with some phase of human emotion, or some passage of human experience; and he rarely exhibits her less familiar phenomena. Freiligrath, on the contrary, delights in the vivid realisation of objects new and strange, and his volume of poems might be appropriately designated a picture book without pictures. He seldom rises into the regions of elevated thought, and is rarely betrayed into the expression of emotion; but he brings before us, in vivid colours, the varied wonders of this ever-wonderful world, and by infusing his own spirit into inanimate objects, presents us with many a pleasing fancy

which surprises us by its novelty, or charms us by its grace.

Herwegh appears to entertain a lofty conception of the poet's vocation : some of his finest sonnets owe their inspiration to this favourite theme.

We have taken what may appear to some an unwarrantable liberty in our translation of the following sonnet, the commencement of which runs thus :—

“ Ya, ich bekenn's, die Stimme Gottes ist  
Des Volkes Stimme ! ”

We believe we have been true to the spirit though not quite to the letter of the original.

The cause of Freedom is the cause of God ;  
And who with earnest faith upholds her reign  
Builds on the solid rock, while evil men  
Are smitten of the Lord's avenging rod.  
Hail to the bard whose eye indignant grief  
Alone suffuseth for the people's wrong !  
Who with self-pleasing aim ne'er tunes his song,  
Seeking for private woe a vain relief !  
But must he therefore tamely take his stand  
Behind th' embattled host, in hour of need  
To reach forth weapons with a menial's hand ?  
Forbid it Heaven ! Not such the poet's meed !  
A fiery pillar he should march before,  
A seer, a prophet, as in days of yore !

Poets have been aptly designated “ the unacknowledged legislators of the world,” a position which Herwegh assigns to them in the following sonnet :—

The God of Peace will bless us never more :  
Weeping, his olive branch he lays aside ;  
The fiends of war from Nile to Tagus' side  
Are raging fiercely, with a deafening roar.  
Amidst the tumult on the warrior's form  
Men fix their gaze, who doth aspire one day  
The doom of empires on his sword to weigh,  
Meeting the storm of war with answering storm.  
The bard they heed not, who while fiercely burns  
The fiery conflict, and while ceaseless flow  
Torrents of human blood, retires from sight.  
Yet he alone God's holy will discerns !  
The gifted seer is needed even now,  
Once more to read the eagle's bodeful flight.

The admirers of Shelley's genius will relish the following tribute to his memory; it appears to us a happy specimen of the difficult art of poetical portraiture.

## SHELLEY.

His God, whom still he sought with earnest strife,  
To him, when found at length, was doubly dear;  
To the Eternal was no soul more near,  
No faith more earnest or more full of life!  
For humankind still throbb'd his generous heart,  
And still with Hope he sat beside the helm,  
And those alone his burning words o'erwhelm  
Who play the tyrant's or the minion's part.  
An Elfin-spirit in a human form,  
A spark from Nature's altar, bright and clear,  
Hence for the shafts of dullness still the aim.  
Fill'd with the breath of heaven, amid the storm,  
Cursed by the bigot, to his consort dear,  
A brilliant star, he sank into the main.

The following apostrophe to Freedom appears to us to be worthy of notice.

Oh Freedom! not where sounds the ear assail  
Of lofty triumph, courtly throngs before—  
Thou dwellest, Freedom, on the lonely shore,  
Thou lov'st retirement, like the nightingale.  
Not in the marble hall dost thou appear,  
'Mong noisy revellers, with wine oppress;  
To the lone hut thou com'st a willing guest,  
Where in the empty beaker falls the tear.  
In dungeon glooms thou dwell'st, a form divine!  
The music of thy martyr's chain thou hearest,  
And smiling to his parting soul appearest;  
To thee we will erect no stately shrine,  
Nor do thee homage on our bended knee:—  
Thou wert not Freedom, did we kneel to thee!

The sanctifying influences of sorrow are strikingly exhibited in the following sonnet.

Hail, pious people of the olden time!  
Him ye alone accounted blest who grieved;  
And every structure by the lightning cleaved,  
Sacred ye held to Jove,—a thing divine!



Ye doubtless felt that Heaven, its hidden ways  
To grief alone reveals ; that truth divine  
Through the rent bosom first doth clearly shine,  
As through the riven cloud the lightning's blaze.  
Say, was it not affliction's anguish'd hour  
Unveil'd the infinite, what time the voice  
Of God first stole upon your listening ear ?  
Not the mild zephyr, but the storm hath power  
To bear us upwards ; our divinest joys,  
Like yonder stars, on night's dark ground appear.

Our concluding specimen shows that our exiled bard, like the banished duke in the forest of Arden, can solace his retirement by communion with nature, and in the absence of human society can find "books in the running brooks."

For hours I stand the running stream beside,  
When driv'n, an outcast, from the haunts of men :  
Like a sage counsellor, it teacheth then,  
Of ample knowledge and experience wide :  
It's course it painteth, when a struggling rill  
Through frowning rocks it forced its arduous way ;  
Then how 'mong burning sands it shrank away :—  
Still flowing on, it teacheth wisdom still ;  
How freely now it rolls, with ample sweep !  
Throughout its toilsome march, its devious course  
It ne'er forgets, 'I must towards the deep.'  
Wilt thou alone, my soul, with keen remorse  
Swerve from thy destin'd path ? To nature go—  
Draw wisdom from the waters as they flow !

We shall now take leave of Herwegh, many of whose sonnets we regard as poems of a high order, affording, we think, an additional ground for the poet's injunction, "scorn not the sonnet." In his hand it has not only "soothed an exile's grief," but in our judgment has occasionally become

"A trumpet, whence he blew  
Soul animating strains."

We shall now proceed to extend our readers' acquaintance with the less philosophical but more imaginative Freiligrath, who with a wave of his enchanter's wand bids

defiance to the barriers of space, and brings before our mental vision, with wonderful distinctness, the most distant regions of the globe. It must not be forgotten that the spell loses much of its potency when wielded by another hand; we hope however, even through the medium of translation, to give some idea of our author's peculiar genius; our first specimen is interesting as containing the boyish aspiration which has been so amply realized in later years.

## ICELAND-MOSS TEA.

Sixteen years—and weak and weary,  
Like grey age, I'm seated here;  
Lo! the Geyser and the dreary  
Hecla send this draught to cheer.

On the island stark and rigid,  
Stiff with ice, and lava-bound,  
And whose summits, hoar and frigid,  
Give to view the Arctic round;

Where the Boreal lights are glowing,  
Where the sulphurous caverns shoot  
Jets of flame, where founts are throwing  
Boiling spray—this moss had root.

From the mountain's central regions,  
From their smoke-enveloped peaks,—  
Like strange birds, with flaming pinions,  
Of whose birth tradition speaks,—

Right against the murky heaven  
It beheld the rocks ascend,  
And a flood of burning resin  
Downward to the plain descend.

From the summit of the Jokul  
See it stripes the snowy field,  
Like the Danbrogorden's\* symbol  
Blazoned on a giant shield.

Clouds of vapour, smoke and ashes,  
Soar aloft; the sea-cows moan;  
Far and wide the glowing masses  
Are to distant islands thrown.

\* Danbrogorden is the name of a Danish order of knighthood established by Waldemar II. 1213. Its symbol of honour is a golden cross covered with white enamel and worn in a white band with a red border.—[TRANS.]

Now the ice-sea foams and tosses  
 High its waves, the mountains shake ;  
 Flourished there these bitter mosses,  
 There their native hues they take.

That my health I may recover,  
 Life enjoy and being's use,  
 Thus in dreamy mood I offer  
 To my lips their dark green juice.

Fire amid my nerves is kindled !—  
 There the desert land doth lie !  
 Rocks, in fluid jets commingled,  
 Yawning craters hurl on high.

Bolder now I feel, and stronger  
 Bounds my pulse ; the fiery glow  
 With thy wildness, bold Berserker,\*  
 Makes my dancing blood to flow.

Northern lights and glowing lava  
 Shed their brightness o'er my brow ;  
 Let thy fabled heroes, Edda,  
 Straight appear before me now !

Should this moss, in Iceland gathered,  
 Prove a cup of life to me,—  
 Wondrous isle, may I henceforward  
 In my life resemble thee !

O within may fire be kindled !  
 Noble fire which still shall glow,  
 Radiate still, when age hath mingled  
 With my tresses reverend snow.

And as Hecla's towers appalling  
 Cast forth burning stones, which shake  
 Distant islands in their falling—  
 So may songs heroic break

From my brain with wild commotion ;  
 Glowing fervour may they dart,  
 Torch-like, over land and ocean,  
 Kindling many a distant heart.

From this rugged description of Northern desolation,  
 we turn to the following equally vivid picture of the red

\* Berserker, according to Scandinavian tradition, was a terrible warrior. He scorned defensive armour, and, contrary to the custom of his age, went unmailed into every fight. Hence his appellation Berserker, which is said to signify without mail.—[TRANS.]

glare of the African desert, which is represented as arrayed in all its fiery horrors in the poem entitled

## MIRAGE.

My restless eyes, untired, explore the port's wide reach, with  
streamers gay,  
And thine, with laughing glance, meanwhile my nodding ostrich  
plumes survey.—  
'While waves are gurgling round our skiff, I'd gladly of the desert  
hear.  
Paint me a picture of the land from whence was brought your fea-  
thery gear.'

A picture, good ! my brow I shade within the hollow of my hand ;  
The curtains of mine eyes I close !—Lo, there the desert's burning  
sand,  
The camping places of my tribe, appear ;—arrayed in lurid light,  
Rob'd in her burning widow-weeds, Sahara bursts upon my sight.

Who travell'd through the lion-land ? Of claws and hoofs the prints  
appear ;  
Tumbuctoo's caravan ! Behold, far in the distance gleams the spear ;  
There banners wave, while through the dust the Emir's purple floats  
along,  
And with a sober stateliness the camel's head o'erpeers the throng.

Where sand and sky together blend, onward in close array they sweep ;  
Now the horizon's sulphurous mist engulphs them in its lurid deep :  
The vestige broad thou still canst trace distinctly, of the flying train,  
As gleam, at intervals dispersed, their reliques o'er the sandy plain.

Look yonder ! like a milestone grim, a dromedary dead lies there ;  
Upon the prostrate bulk are perched, with naked throats, a vulture-  
pair ;

Intent upon their ghastly meal, for yon rich turban what care they,  
By some young Arab left behind in that wild journey's desperate way ?

Fragments of costly housings float the tamarisk's thorny bushes round ;  
And near, an empty water-skin lies foul and gaping on the ground ;  
Who's he who treads it 'neath his feet ? The Sheik it is with dusky  
hair,

The Sheik of Biledulgerid, who gazes round with frantic stare.

He closed the rear ; his charger fell ; behind he's left upon the sand :  
O'ercome with thirst his favourite wife doth from his girdle drooping  
hang :

How flashed her eye as she erewhile in triumph rode before her lord !  
Across the waste he trails her now, as from a baldric trails a sword.

The burning sand, swept o'er at night by the grim lion's tail alone,  
Is by the waving tresses now of yonder helpless woman strown ;  
It gathers in her tangled locks, dries on her lip the spicy dew,  
And with its sharp and cruel flints, her tender skin it pierceth through.

And now, alas, the Emir fails !—Throbs in his veins the boiling blood,  
His eye-balls glare,—in lurid lines swells on his brow the purple  
flood :

With one last kiss, one burning kiss, he wakes to life his Moorish  
bride,

Then flings himself, with frantic curse, on the red desert by her side.

But she, amazed, looks wildly round.—' My Lord, awake !—Thou  
sleepest here ?

The sky, but now like molten brass, like polished steel gleams cold  
and clear.

Where now the desert's yellow glare ? A radiance gleams mine eyes  
before,

It sparkles like the sea, whose wave at Algiers breaks along the shore.

Its grateful moisture cools my brow ;—yonder its flowing waters  
gleam ;—

A giant mirror, there it shines ;—Awake ! perchance 'tis Nilus'  
stream ;

Yet no, we travell'd South, I'm sure—The Senegal it then must be ;—  
Or are yon heaving waves indeed the billows of the surging sea ?

No matter ! It is water still ! Awake, my Lord ! oh let us hence ;  
My robe I've cast aside ; oh come, this deadly scorching fire to quench !  
A cooling draught, a quickening bath, will with new strength our  
limbs indue ;

Yon tow'ring fortress once achiev'd, to all our toils we'll bid adieu !

Its crimson banners proudly wave defiance round its portals grey ;  
Its ramparts bristled o'er with spears,—its mosques within,—I all  
survey ;

High-masted vessels in the roads securely ride, in stately rows,  
Its shop and caravanseries a crowd of pilgrims overflows.

My tongue is parch'd ! wake up, Belov'd ! Already nears the twi-  
light now !'

He lifts his eye and murmurs hoarse—' It is the desert's mocking  
show !

More cruel than the hot Simoom ! Of wicked fiends the barbarous  
play '—

He stops—the baseless vision fades—she sinks upon his lifeless clay.

In Venice' Haven thus the Moor spake of his home, the desert wild :  
The thrilling story which he told, fair Desdemona's ear beguiled ;  
She started as, with sudden shock, jarred on the quay the lofty prow,  
He, silent, to her palace led the heiress of Brabantio.

The East under all its varied aspects appears to have possessed the imagination of our poet with singular vividness. In the poem entitled *Ammonium*, we have a graceful sketch of the Oasis, whose verdure, surrounded by the yellow glare of the desert, is compared to an emerald, encircled by the topas' light: we must not linger there however, to watch the slender Arab Maids dancing beneath the waving palms, but must pass on to contemplate the desert as pourtrayed in the *Spirit Caravan*, where supernatural horrors augment the wild sublimity of the scene.

#### THE SPIRIT CARAVAN.

On the desert sand bivouac'd, silent lay our motley throng;  
My Bedouin Arabs slumber'd, the unbridled steeds among;—  
Far away the moonlight quiver'd o'er old Nilus' mountain chain,  
Dromedary-bones lay bleaching, scatter'd o'er the sandy plain.

Wide awake I lay:—my caftan's ample folds were o'er me spread,  
Cov'ring breast and feet; my saddle formed a pillow for my head;  
There I thrust my purse, together with the date-tree's fruit; and near  
I had placed my naked sabre, with my musket and my spear.

All was silent, save the rustle by the dying embers made,  
Save the wheeling of the vulture, from its distant eyrie stray'd;  
Save when an impatient charger, firmly tether'd, pawed the ground,  
Or a rider snatch'd his weapons, dreaming in his sleep profound.

Lo! the firm earth trembles! yonder, ghastly shapes are gliding by  
Through the moonlight; o'er the desert savage beasts in terror fly!  
Snorting rear the frighten'd chargers;—grasps his flag our leader  
bold,—

'Lo! the spirit caravan,' he murmurs, and lets go his hold.

Ay, they come! Before the camels see the spectral drivers glide;  
Seated on their stately saddles, unveil'd women proudly ride;  
By their side appear young maidens, bearing pitchers like Rebecca;  
Troops of phantom riders follow—on they rush with speed to  
Mecca.

Still they come!—the train is endless—who can count the number  
o'er?

See, the scatter'd bones of camels rise instinct with life once more;  
And the whirling sand, whose masses o'er the desert darkly roll'd,  
Changes into dusky drivers, who the camel-bridles hold.

This the night when all the creatures, swallow'd by the sandy  
 main ;  
 Whose storm-driven dust distress'd us, as we cross'd the burning  
 plain ;  
 And whose mould'ring skulls were trodden, 'neath our horses' hoofs  
 to day,  
 Come to life, and in procession haste at Mecca's shrine to pray.  
 More, still more ! not yet have passed us those who close the  
 ghastly train ;  
 And the first appear already, flying back with slacken'd rein ;  
 From the mountains, lying yonder, whirling with the lightning's  
 speed,  
 They have passed to Babelmandib, ere I could unloose my steed.  
 Now make ready !—loose the chargers—every rider in his seat !  
 Tremble not as the distracted herd, when they the lion meet !  
 Let the spectres' flowing garments touch you as they rustle by ;  
 Allah call !—and on their camels let the phantom riders fly !  
 Wait until the morning breezes in your turbans wave the plumes ;  
 Morning red and morning breezes will consign them to their tombs :  
 Back to dust these nightly pilgrims will return at break of day ;  
 Lo ! it glimmers, and my charger greets it with a joyous neigh.

It appears to us that our author's talent for graphic delineation occasionally betrays him into the selection of subjects unsuited to the purposes of art, the true aim of which is to elevate and spiritualize our nature. Physical suffering is a revolting object of contemplation. It becomes indeed a powerful and legitimate instrument in the artist's hand when viewed as the evidence of retributive justice, or as revealing the wonderful energy of mind triumphant over physical agony ; but where brute animals are the sole actors, suffering is necessarily devoid of all moral significance, and we turn away from its contemplation with a feeling of repugnance. Hence such poems as the *Lion's Ride* afford us no pleasure. Here the King of the desert is represented as springing upon the kneeling giraffe, who, bounding forward with a cry of anguish, bears its fell rider over the desert, till, covered with blood and sweat, it falls groaning on the ground. We admit the wonderful power of description exhibited in this poem ; the very force and minuteness of the delineation, however, render it in our judgment only the more re-



volting. The poem entitled "Under the Palm-trees" is we think open to a similar objection. Here the tiger and the leopard are represented as contending over a mangled corpse; in the fierceness of the struggle, the body, stark and rigid, is raised between the hostile powers, when suddenly a giant snake, descending from the overhanging boughs, envelops the trio in its ample folds.

In the selection and graphic treatment of such subjects Freiligrath reminds us of our own Landseer, many of whose paintings are genuine poems, abounding in touches of exquisite feeling, while from others we turn away revolted by the exhibition of some inoffensive animal writhing in the agonies of death.

In one of our author's most characteristic poems, entitled, "The Ships," he represents himself as seated upon an anchor by the side of the harbour, listening through the stillness of a May evening to the murmured voices of the figures adorning the prows of the various vessels lying at anchor, who are supposed to be amusing each other with the recital of their adventurous lives. The narratives of these strange wanderers, gathered together from the remotest regions of the habitable globe, afford ample scope for the descriptive talent of our poet; we shall however confine ourselves to one specimen, and select the story of

#### THE GLADIATOR.

The second vessel this, whereon  
O'er ocean's trackless waste I wander;  
The first, upon a coral reef,  
Long years ago was rent asunder.  
Beside her, from Archangel's port,  
Another vessel sailed, the *Lena*;  
For mine alone the rocky knife  
Was sharpen'd, of the foam-arena.  
She was allowed to hold her course,  
And in a palmy bay to anchor;  
Of mine, the metal-girded ribs  
Were open ripp'd with cruel rancour.  
The storm-blast roars among the shrouds,  
The rudder cracks, the masts are reeling;  
The wrestler struggles with the storm;  
With groans, the stubborn planks are yielding.

The bark, whilome with streamers gay,  
To pieces falls with loud commotion ;  
The image only works its way,  
Dashed from its scaffold to the ocean.

Now must the Gladiator strive  
Contending fiercely with the ocean,  
When suddenly I feel an arm  
Clasped round me with a trembling motion.

From dripping locks, an anguish'd face  
Looks forth, as pale as marble statue :—  
It is the sailor's gentle child—  
'Hold fast ! Be strong ! and thee I'll rescue.'

Together with convulsive grasp  
Her hands are lock'd ; three days I bore her ;  
Lo ! on the fourth, the land appears,  
But ah ! a corse, I now deplore her.

The breakers hurl us on the beach :—  
To greet their sister from the waters,  
Through palmy groves, o'er flowery lawns,  
Come forth the island's graceful daughters.

The sea-waves moan, the wild doves coo,  
Beneath the earth they lay her weeping ;  
An ancient bread-tree shades the spot  
Where she, the stranger maid, lies sleeping.

Safe on the shore the Lena lay,  
Her prow alone the tempest's portion :  
Behold my form adorns her now,  
And ceaseless thus I plough the ocean.

In the foregoing poem we have a remarkable instance of our author's tendency to invest inanimate objects with the attributes of humanity, a licence in which he not unfrequently indulges also in reference to the brute creation. The swallow, on its return to more northerly regions, recounts its experiences in the glowing land of the desert and the palm. The stranded Leviathan, in the agonies of death, groans forth its imprecations against man's miserable brood. The month of May is a merry rover, bearing blossoms and verdure from the palmy forests of the Indian seas, and the royal mummy reposing in the Pyramid,

awakened by the lion's roar, reverts to the time when, throned in his city with a hundred gates, the ancestors of him who thus disturbs his peace were yoked to his triumphal car. We have space for only one more example of this class of compositions, and select

THE REVENGE OF THE FLOWERS.

Pillow'd soft, the maid reclineth,  
Bathed in slumber's golden dew ;  
On her cheek the rose-bloom shineth ;  
Shrouded are her orbs of blue.

See a chalice stands beside her,  
Rainbow hued, and wrought with skill ;  
Blossoms fair and freshly gathered  
With their blooms the chalice fill.

Heavy with oppressive fulness,  
Broods the hot and perfum'd air ;  
Summer heats have scar'd the coolness ;  
Closed are all the windows there.

Quiet is the room and noiseless !  
Sudden Hark ! Soft whispers come !  
Breathing murmurs, sounding voiceless,  
From the branches and the bloom.

Fairy shapes, like winged odours,  
From the chaliced flowers exhale ;  
Crowns adorn the elfin creatures,  
Airy mist their cincture pale.

From the rose's sweet recesses  
Floats a comely maiden fair ;  
Freely wave her wanton tresses,  
Pearls, like dew-drops, glitter there.

From the dark and helmèd monk's hood,  
With his heron-plume and shield,  
Steps, in bloom of lustihood,  
A gallant knight, his sword to wield.

From the lily's snow-white chalice,  
Soars a form of virgin light ;  
Thin as gossamer the texture,  
Wreathed around the dainty sprite.

From the gourd, like eastern sultan,  
Steps a moor in gorgeous show ;  
Brightly in his dark green turban  
Gleams the crescent's golden bow.

From the crown-imperial, boldly  
Issues forth a sceptred king ;  
And his huntsman dressed in liv'ry,  
From the iris taketh wing.

From the leaves of the narcissus  
Floats a youth with sombre air,  
Who imprinteth burning kisses  
On the maiden slumb'ring there.

But around her couch the others  
Dance and whirl in mazy ring ;  
As they whirl, to her who slumbers,  
Thus their choral strain they sing.

' Maiden, maiden, thou hast torn us,  
Ruthless from our native soil,  
Prisoned in this colour'd chalice,  
Here to wither, droop, and spoil.

On our mother earth reposing,  
Oh how blissfully we slept,  
Where to kiss us, through the waving  
Branches, golden sunbeams crept :

Where our stalks so slight and slender,  
Cooling zephyrs gently swayed ;  
Where within our leafy mansion,  
Merry elves we nightly played.

Rain and pearly dew reviv'd us ;  
Here we wallow in the mire ;  
Maiden, yet before we perish,  
Thou shalt feel our vengeful ire.'

Now the choral music endeth ;  
Round the sleeper low they bow ;  
With the silence once more blendeth  
Many a whisper faint and low.

What a strange and hollow murmur !  
How the maiden's cheek doth bloom,  
As the spirits breathe upon her,  
And exhale their faint perfume !

Now the sun salutes the chamber ;  
 With his beams the shadows fly !  
 Lo ! upon the downy pillow  
 Cold, the fairest corpse doth lie !

She, herself a faded blossom,  
 Still with roseate beauty fair,  
 Sleepeth near her faded sisters—  
 Odours sweet have stifled her !

The following picture of a group of German emigrants, preparing to abandon their native country, and to seek new homes amid the solitudes of the far West, appears to us one of the most pleasing poems in the collection.

#### THE EMIGRANTS.

I cannot turn aside my gaze ;  
 Still must I mark yon pensive band ;  
 How to the mariners they reach  
 Their goods with never-wearied hand.

Strong men, who from the boat uplift  
 Their heavy baskets, stored with bread,  
 From German corn prepared, and baked  
 On hearths they never more shall tread.

Black-forest maids, of slender form,  
 With platted tresses, dark their mien ;  
 Their pitchers carefully they range  
 Upon the shallop's benches green.

In those same pitchers oft you've drawn  
 Bright waters from the village spring :  
 By far Missouri, to your hearts  
 The scenes of home full oft they 'll bring ;—

The fountain, with its moss-grown wall,  
 Where once ye filled them, stooping low ;—  
 The dear familiar hearth, the shelf  
 Where they were ranged in seemly row ;—

Soon the log cabin's walls they 'll grace,  
 In the far West ; and soon your hands  
 Shall reach them, brimming o'er, to guests  
 Of dusky mien, who roam those lands.

Thence the chace-wearied Tscherokee  
Shall drink, reposing on the ground.  
No more with songs ye 'll bear them home,  
From German vintage, verdure crown'd.

Oh, why forsake your native land ?  
The Neckar's vale has wine and corn ;  
In the black forest lowers the pine,  
And in the Spessart sounds the horn.

Mid shadowy forests how your hearts  
To your dear native land will yearn !  
How to her fields of golden maize,  
Her vine-clad hills, you 'll fondly turn !

The light of by-gone days shall haunt  
Your dreams as with a mystic spell ;  
Like to a pious legend old,  
Their mem'ry in your souls shall dwell.

The boatman nods ;—Go forth in peace !  
Man, wife, gray age, may all be bless'd !  
Still may your fields yield rice and maize,  
And joy and gladness cheer your breast.

We have reserved for our concluding specimen of Freiligrath's poems the one which is our greatest favourite. It has been remarked that "apart from all questions of inspiration, there is no grander agent than the Bible in the world. It has opened the devout and fervid East to the wonder and affection of the West." We cordially sympathise in this utterance, and feel assured that all lovers of this wonderful book will relish the following little poem, entitled

THE PICTURE BIBLE.

Hail ! playmate of my childhood,  
Thou folio, gray with age,  
Oft has a hand beloved  
Unclasped for me thy page :  
Oft have thy pictur'd treasures  
Entranc'd the dreaming boy,  
Who, lost in Eastern splendours,  
Neglected every toy.

Thou didst unbar the portals  
To me of distant climes,  
And show as in a mirror  
What sparkles there and shines :  
'Mong objects unfamiliar  
With wondering gaze I went,  
Saw camels, palms and deserts,  
The shepherd and his tent.

The heroes and the sages  
Of whom the prophets taught  
Before me by thy pages  
In living hues were brought ;  
Fair maidens with their pitchers,  
Or 'mong the golden sheaves,  
As holy writ portrays them,  
Were pictur'd on thy leaves.

The patriarchs' simple manners,  
Their life so still and calm,  
Their wanderings with their camels,  
Their rest beneath the palm ;  
How angels hover'd round them,  
As on their way they went,  
All this appeared before me,  
As o'er thy page I leant.

To me it seems as wert thou  
Spread out on yonder chair,  
And I, with eager longing,  
Beside thee kneeling there ;  
As if what once I gazed on  
With rapture and surprise,  
Appear'd in vivid colours  
Once more before mine eyes :

As if again with wonder  
I traced the forms grotesque,  
The blossoms and the branches  
In graceful arabesque,  
Which circled every picture,  
With fancies new and rich,  
Yet with symbolic meaning  
Still harmonized with each.



It seems as if my mother  
Once more I did implore  
To show me every picture,  
And tell its story o'er ;  
Who still with every picture  
Some song or text instill'd,  
While on us gazed my father,  
With quiet rapture fill'd.

O by-gone time ! Thou seemest  
To me a legend fair ;  
The picture-bible's splendour ;  
The eye which rested there  
With childlike faith ;—the loved ones  
Who guided me of yore ;  
The simple joy of childhood ;—  
Return—oh, never more !

We must not conclude our notice of Freiligrath without briefly alluding to his translations. In this department he has been a diligent and faithful labourer, having enriched the literature of Germany with many valuable contributions from the poetry of England, Italy, and France. We have had great pleasure in recognizing many of our favourites in their foreign garb, and rejoice to see the master pieces of our modern English poets rendered into a foreign language by so able and vigorous a pen.

## ART. III.—THE GREAT ATONEMENT.

*The Great Atonement.* By Henry Solly. London :  
J. Chapman, 1847.

THE established formularies of Christian doctrine, notwithstanding their irreconcilable variance with modern scientific ideas, have retained an influence which mere usage is inadequate to explain. It is impossible to state the doctrine of the Trinity without a contradiction in logic ; or that of the Atonement, without affront to the first principles of ethics : yet both have maintained themselves in this apparently untenable position, aided by some secret succours of human consciousness. They cannot, however, permanently refuse to negotiate a peace with philosophy : nor can they be reasonably assailed with the expectation of their unconditional surrender. There are certain great truths, latent but not untraceable, of which they are the imperfect symbols. To detect these truths, to provide them with a less exceptionable expression, to disengage them from the erroneous conceptions with which they have been blended in every age of Christendom, appears to be the proper aim of theology in the present day ; the continued neglect of which cannot but have the effect of compelling thoughtful and serious men to construct a religion for themselves, out of the crude materials of their own personal thought, with too little regard to the antecedents of Christian experience, and the historical sources of the Christian Church.

Writers upon the doctrine of the Atonement divide themselves into two classes, whose judgments, though ostensibly appealing to the same authority, are really governed by different standards. One takes its point of departure from the elementary principles of moral philosophy, and natural religion ; and regards as inadmissible every interpretation of Scripture which offends against these. The other begins with the exegetical study of the Epistles ; reads them under no restraint of rational preconception ; and barely condescends to vindicate their meaning from the protests of natural sentiment. The former, chiefly the Grotian and Socinian divines, claim for the

death of Christ no efficacy beyond its proper operation on human motives and affections ; and even attach no specific importance to the cross, which, in their view, stands for the whole agency and religion of Jesus. The latter, disciples of Luther and Calvin, regard the sacrifice of Calvary as a true expiation ; which, as a mere objective fact, altered the whole relation of the human being to the Divine ; which effected the pardon of sin, antecedently to any change of character ; and aimed at reformation through free forgiveness, instead of promising forgiveness on condition of reformation. Unhappily, the strength of each scheme appears to lie chiefly in the weakness of the other. The more credible is justly felt to be the less evangelical : and in reading the comments of Crell, Taylor, and Belsham, we cannot wonder that the contrast is remarked between the exility of Unitarian meaning and the richness of Pauline expression. So long as the superstition of Christendom shall bind over the Scriptures to speak nothing but truth, and the truth to say nothing that is not scriptural, belief and interpretation will remain alike unsound. If the very problems which our controversies discuss, respecting the moral constitution of man and the moral government of God, the guilt and the recovery of the human will, the danger and escape of infinite evil,—never were before the apostles' minds at all ; if the questions which interested them were special to their nation, not universal to our nature ; if the fears from which they were rescued, and the deliverance for which they looked, were parts of a Messianic theory which time and Providence have disappointed and displaced by more glorious realities ; nothing but confusion can result from the attempt to find, beneath their Jewish language, a reply to inquiries which were not within view of their mental station. So convinced are we that St. Paul was treating of one thing while we are thinking of another, that the whole phraseology of "redemption" appears to us scarcely capable of ingenuous use. It is not the language which would spontaneously have flowed from the lips of a Socinian disciple, free to utter his own theory in his own words. If he had been in Paul's place, he would have chosen differently ; and not have perplexed posterity with a diction so forced and inflated. There is a clear and definite sense, in which

one who holds by the confessions of Augsburg or Geneva can acknowledge a "remission of his sins," a "reconciliation unto God," a "propitiation," a "salvation from wrath," through "the blood of Christ." He feels himself transported, by the simple fact of the crucifixion, over the whole interval from Hell to Heaven, from absolute alienation to benign acceptance. But he who does not believe in any antecedent curse; who was never conscious of danger from the great hereafter; who feels that he was always safe in the everlasting hands; who regards the death of Jesus as an historical event, which might have happened otherwise, or even not at all, without essentially altering the moral relations of mankind, and who simply wishes to express his appreciation of the religion and sanctity of Christ;—cannot employ these phrases for this purpose without the appearance of insincerity and affectation. We cannot be surprised that such use of the Pauline diction should be denounced as a poor mockery.

It is to be regretted that so earnest and able a writer as Mr. Solly should have sanctioned this abuse; and with so eager an emphasis as to resort to it on the very title-page of his work. A writer is quite at liberty to employ a word in some new sense, in the body of his writings, where due explanation may prevent the possibility of mistake. But to avail himself of an unusual meaning in the *announcement* of his book appears to us difficult to reconcile with the rules of ingenuousness. In the present case, the effect certainly is, that the promise of the title is not fulfilled: and the subject suggested is very slightly touched. We expect a treatise on the sacrifice of Christ, and the effects ascribed to it in the epistolary writings of the New Testament. We find a discussion on the law of progress, the greater part of which has not the smallest reference to the crucifixion, and a very slight one to Christianity at all. The author's interpretations of Scripture, and conclusion as to the Pauline doctrine, so far as can be judged from the few pages devoted to the subject, do not appear to differ from those of previous writers: and whatever new and interesting thoughts he throws out, lie entirely within the limits of devout philosophy. The work indeed, notwithstanding its evangelical title, is little else than a psychological sketch of the course of religion in the mind. We are far

from urging this as an objection to the *book*: but we think it a manifest objection to the *name*. The mode in which the author falls into a track of thought so unexpected will be understood from a few words of analysis. First, he uses the word "Atonement" in its obsolete sense, to denote the condition which reconciliation brings about,—the condition wherein separated beings or objects are "*at one*" with each other. Next, he lays it down, that such assumption of a state of union is the characteristic mark and equivalent of progress. Hence, if he treats of the causes of human progress, whatever they be, he cannot be wandering from the "*great at-onement*," whereby man is set at harmony with himself, his fellows, and his God. Let loose, accordingly, upon the wide themes of the nature, the lot, the destinies of man, our author then enumerates the *subjective conditions* of spiritual improvement, pronouncing them to be *faith, sorrow, love, and joy*. And, finally, Christ is regarded as its *objective condition*, because his mission, character, and history are of great power to awaken these purifying sentiments. No peculiar function is assigned to the death of Jesus, beyond its attractive influence on our affections, as an instance of forbearance and self-renunciation on the part of one who might at will have assumed prerogatives above the reach of suffering.

The general structure of the work appears to us very deficient in strength and compactness: and its chief interest will be found in the detached lights of moral painting with which its interior is occasionally enriched. In these there is often beauty and depth of expression. But the main propositions of the argument are of so vague a character as to terrify a cautious understanding, and drive back the assent, which possibly a little more precision might have conciliated. When, for instance, we are told that all order, harmony, and progress may be resolved, even in the material world, into an act of *union*, the assertion may be true: but for ourselves we should not have perceived the difference, if the author had said *disunion*. The chemical and vital affinities by which Mr. Solly illustrates his position, doubtless produce new compounds; but only by the simultaneous destruction of old ones. And as resolution and composition must always proceed toge-

ther, and are in fact only two sides of the same phenomenon, the "law of progress" might be described indifferently in terms of either. Nor can we admire the attempt to comprehend within the limits of one law of development the physical and the mental worlds. To enter corpuscular attraction and moral sympathy under the same head, would justify our speaking of the *synthesis* of human affections, or the *atonement* of oxygen and carbon; and is in the spirit of that showy and false generalization, which brings so much disrepute upon philosophy, and to which, we trust, the English intellect will always retain its aversion. Had our author simply said, that the ultimate tendency of our spiritual nature must be to perfect peace with ourselves, and with all other minds, he would have affirmed all that his argument required, without burthening it with delusive analogies.

Again, four states of mind are mentioned as instruments or conditions of "At-onement." We have sought in vain to discover the principle of this enumeration, which we know not how to defend from the charge of being arbitrary and accidental. Why the author stopped with these four sentiments, we cannot tell. Might he not have treated of the "At-onement by aspiration,"—"by purity,"—"by hope,"—"by uprightness?" His list indeed is so far from being exhaustive, that it does not comprise a *moral* sentiment at all, and might complete itself within a nature destitute of conscience. Sorrow, love, and joy, are states of affection, manifestly possible to mere sensibility, apart from the perception of right and wrong: and faith, when defined as it is here, and made to consist of intelligent belief in physical and trust in testimonial realities, is no less independent of the feeling of proper obligation. And accordingly, no sanctifying influence necessarily resides in these sentiments and emotions, considered in themselves, and irrespectively of the occasions and objects which give rise to them. They may all take a direction morally indifferent or even depraving: and in exhibiting their ennobling efficacy, our author has to correct the breadth of his formula by the selectness of his illustrations. The truth is, his arrangement is rhetorical rather than philosophical: and, as often happens in such cases, has sometimes led him into forgetfulness of the position which

he has undertaken to establish. Thus his last chapter, entitled "the Atonement by Joy," ought rather to be called "The Joy by Atonement;" for it is wholly engaged in showing, not that joy effects our union with God, but that such union must complete our joy.

To our author's view of the spiritual office of Christ in the world, as the ideal of moral perfection and the humanised representation of God, we heartily assent. This account touches, we believe, the essential point in the actual influence of Christianity on the mind of so many ages. But that this method of "at-onement" concurs with Paul's view, and provides any such function for the crucifixion as his writings claim, we find it impossible to allow. Moral admiration and reverence for Jesus, as an individual, constituted a very small and subordinate element, we think, in that Apostle's faith. Assured of his Messiahship, he knew little of his character. The private life at Nazareth, the transition from the peasant to the prophet, the Galilean ministry, the visits to Jerusalem, the self-disclosures to intimate companions,—indeed the whole sphere of speech and action which revealed the inherent qualities of the Master's mind, and still furnishes forth the conception of his character, appear to have been unknown to Paul; and, at all events, were unessential to the image of Christ reflected from his epistles. Himself a posthumous convert, whose faith commenced after Christ's moral administration of life had closed, he even vaunted its independence of such antecedent details: his retrospect stopped with the cross; and the biographical element which we owe to the four gospels, was absent from his religion. The very essence of Mr. Solly's Christianity was therefore but an accident in the apostle's. On the other hand, for the great central fact in the Pauline scheme,—the sacrifice of Calvary,—our author's view finds no satisfactory place at all. We cannot see in what way so early and violent a death was necessary in order to constitute Jesus our "ideal of moral perfection;" or why, *if we judge only from the nature of the thing*, we should not as readily believe the assertion of Irenæus,—confirmed, as he declares, by "the unanimous tradition and positive testimony" of all the surviving companions of the Apostles,—that Christ lived to old age, in order "to pass through the several stages of life, and be a



pattern to them all." \* The only way indeed of preserving the solemn beauty of the crucifixion, as an expression of human character, is by regarding it as *involuntary*,—the infliction of cruel and inexorable law. Once allow it to have been *optional*, and to have been deliberately chosen and brought about as a means of attaining certain preconceived ends; and the most embarrassing questions arise, which no one can reverently answer, except those who believe Jesus to have been raised above the reach of human obligations, and therefore *not* the model of human perfection. Our author falls into this snare. He supposes it a part of Christ's *plan* to die. With what object?—that he might not be driven to use *compulsion* in collecting a body of followers, but might give his countrymen *time* to think better of his claims; and that, by laying aside his Hebrew personality, he might render it possible for Gentiles to enter into relations with him. But what need was there, we cannot but ask, of abruptly closing his earthly career for these purposes, which his prolonged life, so far as we can pronounce, might as well have served? What necessity imposed upon him that fanciful alternative,—death to himself or compulsory subjection of his country? If time was to be given for the growth of better sentiments towards him, why go away to pass that time in heaven, instead of living down the mistaken hostility of men by a visible sanctity of presence upon earth? And as to Gentile faith in him,—how did his Hebrew lineage exclude it? If discipleship consists in the acknowledgment of him as the authorised image of moral perfection, under what ban of alienation did his family origin put the Gentiles? Were they forbidden to look at his life? Could any one hinder their perception of its divine beauty, and their devout acceptance of it as their appointed guidance? That moral and spiritual appreciation of him which, as our author justly affirms, constitutes the essential attitude of the disciple's mind, is, in its very nature, open to all human hearts: and even if the promise of such a being had been special to the national literature, the performance must have been public to the race. These pleas therefore for an act of voluntary death are insufficient. No doubt, they are substantially those which St. Paul so powerfully urges.

\* Iren. II. 39.

But they are, with him, part of a theory of Christ's office wholly different from Mr. Solly's and from any that modern Christendom can hold. In the apostle's view, the Providential destiny of Jesus was, to erect and preside over a Theocracy on earth; the requisite powers for which he had held in secret investiture even during his Galilean humiliation. The boundaries of this theocracy were not to be all-comprehending: they might embrace a wider or a narrower scope; but universal citizenship was impossible. Where then was the line to be drawn? That was decided by the Law and the Prophets,—from whom alone the Messianic scheme could be learned. And from them it appeared that there were *two* exclusions, which would bar the entrance into the kingdom:—alienation of *faith* from the King, and alienation of *race*. To have denied him, and to be of a foreign clan,—were both,—according to the national ideas,—disqualifications for recognition as his subjects. Had Jesus asserted his prerogatives at the earliest moment, and with the blood of David in his veins and the obligations of the priesthood on his person, opened the registers of his empire, the first barrier would have shut out the whole of his countrymen: the second, the rest of the world. Death, beyond which there is no ritual and no ancestral roll, destroyed the legal rule against the Gentiles, and widened the period and opportunities for belief. Without this, the Pagan of good heart might indeed have contemplated Christ with reverential obedience, till he fell into the *mental posture* of a disciple: but to hold the religion of the kingdom was not to possess its franchises. Filled with these ideas, the Apostle might well rejoice on behalf of those whom the death of Christ redeemed, as he conceived, from a terrible exile and exclusion, penally due to the Israelite, and naturally inherited by the Gentile. But what truth or significance has this doctrine for us? It belongs to the false expectation of a terrestrial Theocracy; and is a part of that Judaical interpretation of the new religion which, when its inaugurating work was done, Providence gloriously disappointed and surpassed. To restore any true meaning to it now is impossible. Does Mr. Solly really believe, that, if Jesus had lived longer, “instead of a Saviour, he must have become a Destroyer,” by “his strict government” “rapidly sweeping the whole

human race into the abyss of death?" Is it an historical fact, that he had arrived at the necessity, and possessed the power, of raising an army,—whether of angels or of men,—and setting up a dominion of force: and that, to evade this, he took measures for being put to death? Is it true, that his living presence made converts "by compulsion," while his absent influence drew them "by cords of love?" The contrast seems to us purely fictitious. Our author has incongruously mixed a philosophical idea of Christianity, as discipleship to a godlike man, with the Israelitish theocratical tradition. He has encumbered himself with the vague and scarcely intelligible proposition, that "Jesus was *the Messiah*;" the said Messiah not being a real personage, but an imaginary object, an indeterminate mythological creation, whose identity with any living individual could never be established on any definite and rational grounds. The *nodus* which the death of Christ is supposed to have resolved,—the dilemma and the extrication,—the danger and the redemption,—are mere results of the Messianic theory, having as little relation with realities as Justin's apocalyptic architecture of the new Jerusalem, or the Millenarian grapes of Papias.

The real truth contained in the great doctrine of justification by faith appears to us to have escaped our author's view, in consequence of his adherence to the rationalising rather than the evangelical use of the word "faith." Though he claims for it more than a mere equivalence with *belief*, the additional ingredient amounts only to practical confidence in the thing believed as a reality. It stands opposed to *Sense*, and denotes the assurance which the *Reason* affords of invisible existences. Hence it is treated as if destitute of any moral and affectionate element; and is separated, as a lower and introductory state, from *love*, to the agency of which a later chapter is devoted. Mr. Solly is indeed conscious that a feeling of *reliance* is implied in the word: had it occurred to him that *belief* is directed to *propositions*, *trust* to *persons*, he would probably have felt that it is impossible to keep faith and love apart; and that the former, so far from being the intellectual antecedent, is the highest moral consequent, of the latter. Instead of defining "justification by faith," the act of "turning towards God at the bidding of Christ by an effort

*of Will,"* he would feel, with Paul, that Faith is the direct antithesis of Will, and denotes the free movement of a reverential heart towards an object of supreme reliance. While Law addresses itself to the voluntary power, and appeals in part to interest, in part to the sense of obligation, Faith seizes the involuntary impulses, not parleying with the Will, but carrying it fairly away. While the one often laboriously fails, the other springs to a happy success: bringing to the mind's strength, not the depressing weight of prohibition, but the renovating force of love. Thus justification by faith, translated into other language, simply means the emancipating power of disinterested and reverential affections; which render, unasked, an obedience rarely obtained by precept and exaction. A profound sense of this great truth appears to us to be the grand permanent result of the Pauline Christianity, infused thence into all the Lutheran Protestantism. While the authority of Divine Law over the Will has been represented by the Romish and the Arminian Churches, the energy of a Divine Love, in transforming and sanctifying the whole nature has been proclaimed by the Evangelical sects. A scheme that shall blend and conciliate these opposite truths, and make each the supplement rather than the antagonist of the other, will be co-extensive with the religious wants of men, will gather into one communion the tranquil worker and the enthusiastic thinker, and present the world with a genuine Catholicism.

We have already adverted to the fact, that among the affections illustrated by our author as affecting our union with God, the moral sentiments have no place. This is not the only mark of a low relative estimate of them, strangely at variance with the high doctrine of free-will which pervades the work. "Justice" is disrespectfully described as "a principle that is designed to govern man in the earlier stages of his moral being."—P. 112. And the whole doctrine of Punishment is indiscriminately condemned, as a product of human vindictiveness, and receiving no sanction from even so "carnal" a principle as justice.—P. 113. All use of "pain for the repression of evil" is represented as a criminal "retaliation:" and States as well as individuals are required to treat offenders with "forgiving love." In

his overflowing tenderness towards wrong-doers, our author unconsciously slips into the Necessarian apology for evil passions, and calls them the "disease of the soul," requiring the medicaments of soft affection, not the reproaches of indignant goodness. This is inconsiderate language. In popular sects and among philanthropic enthusiasts, called into existence by the vehement reaction of social cruelty and abuse, exaggeration of this kind must be expected: but in a writer whose sympathies should not be without some regulation from philosophy, it fills us with surprise and regret. We protest against the arrangement which subordinates justice to love, and degrades Conscience into the servitor of Pity. We cannot allow that retribution is the product of "animal passion," or is tainted with the wickedness of revenge. The fallacies involved in our author's exposition of this matter are not new. He confounds moral disapprobation with personal vindictiveness; and overlooks the distinction, that, while the former contemplates with impartial displeasure all wrong-doing, simply as such, the latter is determined in its anger by the direction of injury towards one's self. Forgiveness is the direct contrary of vengeance; it may relinquish all claims of personal reparation: but it can do no more: it cannot cancel either the *fact* of past wickedness, or the *feeling* which the contemplation of it must excite. No man has the right or the power to forgive offences against others or against the will of Heaven. Disapprobation then must remain; with disapprobation, remorse; and so long as these sentiments are right, punishment cannot be wrong: for, define them as you will, they imply demerit; and demerit is ill-desert; and ill-desert means just liability to penal suffering. To expunge the retributory sentiments would be to repeal the whole moral law.

We are far from denying,—still further from depreciating,—the noble instances of Christian forbearance afforded by the Society of Friends and others who have made it a point of conscience either to succumb to evil or to overcome it with good. But when these stock-examples are pressed upon us for universal imitation, and urged upon the attention of States as reasons for dispensing with a penal code, and embracing their criminal population in

the arms of political love, their whole power is exhausted by such excessive and absurd demands,—like the river which may fertilise a thread of the desert, but if employed to reclaim the Sahara, is instantly swallowed in the sands. True, clemency is often a mighty instrument for subduing the hardened heart. But what is the secret of its power?—its unexpectedness, touching the offender with grateful surprise. Its influence therefore betrays the natural anticipations of the guilty; shows what they think of their own deserts; and proclaims that the law of retribution has an eternal seat in the human heart. Except upon the ground of this fundamental law, mercy can have no operation, no existence: the very word is without a meaning. Not more impossible is reaction without action, or a lifted shadow without intercepted light, than a triumph of forgiveness over a nature not fitted for punishment. The apostles of Love may preach against the severities of human judgment: but did they not live in a world of Justice, their occupation would be gone; their doctrine, by becoming universal, would declare itself impossible; and, by simple diffusion, be indistinguishable from the inane.

Mr. Solly esteems it “most unnatural” to claim, on behalf of retributory justice, any sanction from the doctrines or example of Christ. We cannot honestly escape his condemnation. When the question is put to us, whether the all-subduing power of love on the alienated heart “was not exemplified in the history of Jesus;”—whether it “was not thus that he came unto those who would not approach *him*, until by his disinterested labours and sufferings he won the deepest affections of their hearts;”—we feel constrained to answer with a distinction. To oppressed poverty, to repulsed childhood, to despised goodness, to insulted shame, his tenderness and patience were inexhaustible. For those who injured him, “not knowing what they did,” the divine prayer was ready to his lips. But, in the presence of those who were hardened against him by evil prejudice, interest, or passion, of sacerdotal spies and sanctimonious Pharisees, his deportment, it strikes us, was marked by invariable severity. He maintains a position of uniform antagonism, and rids himself of them by devices perfectly



just, but not peculiarly affectionate. He parries their blows; evades their snares; perplexes their theology: and, not content with the attitude of defence, assails them with impassioned invective and damaging exposures, rising to a terrible pitch of minatory defiance. What reproach was too austere to find utterance with him? What punishment too appalling for him to name? What judgment too fearful for him to predict as the decree of his own tribunal? Who has not shuddered at that periodic knell of his discourse,—the “weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth,”—and listened in dread of its returning ring upon the heart? That any one, with these things before him, should say that Christ came to show us how “purely animal” is “the tendency” “to inflict punishment on an offender either by word or deed, by altered behaviour or threat,” and to exemplify the treatment of wrong-doers without the use of penal fears, is one of the most astonishing delusions to which the misuse of Scripture has given rise.

On the whole, this work of Mr. Solly's, while frequently awakening a hearty admiration, has presented us with a series of perplexing surprises. In his own mind there must no doubt be some mediating ideas, capable of “*at-oning*” its various parts: but, for want of these, we confess to an insuperable difficulty in harmonizing the opinions scattered over his pages. He maintains the highest doctrine of Freewill; yet claims the tenderest nursing for guilty beings, as if they were not Agents but Patients, lying sick of a “disease of the soul.” He vindicates responsibility, yet objects to retribution. He explains away the dogma of perdition, yet retains the correlative language of “*Salvation*.” He believes only in an Atonement by sentiments never in any age absent from the human heart; yet speaks of the great scheme of Atonement as projected and executed by the historical prophet of Nazareth. He approves of interpreting Paul by reference to the obsolete and mistaken doctrine of a theocratic Messiah; yet appeals to this very language as if expressing eternal truth. He explains the imperfect notions with which portions of the Scriptures are pervaded; yet speaks of the whole Bible, “from Genesis to Revelation,” as the “revealed will of God,” the “explicit and express declaration” of the Most



High, which must be exempted from the "test of reason" applicable to the "fallible inferences of uninspired men." While these things must remain riddles for us, there are many passages of illustration and feeling which no thoughtful and devout reader can pass without a mental salutation of thanks and blessing to the author: and had we felt at liberty to try his work by any other standard than his own professed design, we could gladly have kept our readers and ourselves in hearty sympathy with him, by dwelling on selected thoughts both truly conceived and freshly presented. The following remarks on the trials incident to the Strong Will appear to us just and impressive:—

"Without a strong will there can be no improvement, no conquest over temptation, hardship, pain. But while our chief glory and our highest hopes (next to religious and moral progress, which is indeed wholly dependent upon this same will) lie in the strength of our will, of our determination, so our chief peril (at least to nobler natures) lies in the temptation to erect that will in rebellious opposition against the Divine Will, and to abuse to our own destruction that power of independent thought and action which He has given for our eternal benefit. One of the hardest but most important lessons which persons of strong and earnest character have to learn, is the blessedness of bowing their headstrong will to the Will of God in child-like reverence and love. Not in slavish subjection; oh no! but through deliberate conviction and heartfelt approval, through the combined and mighty power of Reason and Affection. But how impossible it is to learn this lesson of at-onement with God, until our haughty and impetuous spirits have been chastened, humbled, purified from selfishness, worldliness, pride, and conceit, by the fiery furnace of affliction! It is interesting to reflect how that very strength, power, and infinite capacity of man's Nature create the necessity for affliction to chasten his passions, to humble his pride, to elevate and refine his desires,—and we ever find, both in history and in our own experience, that the characters of most power and energy, of strongest passions and deepest affections, those persons, in short, who evidently possess the greatest qualifications for good or for evil, are precisely the persons who suffer most acutely. They are more capable of accomplishing the Almighty's purposes; and therefore they receive more of that discipline and sorrow-training which is needful to make them, here and hereafter, truly valuable and efficient labourers in their Saviour's vineyard. And the more progress they make in usefulness to Christ, the more pains and care seem to be taken to train them. 'For,' says our crucified Master, 'every

branch that beareth not fruit, the husbandman taketh away, and every branch that beareth fruit, he cleanseth it that it may bring forth more fruit.' So again, 'Whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth.' And truly we find that just in proportion as persons are capable of serving the Lord, of promoting His glory and the welfare of immortal souls, they are tried in the furnace of affliction, and thus it comes to pass that they are perfected through suffering, as their divine and sinless Master was before them. All the saints in heaven and on earth can testify to this truth. Nay, cannot the reader, on looking back over his past life, see that what at the time were his heaviest sorrows proved afterwards the greatest blessings, brought forth the richest harvest of peace and piety, holiness and happiness, which he had ever experienced? Is not that saying true which we often hear among the poor, that 'if it were not for trouble we should soon not know where we stand?' The remark well describes the presumptuous, hardened, God-forgetting state into which we grow by uninterrupted prosperity. 'No chastening, indeed, for the present seemeth joyous, but grievous; nevertheless, afterwards it yieldeth the peaceful fruit of righteousness.'—P. 90.

In this passage the feeling is so pure and genuine as to restrain the exuberance which, not unfrequently, our author forces us to regret. The style of the book, indeed, is that of a fluent and fervent extempore speaker; altogether wanting in the precision required for philosophical discussion: without the simplicity and compactness on which a severe taste would insist; yet adapted to the free out-pourings of religious sentiment which it is commissioned to bear into the world. If the author cannot be held to have greatly advanced towards solution the high problems of theology, he will do a better thing,—touch and interest many hearts with a new consciousness of religion.

## ART. IV.—THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH FRY.

*Memoir of the Life of Elizabeth Fry, with Extracts from her Journals and Letters.* Edited by Two of her Daughters. In 2 vols. 1847.

ELIZABETH FRY was one of those mystic personages whose wonderful power proceeds from their personal presence, and cannot otherwise be communicated or described. Their word is with power, they speak with authority, and men wonder at the gracious things which proceed out of their mouths. But take away the magic influence which the soul communicates to the frame; the sweet and earnest grace that makes the dignity of goodness; the speaking eye; the expression of a countenance fully revealing the love, pity, and solicitude which no words convey,—a voice of music that carries into the heart at once a sense of holiness and of subduing gentleness, in tones we may suppose the angels use when they address themselves to the office of consolers,—take away these, and the dead page gives no true image;—the record of deeds done, and exact transcripts of words spoken, seem insufficient to produce the effects that followed. A look, a tone, a beam of light from a face illumined from within by a loving, heavenly, spirit, would explain it all, and reproduce the work of grace in the veriest sceptic,—but Memoirs are powerless here. Philanthropists in this respect often share the fate of great actors: any true memorial of the sources of their power is an impossibility. Spiritual vitality, and the influence on the human heart and will of personal gifts, are as the essence of the rarely endowed person,—and cannot be pictured so as to be realized by those who have never seen nor heard. Books, “the ships of time,” convey to the latest ages, perfectly and safely, great thoughts, holy sentiments, adventurous deed, or homely incident,—but cannot hold or carry the natural magic by which hearts filled with the Spirit of God touch and sway other hearts, and work miracles of love, not by power of thought, but by power of

earnestness. The Memoir of Mrs. Fry does not, and cannot, do her justice. Her greatness was not of a kind that books can preserve. She was a living expression of the holy goodness of God,—and the *human frame* was the wonderful instrument through all whose organs that spirit spoke. Let no one then proceed to lower her from the place she has long held in their inmost chamber of reverence, because a biography may not convey the power of her living presence. If she had been a philosopher, or a great thinker; or if her actions had belonged to the outward life of man, and this only,—all that was in her, and all that she did, might have been wholly preserved. It is because her power was of a spiritual order, that it cannot be separated from herself, to be stored in propositions, or represented in pictures. Memoirs such as hers can, consequently, be read truthfully or profitably only by those whose sympathies of heart and spirit are in a state of activity kindred to her own. All such will recognise here Heaven's choicest blessing to the world, a sincere spirit, wholly given up to the love and operation of the moral attributes of God.—Human defects and infirmities there are, the weakness of the flesh,—but the willing and ruling spirit every where appears.

Elizabeth Gurney was born in 1780 at Norwich. She had a happy childhood in a happy home. Earlham, her father's country house, filled her young soul and sense with the brightness and joy of beauty and domestic sweetness. That home continued to be a refuge for her to her last day, and as often as she turned to it through life, you perceive that she is a child again, clasping her mother's hand, wandering among its flowers, and listening to the murmurs of its waters. Even of an earlier home on a Common, though she left it when five years old, all the images were fresh in her heart. The music of its rills, and the poor of its scattered cottages, their names, characters, and stories, continued with her. 'My mother,' she writes, 'was most dear to me, and the walks she took with me in the old-fashioned garden are as fresh with me, as if only just passed; and her telling me about Adam and Eve being driven out of Paradise: I always considered it must be just like our garden at Bramerton.'—As might be anticipated from so much sen-

sibility, she was a nervous and timid child, and, though prevailingly happy in the constant love that sheltered her, subject to occasional suffering from overwrought feeling. She used to lie awake at night weeping at the thought that her mother might die and leave her. She was in the habit of watching her when sleeping, in terror of the image of death,—and of stealing silently to her bed side to listen for her breath. Her childlike prayer was that two great walls might crush them all together, so that they should never know the pain of separation. This susceptible child lost the mother who could perfectly bless and satisfy the demands of such a sensitive, timid, loving, nature, before she was twelve years old.

The Gurneys were Quakers; and the Quakers of that day, the Memoir tells us, combined a mystical piety with something of a distaste for the doctrine of the 'Trinity in Unity.' Elizabeth Gurney, it appears, narrowly escaped being a sceptic or a heretic. And here let us say, once for all, that the tone used by her daughters, when speaking on religion, of what they deem essential to religious life, is not graceful or becoming. To dogmatism we are too well accustomed; but we are never so impressed with its unkindly nature as when women talk like popes, and extinguish, or obscure, the natural gentleness and humility of their sex by that quiet arrogance of infallibility which is detestable even in masculine Divines who have sworn away their liberty, and solemnly engaged to be Truth *seekers* no more, but professional Advocates of fixed Opinions—bound by thirty-nine Articles, or with hand and seal set to the Westminster Confession of Faith. The evil of this spirit is in the confidence with which it so imbues the whole mind, that on the subject of religious truth and error, the most refined, amiable, and candid, overstep the limits of modesty, and know not that they offend.—The Gurneys, we are told, with only a mystical piety and no clear acknowledgment of the Trinity in Unity, were for a time permitted 'to stumble upon the dark mountains, seeking rest and finding none.' Elizabeth had clearly from God the precious gift of a devout nature, but religion had never been presented to her by others in a form to captivate her affections, or satisfy her reason. We should infer, from the slight no-

tices given of the religious character of the Society in which she moved, that the garb and customs of Quakerism did not sit easily upon, or proceed naturally from, the spirit that was under those quaint usages, and that the obvious result was formalism, or hypocrisy, or a vehement fanaticism determined to be sincere. It is very remarkable to find a girl of seventeen, with a heart of exquisite sensibility to all the influences of God, writing thus:—

“A thought passed my mind, that if I had some religion, I should be superior to what I am, it would be a bias to better actions: I think I am, by degrees, losing many excellent qualities. I am more cross, more proud, more vain, more extravagant. I lay it to my great love of gaiety, and the world. I feel, I know I am falling. I do believe if I had a little true religion, I should have a greater support than I have now; in virtue, my mind wants a stimulus; never, no never, did mind want one more: but I have the greatest fear of religion, because I never saw a person religious, who was not enthusiastic.”

The love of gaiety and the world will not surprise any one—but the desire for *some* religion, and the inability to distinguish it from enthusiasm, indicates something very stiff and unreal in the kind of religion that was exhibited by others to her youthful eyes. She was at this time a girl of a gay and buoyant spirit, fond of dress and admiration, and subject to all the infirmities and vanities of her age. Her father lived in luxurious hospitality, and Earlham seems to have been a pleasant haunt for the officers stationed at Norwich, and other fashionable idlers. The Duke of Gloucester, ‘the Prince,’ as he is called, quite disordered her imagination.—“Why do I wish so much for the Prince to come?”—“I met the Prince: it showed me the folly of the world; my mind feels very flat after this storm of pleasure.”—This Prince was occasionally her partner in the dance, and he lived to meet her in prisons, and aid her with his influence in high places, and be her partner in many good works. He seems indeed to have acted the part of a true friend, and it is distinctly said, in a late period of the Memoir, that at this time he gave the ‘motherless daughters,’ and the perhaps inexperienced and unsuspecting father, some kind and judicious

advice. That it might not be altogether unneeded, such a passage as the following sufficiently betrays. On her seventeenth birthday she writes:—"It [her heart] is in such a fly away state; but I think if it were settled on one object it would never, no never, fly away any more; it would rest quietly and happily on the heart that was open to receive it, it will then be most constant; it is not my fault it now flies away, it is owing to circumstances." A little later in the same year she writes:—"I must beware of not being a flirt, it is an abominable character; I hope I shall never be one, and yet I fear I am one now a little.—My inclinations lead me to be an idle, flirting, worldly girl." And later still, and after a new religious life was commenced in her, and she was entertaining earnest thoughts of becoming a preacher:—"I rode to Norwich, and had a very serious ride there; but meeting, and being looked at, with apparent admiration, by some officers, brought on vanity." Now, why do we note these things?—To show the noble possibilities that may lie, undeveloped yet, in the spirit of a girl, in whom perhaps all observers discovered nothing but the ordinary character and interests of young ladies of seventeen. It would be well for parents, and teachers, and society, and grave men, to know what high elements of soul may be mingled with some vanity, and desire for admiration, and love of dress. The presence of these things should not scare away the hope of finding great qualities in such a neighbourhood. The woman who now lives in the reverence of the world, honoured above all women of her time, used to ride to Norwich in a scarlet habit, looking out for, and gratified by, the admiration of officers.

Even then, any one who had an opportunity of reading her thoughts, as given in her Journal at the time, would have discerned the signs of an uncommon character. We confess we are more struck with the evidences of originality of mind, of deep thoughtfulness and observation, than at any later period of her life, nor does the promise of genius then given seem to us to be fulfilled. Outwardly she continued to lead the kind of life indicated in the extracts we have given, until a circumstance occurred that gave a direction to her mind, to which, after some natural vacillations, she wholly and freely yielded. On the 4th of Feb.



ruary 1798, she went to the Quakers' Meeting at Norwich, in purple boots laced with scarlet. These smart boots were an object of great amusement to her sisters, and we suppose were very much out of place at a Quakers' Meeting even at Norwich, which William Savery declares was "the gayest Meeting of Friends he ever sat in." This William Savery, an American Friend, and a man of piety and genius, began to preach, to relieve his mind, as he expresses it. We must let her sister tell the rest.

"His voice and manner were arresting, and we all liked the sound; her attention became fixed: at last I saw her begin to weep, and she became a good deal agitated. As soon as Meeting was over, I have a remembrance of her making her way to the men's side of the Meeting, and having found my father, she begged him if she might dine with William Savery at the Grove,\* to which he soon consented, though rather surprised by the request; we went home as usual, and, for a wonder, she wished to go again in the afternoon. I have not the same clear remembrance of this Meeting; but the next scene that has fastened itself on my memory, is our return home in the carriage. Betsy sat in the middle, and astonished us all by the great feeling she showed. She wept most of the way home. The next morning, William Savery came to breakfast, and preached to our dear sister after breakfast, prophesying of the high and important calling she would be led into. What she went through in her own mind, I cannot say, but the results were most powerful, and most evident. From that day her love of pleasure and of the world seemed gone."—Vol. i. 34.

The last sentence of this extract must be a good deal qualified. Ten days after this memorable preaching she enters in her Journal an expectation of going to London;—and playhouses and gaieties, and William Savery, and the Prince, and making dress a study, and reading in the Bible, are all mixed up together in the most admired disorder. She is sent on a visit to London "in this awakened state of mind," with a questionable wisdom considering that she was but smoking flax, that she might have an opportunity, it is said, of "trying all things." She had a great desire to go to the theatre, but would not like William Savery to know of it. She goes however, and though Banister and Mrs. Jordan acted to her, she "was not at all interested in the play, and had no other feeling whilst there than that

\* Her uncle's.

of wishing it over." This looks like a total want of imaginative thought as connected with art and poetry, and this we fear is the truth, ardent, serviceable, and powerful as her moral imagination ever was. Some time after she goes to the Opera, and her comment upon it is a choice specimen of mere girlish, or rather childish, silliness. "I own, I do love grand company. The Prince of Wales was there; and I must say, I felt more pleasure in looking at him, than in seeing the rest of the company, or hearing the music. I did nothing but admire his Royal Highness; but I had a very pleasant evening indeed." With such feelings and temptations, and yet with an earnest desire for seriousness of heart, we are not surprised that she came to "the conviction that these things were wrong, from seeing them, and feeling their effects," and that it was necessary for her "to give up attending all public places of amusement, as she saw that they tended to promote evil."

From this period the bent of her life commences; she employs herself at Earlham in all the good offices open to her active, intelligent, and suggestive goodness; in her school, where alone and single handed she sways and rules marvellous numbers, in visiting the poor, and reading to the sick and dying. She insensibly becomes a marked person in the Society of Friends. Great hopes are entertained of her, that she is a chosen vessel, and in their private meetings for prayer and exhortation her friends openly prophesy to her in her eighteenth year that she is to become a light to the blind, speech to the dumb, feet to the lame, a minister of Christ, and she believes that their word is from the spirit. What effect these predictions may have had in determining her future destiny, it is impossible to say. It is remarkable that William Savery makes the same prophecy about her, the morning after she had gone to Meeting in purple boots laced with scarlet. Still her buoyant nature craves indulgence, and her reasons for repressing it inspire at once respect and melancholy. She would sing, only that it leads to dissipation of mind; she would dance, if she could make a rule never to give way to vanity, excitement, or flirting, but she never remembers dancing without feeling a little of all three, and sometimes a great deal: she is overtaken in the evenings

by a hankering after the world and its gaieties, but asks herself what real satisfaction is there in being admired. If any one sees in all this the common signs of their own weaknesses, or laments that she converted natural graces and gaieties into dangerous things,—let them at least remember that her own eye detected the infirmities, her own hand records the confessions, her own severity against herself overcharged their evil, her own faithfulness turned from the temptations, and chose the better part. How many have felt as foolishly, and never detected the folly, nor left it at the bidding of any high duty, but only when singing, and dancing, and vanity, were no longer possible to their years!

In 1799, having in all things adopted the principles, garb, and peculiarities of Quakerism, the mob cap and close handkerchief, she is sought in marriage by Mr. Joseph Fry. But she hesitates, whether she has not a call to the work of the ministry, and whether like the Romish clergy she ought not to practise celibacy, whether “the active duties she may have to perform in the Church, are not rather incompatible with the duties of a wife and a mother.” She writes to a valued cousin seeking counsel on the subject, and strange to say, the state of her own affections is the one matter that is not introduced into the consideration. She confesses that to marry would be to overturn all her theories for herself, and teach her that the ways of the Lord were unsearchable; but she refers it all to a higher guidance, and hopes she will be shown, by what signs is not said, the right path to walk in. The result was, that she was led into marriage with Mr. Fry, shortly after she had completed her twentieth year. In her description of the ceremony there is an amusing quaintness in the account she gives of her own elocution on this solemn occasion, for among Friends the parties themselves speak the important service, and the inferior, though satisfactory, place she assigns to her husband’s part of the performance “I felt every word, and not only felt, but in my manner of speaking expressed how I felt: Joseph also spoke well.” For the next ten years she resided principally in Mildred’s Court, in the city of London; after which Plashet in Essex, the Country seat of her husband’s family, was their home for the greatest part of the year.

From the time of her marriage we may trace the gradual growth of the persuasion that she is called to a public ministry among the Friends. Any one who will read carefully her Journals for the period, will come to the conclusion that she argued herself into this belief. Conscious of her own powers among a body of limited cultivation, listening weekly to men and women preachers whose very feebleness to have interested her, thoroughly persuaded that God gives a secret call, and suggests a text, a sentiment, or a prayer, which it would be disobedience to his spirit to keep back, she questions herself about every strong excitement of her mind, every striking text that might happen to be vividly suggested to her, until she begins to regard her natural modesty, shrinking, and reluctance, as signs of the unwillingness of her heart, and through the very fear of holding back incurs the danger of going where she is not called. We confess we wonder that all Quakers are not preachers, for the very terror of disobeying a divine call is enough to make them mistake every strong emotion of their hearts, every fervid rush of sentiment, for a special summons. Mrs. Fry begins with an apprehension that she would at some time have to speak; she recurs again and again to the thought, with much self scrutiny, at every fresh movement of her religious nature, until the idea gets a morbid possession of her; and she speaks at last through the fear that not speaking would be to resist an inward monition. That at all times there was a morbid element in her mind, a tendency to low spirits and fears for her spiritual state, a habit of speaking of overwhelming sorrows the causes or nature of which are not declared—all proceeding we think from the sincerity with which she held the doctrine of immediate inspiration and a consequent humiliation in those flat times when she thought herself deserted—is shown by her Journals from first to last. One or two extracts from her Journal may show the process by which she alarmed herself into the conviction that she was called to be a preacher.

"16th Oct. 1809. *Tunbridge Wells*.—Having no Meeting here, we yesterday sat silently together in the family; and I have to relate what has pained me in regard to myself. There appeared on our first sitting down so solemn a covering; but notwithstanding

all my covenants, and all my good desires, I flinched in spirit and turned my mind from it, instead of feeling, 'Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth;' my great fear was, lest I should have to acknowledge that I believed the promise was verified with us, that 'when two or three are met together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.' Now I think it very likely I should not have found myself thus called upon; but my fear was so great, that I dare not ask whether it were the right call or not, but turned from it."—Vol. i. p. 143.

Again, at her father's funeral, she apprehended that a text which she had spoken to the family the night before, might be required from her again:—

"We attended our beloved father's funeral: before I went, I was so deeply impressed at times, with love to all, and thanksgiving, that I doubted whether it might not possibly be my place, to express it there; but I did, the evening before, humbly crave, not to be permitted to do so, unless rightly called to it.—However after a solemn waiting, my dear uncle Joseph spoke, greatly to my encouragement and comfort, and I believe removal of some of my fears. I remained still, till dearest John began to move to go away; when it appeared as if it could not be omitted, and I fell on my knees, and began, not knowing how I should go on, with these words, 'Great and marvellous are Thy works, Lord God Almighty: just and true are all Thy ways, thou King of Saints; be pleased to receive our thanksgiving;' and then I seemed stopped, though I thought I should have had to express, that I gave thanks on my beloved father's account. But not feeling the power continue, I arose directly."—Vol. i. p. 147.

Once more:—

"Last first day morning I had a deeply trying Meeting, on account of the words, 'Be of good courage, and He will strengthen your hearts, all ye that hope in the Lord;' which had impressed me towards Norwich Meeting before I went into it; and after I had sat there a little time, they came with double force, and continued resting on my mind, until my fright was extreme; and it appeared almost as if I must, if I did my duty, utter them. I hope I did not wholly revolt, but I did cry in my heart, for that time to be excused."—Vol. i. p. 150.

These passages are instructive and explanatory. The only evidence she has that the spirit has suggested any thing to her is the presence to her thoughts of a text of

scripture, and beyond this she has nothing to say. These same words are turned over in her thoughts for five weeks, until she becomes possessed by them, and at last she commences her public ministry by simply uttering them, and then stops.

"About eleven o'clock, these same words that had done so in Norwich Meeting, came feelingly over me, 'Be of good courage, and He will strengthen your hearts, all ye that hope in the Lord.' And that which had hitherto appeared impossible to human nature, seemed not only possible, but I believe I was willing; simply desiring, that in this new and awful undertaking, I might not lose my faith, and that the Divine will might be done in me: under this sense and feeling, as if I could not omit, I uttered them."—P. 151.

After this it is curious, and we wonder how it could have escaped her own notice, to find her dwelling upon some thought, or danger she had remarked, in her private meditations, and adding with amazing simplicity that she may be called to bear her testimony publicly in the matter. Of course the remark remains with her, and at the next meeting its occurrence is taken for a special suggestion:—"This morning, my desire, indeed I believe I may say prayer, is, that this may not degenerate into a form amongst us, and I should not be surprised, if I had to express as much; however, that I leave."—This conviction of immediate, supernatural, help is obviously accompanied by a spiritual danger which Elizabeth Fry did not altogether escape. When God is the speaker, and the human being only the material organ, one may praise the speech, without direct self-commendation. But indirectly spiritual pride, self-glory in our gifts, is powerfully fostered. There are increased facilities for self praise, even to modest people, under the guise of giving glory to God for all the affecting words that were spoken.

"I believe I was helped," she says, "in the ministry; if any praise be due, may it be given both by me and others, to the great Author."—"It was a striking circumstance, for a poor woman to be made the means, amongst so many great, wise, and I believe good men, of showing forth the praise of the great 'I Am.'"—"I was helped in prayer, greatly as I think, and in a few words afterwards, but may self pass unobserved, for there was a better than man present with us."—"If the gift in me grows and increases

with exercise, may I ever be preserved from decking myself with the Lord's jewels."—"I feared lest the servants and others should attribute that praise to me, with which I had nothing to do, for I could not have prayed, or found an answer to prayer, without an anointing from the Most High; it led me to feel it a blessing to be entrusted with this sacred and precious gift; though ministers may have much to pass through, and many crosses to take up, for their own good and that of others, yet it is a marvellous gift when the pure life stirs, operates, and brings down strong holds."

In the same way a dangerous latitude is given to rejoice in all the glory and acclamation that attended her in her works of mercy, seeing that the gift was from God, and she but the instrument.

"How did the righteous compass me about, from the Sovereign, the Princes, and the Princesses, down to the poorest, lowest, and most destitute; how did poor sinners of almost every description seek after me, and cleave to me! What was not said of me? What was not thought of me, may I not say in public and in private, in innumerable publications?—The work that was made so much of before, some try to lessen now. What shall I say to all this—that in my best judgment, in my soundest faith (if I have this faith), it is the Lord's doing, by his permission, and marvellous in my eyes."

In ordinary cases modest minds think little of the value of their thoughts, for to feel satisfied with what they are able to express, would be to know that power and ideality had gone from them;—and if they are permitted to perceive that they have accomplished any good, their feeling is one of thankfulness that it has been given to them to do. But in the case of the Friends it is impossible not to attach a high value to thoughts and expressions which are supposed to be God's, and it must be very difficult to give the human instruments no glory for the divine impulses and utterances which flow through them. The liability to this danger did not proceed from any peculiar weakness in her, but from the views of the Society, and perhaps no one who accomplished so much could have escaped more clear. Still it would be vain to conceal that this danger did beset her. What must be the peril with common natures, when one naturally so meek and self forgetting could introduce into prayer, these allusions to the marvels of her ministry: "Thou hast helped her in spirit at seasons to do Thy will, to see into the glorious myste-



ries of Thy kingdom, how Thou hast aided her in her weakness to overcome the extreme fear of man : and to declare Thy doings among the people, and to show Thy marvellous works to the children of men, even from princes and prelates, to the poorest, lowest, and most destitute, so as in a remarkable manner to bring to pass what she saw for herself in early life, though as through a glass darkly, which others more clearly saw for her, and had to declare unto her."—When under some obloquy from rigid Friends for suffering her daughter to marry out of the connection, she cites the powerful help of the Spirit still vouchsafed to her in proof of her own worthiness.

"In the low, the very low state I have been brought into ; with an acute sense of the reproach of man, so that I almost expected my mouth would have been shut in Meetings, I have been encouraged and naturally surprised to find that I have seldom known the power of the Spirit more near to help, and to be unto me tongue and utterance, wisdom and power. May it be a lesson to all, not too much to judge others, for acting a little out of the usual course."

And there are even some traces in her Journals that this doctrine of the Spirit may be used not only to betray into self glory, but also to excuse the neglect of some duties as compared with others, or what appear to be such, and to sanction some self indulgence. Thus when called from home on missionary journeys, at critical periods in the health of her children, and well knowing that she must devolve on others the best parts of a mother's duties, she declares that she leaves it all to God. She speaks of one of them suffering from a hip complaint, but says that she does not feel called upon to be uneasy. And in one place she goes so far as to hint that the Spirit will not sanction an abridged allowance of her luxuries and comforts :—

"I have desired to be watchful over personal indulgences, as my fatiguing life, and often delicate health, has given me a liberty in these things, that now as I am better, I desire to curtail, as far as it is right for me ; but I find I do not serve a hard Master, nor one that would lead me into any extremes, for sometimes when in my own will, for appearance' sake, economy, &c., I have wished to leave off indulgences, I have not felt easy with it,—and as far as I know, the

right thing in my heart has warranted my using a sufficient supply of what I require, though of course limited by Christian moderation."

With a mind less pure, watchful, and self denying than Elizabeth Fry's, any mistakes about such intimations of the Spirit might lead to most deplorable results.

Mrs. Fry is principally known for her labours of love in Prisons, for the spirit that carried her through them fearless of danger, and proved sufficient to reach and sway the most hardened hearts they contained. The first notice of Newgate appears in the following simple passage:—

"*Feb.* 16, 1813.—Yesterday we were some hours at Newgate with the poor female felons, attending to their outward necessities; we had been twice previously. Before we went away, dear Anna Buxton uttered a few words in supplication, and very unexpectedly to myself, I did also. I heard weeping, and I thought they appeared much tendered; a very solemn quiet was observed; it was a striking scene, the poor people on their knees around us in their deplorable condition."—Vol. i. p. 204.

At this time the Prisons of Great Britain were dens of disorder and neglect, not so much from cruelty as from carelessness. Our criminals, like our dead, were buried out of our sight. The brief impulse that Howard had given to the better sympathies of the nation had died away, and his labours were forgotten. In Newgate the female prisoners, tried and untried, to the number of three hundred, with crowds of children, were kept in four rooms, without classification and without employment, without decent clothing, and without bedding, sleeping on the floor with raised boards for pillows. Into this part of the gaol the governor himself was afraid to go, and he warned Mrs. Fry and her noble companion that their watches would be snatched from their sides. On her second visit, which it would appear was several years afterwards, she desired to be left alone with these rude and abandoned women. She read to them the Parable of the Lord of the Vineyard, and spoke of the eleventh hour, and of Christ having come to save sinners. "Some asked who Christ was; others feared that their day of salvation was passed."—It would be useless to describe the exact evils she discovered, and the particular improvements she intro-

duced. It is enough to say that she undertook a task in which the practical people, jailers, and officers, and governors and sheriffs, despaired, not only of her success, but even of her safety ;—though it would be unjust not to add that if they distrusted, they did not impede, but freely opened to her every facility she desired. She brought order and good feeling where common decency was deemed an impossibility. She established schools for both the children and the women, and so placed before these unfortunate creatures the dreadful consequences of living without instruction or better guidance in such scenes of depravity, that all her plans were accepted with tears of joy, and observed with almost uniform submission and regularity. She stirred men in authority up to the recognition of the simple fact, that depraved and ignorant people cannot herd together in absolute idleness without vicious consequences, and that to employ them is the only way to shut out evil, and open any chance for good. Whilst reading other Parables to the Prisoners, she taught their Gaolers to understand that Parable in which are described the seven devils entering into the empty chamber. She proved the accessibility of human nature in its worst state to the love of God and the gentleness of Christ ; and weekly she drew crowds to Newgate of all ranks and orders, to see with their own eyes and hear with their own ears, the astounding fact, that criminals were not fiends, and that a voice of pity and holiness from one like *her*, clothed in grace and sacredness, offering her sympathies to *them*, could bring back the memory of their days of innocence, and make them weep like children. And this was no show work on her part, though something of show accompanied it, but a result purchased by unwearied labour, a penetrating insight into human nature, an admirable practical wisdom, along with a brave and generous trust in the hearts she had to reach. Alas, that these first lessons of Christianity should have to be received as utterances of new truths, new lights of love ;—but not the less honour to the noble woman who received so richly into her own heart the spirit of the Master, to which the world around her was infidel ! We cite a single testimony to the effects produced at Newgate by Mrs. Fry and her associates, chiefly ladies of the Society of Friends.

"I went and requested permission to see Mrs. Fry, which was shortly obtained, and I was conducted by a turnkey to the entrance of the women's wards. On my approach, no loud or dissonant sounds or angry voices indicated that I was about to enter a place which, I was credibly assured, had long had for one of its titles, that of 'Hell above ground.' The court-yard into which I was admitted, instead of being peopled with beings scarcely human, blaspheming, fighting, tearing each other's hair, or gaming with a filthy pack of cards for the very clothes they wore, which often did not suffice even for decency, presented a scene where stillness and propriety reigned. I was conducted by a decently dressed person, the newly appointed yards-woman, to the door of a ward, where, at the head of a long table, sat a lady belonging to the Society of Friends. She was reading aloud to about sixteen women prisoners, who were engaged in needle-work around it. Each wore a clean looking blue apron and bib; with a ticket having a number on it suspended from her neck by a red tape. They all rose on my entrance, curtsied respectfully, and then at a signal given resumed their seats and employments. Instead of a scowl, leer, or ill-suppressed laugh, I observed upon their countenances an air of self-respect and gravity, a sort of consciousness of their improved character, and the altered position in which they were placed. I afterwards visited the other wards, which were the counterparts of the first."—Vol. i. p. 273.

Here is part of a description of the first visit to Newgate of one of her associates, after her plans for the improvement of the prison had been some time in operation.

"Most of the prisoners were collected in a room newly appropriated for the purpose, to hear a portion of the Sacred Scriptures read to them, either by the matron, or by one of the Ladies' Committee; which last is far preferable. They assemble when the bell rings, as near nine o'clock as possible, following their monitors, or wards-women, to the forms which are placed in order to receive them. I think I can never forget the impressions made upon my feelings at this sight. Women from every part of Great Britain; of every age and condition, below the lower middle rank, were assembled in mute silence, except when the interrupted breathing of their sucking infants informed us of the unhealthy state of these innocent partakers in their parents' punishment. The matron read; I could not refrain from tears; the women wept also; several were under sentence of death. Swain, for forgery, who had just received her respite, sat next me; and on my left hand sat Laurence, alias Woodman, surrounded by her four children, and only waiting the birth of another, which she hourly expects, to pay the forfeit of her

life; as her husband had done for the same crime, a short time before. Such various, such acute, and such new feelings passed through my mind, that I could hardly support the reflection, that what I saw was only to be compared to an atom in the abyss of vice, and consequently, misery of this vast metropolis."—Vol. i. p. 275.

Mrs. Fry's benevolence was of the kind that deems nothing done, whilst aught remains to do. When her patients were removed from Newgate for transportation, she followed them to the Convict Ship, and used successfully whatever influence she could enlist, in the introduction of new arrangements for their comfort, their instruction, and their virtue, whilst on the voyage. She procured them employment in patch work and fancy work, which would last during a long voyage, and was sure to find a ready sale in New South Wales. The female convicts had hitherto been under the control of sailors only, and she succeeded in obtaining the appointment of female officers. She supplied the women with books and bibles; and had a teacher appointed for the children, and she herself visited the ships to make one more impression on their hearts, and give them her farewell blessing. Nor even here did her love desert them:—her vigilant care provided for their safety and protection when they landed in New South Wales. No refuge whatever was provided for those convicts who might not readily find a service, and who often without means were left to live by the sacrifice of virtue. This far-seeing and large-hearted woman never rested from her applications to Colonial Ministers, Chaplains, and Governors, until in some degree this dreadful abuse, this open snare, was removed.—Nor was her influence, and her care for the prisoners, confined to London or England. Her Ministry, after the manner of the Friends, often laid her "under concern" to visit distant portions of the kingdom, and to carry the word of "testimony" to the Societies in other Lands. And wherever she went as a Quaker preacher, she sought and found admission into the Gaols, and addressed herself to the highest in authority on whatever evils she discovered, with a directness and simplicity worthy to be held in perpetual remembrance both for its own sake, and for the uniform success it met. No one was ever found either at home or on the Continent hard enough to resist such pleadings, or even to suggest that

such interference was unlooked for and strange. In this spirit, and performing this work, she travelled at various times through Ireland and Scotland, through France, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark—and where she herself did not go, as in the case of Russia, her influence went, and her advice and sympathy were eagerly desired. Nor on these journeys did she confine herself to the evils connected with Gaols and Lunatic Asylums. Wherever she saw suffering that could be remedied, wherever she heard of religious persecutions, she found her way to the very court of the Monarch, and face to face admonished him of his sin, yet with such a fulness of grace and charity, that though the admonition was almost always effectual, she never gave offence.—It is wonderful indeed with what a quick vitality she was struck by every occasion of doing good, and saw the means of its accomplishment. At Brighton, where she had gone in sickness and weariness, she sits looking out upon the sea in the early morning to relieve her sleeplessness, and as the figure of the solitary blockade-man crosses her field of view, she thinks of his loneliness, and that it might be relieved by books, and out of that good woman's thought, sitting there communing with her own heart and with God, have proceeded the Libraries at every Coast-guard Station, which have rendered profitable and pleasant innumerable hours, before spent in a weariness and inanity sufficient to turn men into idiots. At the same place she meets Dr. Chalmers, and catches from him the idea of District Provident Societies, and ever afterwards establishes them wherever she goes, with a judgment, tact, wisdom, and persuasiveness which even officials have to yield to as irresistible.

We wish this Memoir enabled us to present any life-sketches that would exhibit Mrs. Fry in action, and teach us something of the secret of her power. But it is quite destitute of all such rich materials. Hardly an incident is pictured, nor her method of dealing with an actual case as it came before her afforded to our eager curiosity. Often and often when we are thirsting for the words spoken, or the things done, or the manner of doing them, we have only vague, inflated, words, telling us that the effects were wonderful. To give one example of this unrealizing kind of writing, which records amazing things, but gives you no

idea of what they were, or how they came to pass. When at Zurich, we are told, that "an apostolic old man pronounced a wonderful blessing on Mrs. Fry, to which she replied in terms that caused the bystanders to weep aloud." This is tantalizing to the last degree.

In the absence of such materials as we desiderate, we must substitute an account, full of life, from a plain man, of the effect that her appearance and manner produced upon him in a short interview.—On a squally day the captain of a Thames Steamer, running a race with a competitor, saw a boat in no small danger, with two ladies in it, in the close Quaker dress. Let him tell the rest of the story himself.

"Well, here was a dilemma! To stop, would spoil my chase, in which most of my passengers were as eager as myself,—but to go on, and pass two ladies in such a situation! I passed the word softly to the Engineer; desired the mate to sheer alongside the boat carefully; threw the delighted rowers a rope, and before the passengers were fully aware that we had stopped the engines, the ladies were on board, the boat made fast astern, and the Eagle again flying up the Thames. I have those two persons strongly, nay, indelibly stamped upon my mind's eye. The one I had last assisted on board, still held my hand, as she thanked me, with dignified but beautiful expression: 'It is kind of thee, Captain, and we thank thee. We made no sign to thee; having held up our handkerchiefs to the other packets, we did not think we should succeed with thee.' I assured them that I could not have passed them under such circumstances, and called the stewardess to take them below into the ladies' cabin and see to their comfort.—The gale had cleared away the rain, and in a very short time they came upon deck again; one of them was Mrs. Fry, and she never lost an opportunity of doing good. I saw her speaking to some of my crew who were looking very serious as she offered them tracts, and some of them casting a side glance at me for my approval or otherwise. I had some little dislike to sects then, which I thank God left me in riper years,—but who could resist this beautiful persuasive, and heavenly minded woman? To see her was to love her; to hear her, was to feel as if a guardian angel had bid you follow that teaching which could alone subdue the temptations and evils of this life, and secure a Redeemer's love in eternity! In her you saw all that was attractive in woman, lit up by the bright beams of philanthropy; devoting the prime of life, and health, and personal graces, to her Divine Master's service: and I feel assured that much of the success which attended her missions of mercy was based upon that love which such



a presence inspired. It was something to possess a countenance which portrayed in every look the overflowings of such a heart, and thus as a humble instrument in the hands of divine providence, she was indeed highly favoured among women. She told me that her companion, Mrs. Pryor, and herself had been down to Gravesend to take leave of the unfortunate women (convicts) on board a ship bound to the settlements, and gave me so touching a description of their behaviour, that I volunteered to take charge of anything for her at any time, or render her any service in my power in my voyages. When about to land, her anxiety to make some pecuniary recompense was very great, but I would not allow her to do so. Mrs. Fry never forgot me when she came near our locality; I saw her from time to time; the earthly tabernacle failing, but the same spirit lighting up with animation her untiring energies. It was an honour to know her in this world; may we follow her to the society of the accepted and blessed in that which is to come."—Vol. i. p. 442.

Mrs. Fry had always been accustomed to affluent circumstances. She had lived from her earliest years in the midst of a large and elegant hospitality, and had grown to regard as her natural auxiliaries all the facilities and conveniences of wealth. It is mentioned as one reason for marrying Mr. Fry, that habit and education had rendered affluence essential to her comfort. In 1828 some reverses of fortune fell upon her husband, and she had the sore trial of leaving her beautiful house and grounds at Plashet, endeared to her by all the sacred feelings which a heart like hers had experienced through so many years. She suffered much from the change, chiefly from the manner in which it affected her hospitalities, her charities, and her freedom of movement. She calls it a mystery that God should so deal with one like her, and when toiling in feeble health against wind and weather she wonders that she should lose her carriage, when others who made no very good use of it were permitted to keep theirs. These are but passing thoughts, and the closest eye can detect no diminution of her numberless labours, her piety, or her self-surrender. After some time the family settled in Upton Lane, adjoining the grounds of her brother, Samuel Gurney, and there continued till her death. It is called small but commodious: small it may have been as compared with Plashet, but the account that is given of the visit of the King of Prussia, and of the party that accompanied or received him, shows that there was no essential abridgment of the

comforts or luxuries of life. A very pleasing letter from Sir Fowell Buxton, who had married one of her sisters, written under his first sympathy in her reverses, indicates the estimation in which she was held by those who were nearest to her.

"I am not sure that the great and lasting disaster is so galling to my mind at the moment, as some of the little provoking and humbling attendants on it. But since the time I spent in heart with you yesterday, I have been able in some measure to get rid of these intruders, and to look upon you under the aspect of one beloved of God, honoured of men, and more than ever loved, cherished, and delighted in, by a large brotherhood. I never felt so keenly as now the privilege of belonging to you, or so conscious of the honour and the benefit of such a sister; and I feel no distrust about your future lot. I cannot doubt that years of contentment and happiness await you. I expect that your light will shine forth more brightly than ever. You have been a teacher to the whole family, and now, I am confidently persuaded, you will instruct us with what humility, with what submission, and with what faith we ought to bear the deepest trials."—Vol. ii. p. 81.

It is in such circumstances, that a character of power and force is invaluable, to put hope into failing hearts, and strength and order into things tending to confusion. One of her daughters remarks with much discrimination: "She had a quality difficult to describe, but marked to those who knew her well; the power of rapidly, and by a process of thought that she could herself hardly have explained, arriving at the truth, striking the balance, and finding the just weight of a doubtful question; nothing could be more valuable than this quality, under such circumstances." There is perhaps nothing in our outward life so full of solemn pathos as the desolation of a home, with whose scenes and memories the history of the spirit is inseparably bound up. The following notice of one of her visits to deserted Plashet seems to us most touching and beautiful, a glimpse into a genuine heart.

"On first day, we were rather suddenly summoned to Plashet House, to attend Anna Golder, who had charge of the house. She was one of the lowly, retired, humble walkers before the Lord; she was suddenly taken very ill, and died in half an hour after her niece got there. It was apparently a departure without sting to mind or body; as far therefore as it respected her, all was peace. But to

myself it was different. I arrived there after dark, drove once more into the dear old place—no one to meet me but the poor man who lived in the house, no dog to bark, nor any life, nor sound, as used to be. Death seemed over the place. Such was the silence, until I found myself upstairs in the large, and once cheerful and full house; when I entered the bed room, there lay the corpse, in her gown, she having died in her chair, only our washerwoman and the woman who lived in the house in the room besides. Circumstances combined to touch some very tender feelings, and the inclination of my heart was to bow down upon my knees before the Lord; thankful, surely, for the release of the valued departed; but deeply and affectingly impressed with such a change! that once lively, sweet, cheerful home left desolate—the abode of death—and two or three watchers. It brought, as my visits to Plashet often have done, the hymn to my mind,—

‘Lord, why is this? I trembling cried;’

Then again I find I can do nothing, but bow, trust, and depend upon that Power, that has, I believe, thus seen meet to visit us in judgment as well as in mercy.”—Vol. ii. p. 99.

The Journeys of Elizabeth Fry, in her character of a Minister in the Society of Friends, form a very remarkable portion of her life. Under concern for the souls of her fellow-believers in Ireland, Scotland, the Channel Islands, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Germany and Denmark, she repeatedly lays the burden on her spirit before the Monthly and Quarterly Meetings of the Society, and obtains their sanction to go on her way as an accredited Messenger of God. We owe it to the Quaker practices and discipline, that we now possess the example and influence of Mrs. Fry. In no other circumstances could a woman have done her work, without overstepping the modesty of her own nature, and exciting against her the sentiments or the prejudices of the world, which confine woman to a more private sphere. Her habitual life as a Quaker Minister made it easy and natural for her to speak to the prisoners of her own sex, and even not to shrink from the publicity, when the fame of her successes and sweet eloquence drew curious crowds to Newgate. It disarmed also the petty prejudices of men. She was doing no more than the Society she had always lived in permitted to her sex. What would have been offensive in others, seemed natural in her. Among many other precious things, we owe it to

Quakerism that Elizabeth Fry enjoyed the freedom that enabled her to do her Master's work, and to take the place that she now fills in the world. To that body alone is confined the honour of a full recognition of the great principle of Christianity, that 'in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female.' We are not now giving an opinion upon the important question, as to whether it is not well, as the general rule, that woman should exert her influence only in the domestic sphere, at the springs of our life. We are simply recording the fact, that Quakerism rendered possible to the world the character and influence of Mrs. Fry. Wherever she went also, it opened the way for her, where other women would only have found obstacles, prejudices, and insults, in their path. Kings and princes were anxious to hear, and pay honour to, the distinguished philanthropist and sweet speaker, whose accidents of education and position enabled her to retain all the graces and dignity of her sex. Sarah Martin, indeed, has proved what any woman may do, and be honoured in the doing of it—but there is this difference, her ministrations were confined to the sorrowing and the sinning, she obtained no access to principalities and powers, no general privilege to arraign, counsel, and rebuke. This arose from her position, and perhaps in some respects from her different mental culture, but she was a noble woman, and, we confess, to us a more striking example of the good one earnest spirit may accomplish, even than Mrs. Fry, because her work is less capable of being assigned to any origin beyond herself, it proceeded more purely and obviously out of her own unassisted efforts.—Wherever Mrs. Fry travelled, her fame had preceded her, and she was received as a privileged person, at liberty to speak her mind as often as she was 'under concern'—whoever might be the delinquents. Her reception at the French Court shows the common character of her intercourse with Monarchs:—

"Our visit to the King and the Queen was interesting; but alas! what in reality is rank!—I expressed my religious interest and concern for them, which was well received.—We strongly expressed to the Queen our desire to have the Sabbath better kept, and the Scriptures more read. She is a sweet minded, merciful woman.—We then proceeded to the Duchess of Orleans'; there we had a de-

lightful visit, and the sweetest religious communication with her, and other interesting conversation."—Vol. ii. p. 271.

At Hanover she visits the Queen by invitation:—

"She is a stately woman, tall, large, and rather a fine countenance. We very soon began to speak of her afflictions, and I gave a little encouragement and exhortation. She was much affected, and after a little while requested us to sit down. We had very interesting and important subjects brought forward: the difficulties and temptations to which rank is subject—the importance of their influence—the objects incumbent upon them to attend to and help in, Bible Societies, Prisons, &c. We then read our address to the Queen, wishing her to patronize ladies visiting the prisons; it contained serious advice, and our desires for her, the King, and the Prince; then I gave the Queen several books, which she accepted in the kindest manner."—Vol. ii. p. 368.

At Berlin she is received by the Royal family with deference and respect; she preaches to them, and prays for them; she ventures even to remonstrate with the King on the persecution of the Lutheran Church in the Prussian dominions, and the next day receives a reply through the King's Chaplain, reporting that the King had said that "he thought the spirit of God must have helped them to express themselves as they have done." And on her return to England, she receives "a most encouraging letter from the Crown Prince of Prussia, expressing great kindness, and unity, his belief that a blessing has rested on her visit to Berlin, and requesting her to go again." In Holland she has the same easy access to the Court, and discharges her conscience with the most simple directness.

"The King, a lively, clever, perfect gentleman, not a large man, in regimentals; the Queen (sister to the Emperor of Russia), a fine, stately person, in full and rather beautiful morning dress of white; the Princess much the same. After our presentation the King began easy and pleasant conversation with me, about my visiting prisons. I told him in a short, lively manner, the history of it; he said, he heard I had so many children, how could I do it? This I explained; and mentioned how one of my daughters now helped me in the Patronage Society. He appeared much interested, as did the Queen. I then

said, my brother had visited the West Indies, and would be glad to tell the King and Queen the result of his observations in these Islands. This he did capitally, showing the excellency of freedom, and its most happy results; he repeated, also, the sad effects of the Dutch enlisting soldiers on the Gold Coast, and how it led to evil and slavery, which so touched the King, that he said he meant to put a stop to it. I then began again, and most seriously laid before the King, the sad defect of having no religious education in their Government Schools, and the Bible not introduced. He said he really felt it; but what could he do when there was a law against it? We then endeavoured to explain how we thought it might be obtained. Our very serious conversation was mixed with much cheerfulness. I felt helped to speak very boldly, yet respectfully; so did my brother."—Vol. ii. p. 399.

At Copenhagen she writes:—

"The King and Queen were kind enough to invite us all to dine at their palace in the Country; this was a very serious occasion, as we had so much to lay before the King—slavery in the West Indies—the condition of the persecuted Christians here—and the sad state of the prisons. I was in spirit so weighed down with the importance of the occasion, that I hardly could enjoy the beautiful scene.—Where we now are, the same old Lutherans whom we found persecuted in Prussia, are persecuting others. On first day morning, we had a very interesting meeting with the poor Baptists. We then again went into the Country, to lay all our statements before the King and Queen. I read the one about the prisons, and the persecuted Christians; and my brother read the one about the West Indies; we had them translated into Danish, for the King to read at the same time. After pressing these things as strongly as we felt right, we expressed our religious concern and desires for the King and Queen. I read a little to them in one of Paul's Epistles; after which I felt that I must commit them and these important causes to Him who can alone touch the heart."—Vol. ii. p. 405.

Nor is her plain speaking at home less remarkable. She goes to dine at the Mansion House, and sits beside Prince Albert:—

"With the Prince I spoke very seriously upon the Christian education of their children, the management of the nursery, the infinite importance of a holy and religious life; how I had seen it in all ranks of life; no real peace or prosperity without it. Then the state of Europe; the advancement of religion in the Continental

Courts; then Prisons,—their present state in this country—my fear that our punishments were becoming too severe—my wish that the Queen should be informed of some particulars respecting separate confinement, &c.”—Vol. ii. p. 423.

We alluded before to her reception of the King of Prussia at Upton Lane. We give the passage, because it shows there was more of a moral bond between her and the Princes she influenced, than mere courtesy or curiosity. She had met the King in the morning at Newgate, and by previous arrangement he was to accompany her home.

“There were difficulties made about his going to Upton, but he chose to persevere. I went with the Lady Mayoress and the Sheriffs: and the King with his own people. We arrived first; I had to hasten to take off my cloak, and then went down to meet him at his carriage door, with my husband, and seven of our sons and sons in law. I then walked with him into the drawing-room, where all was in beautiful order—neat, and adorned with flowers: I presented to the King our eight daughters and daughters in law, our seven sons and eldest grandson, my brother and sister Buxton, Sir Henry and Lady Petty, and my sister Elizabeth Fry—my brother and sister Gurney he had known before—and afterwards presented twenty-five of our grand-children. We had a solemn silence before our meal, which was handsome and fit for a King, yet not extravagant—every thing most complete and nice. I sat by the King, who appeared to enjoy his dinner, perfectly at his ease and very happy with us. We went into the drawing room, after another solemn silence, and a few words which I uttered in prayer for the King and Queen. We found a deputation of Friends with an address to read to him—this was done. The King appeared to feel it much. We had then to part.—The King expressed his desire that blessings might continue to rest on our house.”

We have said little of Mrs. Fry’s domestic character, or of her relations to a wide family circle, with all of whom she lived in intimate sympathy. Beyond the general impression it produces of her remarkable tenderness, and activity of love, and of the support which every member of so large a connection seems to have drawn from her, the Memoir does not permit us to go. By very unnecessarily representing her eleven children, and numerous brothers and sisters, and all their off-shoots, by



blanks and letters of the alphabet, the reader finds himself at last walking among shadows, or dealing with algebraical symbols. No one can go on long keeping up a separate set of ideas and associations for As and Bs and Cs, or clothe these signs with the interests of flesh and blood. Her children, and her brothers and sisters, married into religious connections different from her own, but this, instead of souring her mind, only increased her liberality, enlarged her experience, and widened her love, bringing her delightful assurances that the Church of Christ has its members in all the Churches of men. She says herself in a charming spirit: "I think that my general religious association has delightfully extended my spiritual borders. I can from my heart say, all one in Christ; all dearly beloved, as brothers and sisters, who love his name and seek to follow him." She had many trials of the affections in the illness and death of children; brothers and sisters; and evidently frequent sorrows and disappointments, of other kinds, that are obscurely stated. In 1845, her strength which had been long failing, was manifestly broken, and her life waning away. She came to the Earlham of her childhood and youth once more. Of this last visit her daughters beautifully write:—

"What a history had hers been since the time of the scarlet riding habit—since she sat and wept under the ministry of William Savery. Her ardent aspirations had been strangely granted; she had passed a long life of blessing to others, but by a path of singular sorrow to herself. She had been eyes to the blind, and feet to the lame: when the ear heard her, then it blessed her. She had trodden regal halls to plead for the afflicted and the destitute; she had not withheld unpalatable truth when the language of warning was called for at her lips. She had penetrated, nothing daunted, the gloom of the felon's dungeon, nor had she shrank from the touch of the unclothed maniac; she had nourished and brought up children, and they had risen up and called her blessed; and now, helpless and suffering in body, enfeebled in memory, all that could be shaken tottering to its base—she came again to take a last look at the home and the haunts of her childhood."

We might desire more of details, more of quickening and realizing information as to her methods of action, but

the secret, were it ever so vast and wonderful, of the greatness and goodness of this devoted woman is given in her own words to one of her daughters :—

“My dear R——, I can say one thing: since my heart was touched at seventeen years old, I believe I never have awakened from sleep, in sickness or in health, by day or by night, without my first waking thought being, how best I might serve my Lord.”

## ART. V.—PHILOSOPHICAL CHRISTIANITY IN FRANCE.

*Le Christianisme Expérimental; par Athanase Coquerel, l'un des Pasteurs de l'Eglise Réformée de Paris.* Paris, 1847. Christianity: its perfect Adaptation to the Mental, Moral, and Spiritual Nature of Man; by Athanase Coquerel, &c., translated by Rev. D. Davison, M.A., with a Preface, written expressly for the English Edition, by the Author. London, 1847.

It is the frequent error of a generous faith, to insist on the inefficacy, as well the wickedness, of persecution. The state of Protestantism in France presents formidable difficulties in the way of so consolatory a belief. The scanty circle of the Reformed Church in that country cannot be supposed to comprise all the fruits, which the genius of a great people would naturally gather from the Reformation: and the meagreness of the result is manifestly due, not to any national inaptitude for the Lutheran system, but to the fatal success of ecclesiastical and political coercion. Far from being indifferent to the corruptions of the Church, and careless as to the purity of religion, our continental neighbours were the first among modern nations to betray their sensitiveness on these points. The revolt of the Paterins of Languedoc against the abuses of the clergy and the pretensions of the Papacy had been suppressed by the policy of Innocent and the sword of Simon de Montfort two centuries before the ashes of Huss were thrown into the Rhine. Even before the close of the 11th century, Roscelin, followed by the celebrated Abelard, had vindicated the liberty of philosophizing with a popularity which awakened the alarm, and drew down the punishments of the Church. If a mediæval politician had been asked to name the country most likely to secede from allegiance to the Latin hierarchy, and to be the cradle of a new Christianity, it can scarcely be doubted that he would have mentioned France. That the fact turned out otherwise is no evidence against the sagacity of the prediction. The Papal Court provoked indeed the first fatal resistance at Wittenberg: but only because it had selected the German Empire as a hopeful field for its most audacious enterprise. No sooner

had the schism ripened itself into an independent religion, than it found a hospitable welcome among the subjects of the house of Valois. In no country did it more equally divide the State with the old faith ; so that the history of Protestantism in France is the history of its civil wars. Had Henry of Navarre been succeeded by a prince equally magnanimous, and the Edict of Nantes been maintained as the basis of religious peace, no one can doubt that the whole course of European history would have assumed a different, and—according to all human estimate—a more visibly beneficent direction. France, disappointed of her Reformation, was driven forward to her Revolution. The crisis of grave, religious earnestness was allowed to pass : its remonstrances against wrong in the spiritual stage being spurned, slumbered till the evil assumed the palpable shape of debt and hunger ; and then broke out, not from the sober middle-class as a cry of conscience, but from the populace as an outburst of despair. Every great national struggle leaves behind it a class triumphant and a class depressed ; whose altered relations determine the destinies of many generations. The great social revolution of modern times was effected, in Germany by the princes and literati ; in England, by the yeomen and the trades ; in France, by the *plebs* and the press : and accordingly, the dominant influence remains, in the first case, with the secular powers and the Universities ; in the second, with property ; in the third, with personal qualities and democratic passion. Protestantism, successful in Germany by the weapons of learning more than by popular resolve, never forgot its first alliance : philosophy, in that country, has been developed side by side with theology ; instead of waiting, as in England, till religion compelled it to awake, or pushing itself forward, as in France, to an independent completeness and sufficiency. Among us, it is the interest of the speculative thinker to keep on terms with the divine. In the country of Luther, they may recommend, without mutual disturbance, in the same building, and to the same audience, systems variously contradictory of each other. In Paris, it is necessary for theology to conciliate philosophy. It is unequal to a contest with M. Cousin, and must accept of truce or treaty : the claims of Isaiah being admitted, with reservation of the rights of Kant ; the futurities of the Apocalypse and the third Heavens of Paul

remaining unchallenged, so far as may consist with the non-existence of both Time and Space. Notwithstanding the lofty tone of M. Coquerel's work, a painful feeling oppresses us that the conditions of his advocacy are essentially humiliating. We are fully alive to the importance of harmonising faith and science, so long as each retains its own ground, its own method, its own language. But we do not love to see religion playing the lackey to philosophy; aping its pomps, assuming its livery, and standing behind its chair. Even where a less obsequious relation prevails, it is but too evident which power is patron, and which the client. We are forcibly reminded by the book before us, that Protestantism has no lineage of great recollections in France, no continuous literature, no course of development; that its noblest traditions were abruptly dispersed through other lands, and checked in their indigenous results. For anything that appears, this might be the first work of dogmatic theology in the French language. The absence of all historical matter, the absolute isolation of the author's system, the curious subordination of Scriptural to metaphysical evidence, betray the peculiar conditions under which the task has been wrought out. Reformed Religion in fact has lost its parentage in France; presents itself as an orphan or a foundling without the shelter of an ancestral home; and, though willing to work its way in part by its own merits, submits not unnaturally to appear as the adopted child of that powerful philosophy, which holds empire over the gravest minds in the metropolis of European culture. M. Coquerel himself speaks of the Bible as "little known to the public at large in this country;" and that it is expected to be far less familiar to his readers than the "*Fragmens Philosophiques*," is evident from the whole structure of his work. His instrument for determining "the principal problems of the Human Mind," including the theory of Redemption, is the Logic of the eclectic school: and the dexterity of fence with which its weapons are wielded, and its evolutions performed, contrast strangely with the elementary simplicity of the Scriptural illustrations and proofs. These however are banished, in each of the six books, to the dark closet of an Appendix, into which few will be inclined to penetrate from the light and airy chamber of our author's reasonings; and in which

still fewer will remain long enough to bring down their dazzled vision to so deep a dusk.

We refer to these features of M. Coquerel's book, that our readers may estimate its adaptation to a particular latitude of thought. It is a compromise with the spirit of the age in Paris. It accommodates its expression of what we hold to be eternal truth to the formulas of what we believe to be a transient fashion of the schools: and drives its admeasurements through the universe, from a base which, we fear, is ill-determined, and with instruments not unaffected by the metaphysical temperature of the hour. Strange to say, the subjective sciences, when they affect the most rigorous demonstration, and present a complexion most free from local and historic colouring, are the first to lose their persuasive efficacy by removal to a new place or time. By attaching his Christianity to them, our author has probably consulted well the temper and wants of the church for which he labours. But his logic, we fear, will neither migrate nor keep. It is like an electric charge, carefully collected from a well-dried machine and in a crisp air: to be brilliant and effective, it must be discharged at once: for we live in a wet world: and in awaiting the weather of another generation, or even crossing the Channel to this cloudy land, it oozes off in the damps and disappears. Upon ourselves at least, notwithstanding the most favourable predispositions, we confess that the experiment has been vainly tried. We retain the most delightful impression of M. Coquerel's preaching. We know that his character is no less dignified than his intellect is rich. We concur in the main results of his theology, and rejoice that a faith so generous should have an advocacy so splendid. We see in the title of the book an aim altogether just,—To draw from the self-consciousness of man a confession of the divine beauty and authority of our religion. We were encouraged, by the full and interesting Preface to the English Edition, to expect a privilege most precious,—and be admitted to the interior of a mind affluent in the gifts of nature and experience:—

“The work,” says M. Coquerel, “assumes to be a complete view of Christianity, under the twofold aspect of reason and faith, of human knowledge and Divine Revelation; the volume unfolds, if the labour answers the aim, a complete system of philosophy and of

religion,—the religion of the Gospel, such as I consider and believe it to be.

"It is the labour of my whole life, the summary of the long studies of thirty years spent in ministerial duties.

"The purpose of this treatise would not have been answered if the book, a work of conscience, was not a work of perfect sincerity; it is even so much so, that the system of religion unfolded in these pages is complete; all the deep and awful questions put to the human intellect by the Christian faith are answered. I have said all that I believe; I have kept nothing in reserve, no sentiment of my mind, no secret of my understanding, no conviction of my creed. I have spoken with that tranquil security which faith inspires; and if I have always found myself at ease with respect to the risk of error, it is simply because I have felt myself supported by the calmness of sincerity; in the language of Montaigne, I always could say to myself, 'Ma conscience ne falsifie pas un iota; mon inscience je ne sçay.'

"Every thing is consistent in the book; the thoughts are bound up together; they all serve in their turn as premises and conclusions; it belongs to the very essence of religious truths to be melted down into a condensed alloy, to be orderly disposed in a connected system. To detach a few fragments, to weigh some separate propositions, to discuss not the groundwork and the whole, but some scattered theories of the essay after breaking the links of the chain, would be to dispose of the volume without justice to the author, or without fruit to the reader."—Page xiii.

The program is charming: and seldom have we opened a book with heartier hopes of finding rest for many a doubt and higher certainty for many a truth. Alas!—slowly and sadly have we been brought to confess it,—we find here many problems, few solutions. These logical "chains," that seem so securely stringent to those who fasten them, are too often like the fetters that bind us in our dreams; to the prisoner, defiant of fracture; ideal and non-existent to the observer. The inconclusiveness of M. Coquerel's reasonings appears to us precisely of this kind: they press upon the brain, and do no more. We have read books which have profoundly convinced us of the *falsehood* of the positions they maintained: no writings, for instance, have ever so cleared for us the foundations of religious faith, as Hume's sceptical Essays. But the present work is innocent of so perverse a result. It provokes no doubt; but it helps no faith. We see the language of demonstration, but are unconscious of the presence of



argument. We often agree to the conclusions; only they seem considerably more certain than the premises. And after passing from some semblance of rhetorical dialectics to the luminous statement of a great principle with the pendant of a happy illustration, we are tempted to wish that our author had followed Lord Mansfield's advice,—given his judgment and withheld his reasons. The real, natural sources of human faith appear to us to be scarcely named: and in their place, are substituted processes so artificial, that we know not how any one can fancy them to be the ground of his assurance. Why, for example, do we believe in the resemblance between the human and the Divine mind?—Because man has no model but himself, from which to conceive of God; and we trust in this limit imposed upon our Reason for not debarring us from truth. Our author however replies, Because we know that God had no model but himself, from which to create man (p. 22). Again, most writers on Christian evidence are content to rest the divine authority of Jesus on his personal claims and the ascertained contents of his human life: and having been drawn to him thus, they sometimes throw a wider glance around him, and undertake to show that in the place of his birth and the age of his appearing there is nothing at variance with the good Providence of mankind. Our author proceeds in the inverse order: he finds his Redeemer, as Le Verrier found his planet, by calculating his *whereabouts*. He demonstrates, from the perturbations of history and the necessary action of the world's central forces,—that there is but one era and one spot at which Messiah *could* appear; and having predetermined the elements of his orbit, leaves it to common observers to point the telescope of experiment, and detect him, precisely where he is due, in the spaces of the Past. Jesus *must be* the Saviour: for either date or place would else be wrong. Once more: it seems conformable with nature, to know a little of our acquaintances before we grow fond of them,—to feel pretty sure that their honour is not a semblance or their genial graces a dream, ere we open our hearts to them: and though our continental neighbours are certainly readier in their social advances than a stiff-necked Briton can well understand, we were not prepared to learn the extent to which they

outstrip us. Their affections, not content with being faithful to past intimacies, are prophetic of future; and, like the incubating bird, hatch into reality the objects of their yearning instinct. The first notice men have that a friend *exists* is—the love they bear him: the caress of the parent proves that there is a child. M. Coquerel lives in a pretty populous city: he preaches every week to crowded assemblies: yet the best proof he can find that the earth is not a solitude breaks out in his exclamation, “Pleasant and affecting thought! I am *sure of the existence* of my fellowmen, *because* I love them!”—(P. 12.)

From these examples it will be evident that our author’s reasoning is of the *à priori* kind. The large propositions which this method assumes for its point of departure; the vague terms with which it deals; the facilities it opens at every step for the admission of unauthorized assumptions; render it a treacherous instrument in the hands of the closest thinkers; and where Spinoza and Clarke have not succeeded, it is no dishonour if M. Coquerel have failed. The main purpose of his work being to show the fitness of Christianity to human wants, Man becomes to him the measure of all things. The mind is not only the seat, but the standard, of all science; its conceptions being the representatives of possibility, its faculties the indicators of corresponding realities. Hence, all knowledge must start from self-knowledge: and not till we have noticed which way the mind’s countenance is turned, and followed the sweep of its out-look, can we tell by what external objects we are environed, and in sketching our panorama of the universe, distinguish between the landscape and the mirage. With this idea, our author begins with an analysis of Self, as the prototype or skeleton sphere, whose shadow, projected by the central light of consciousness through the outer vault, hits upon all actual existences, and gives us the form of Nature and of God. Considering the extreme importance of this analysis to all that follows, we feel bound to register one or two difficulties with which it stops us at the outset.

The source of our idea of Causality has given some trouble to philosophers. It has been referred, at one time to the observation of external successions,—at another, to the feeling of internal volition. Perhaps neither of these, if

eternally isolated and unawakened by the other, would suffice for the explanation: and the collision of our spontaneous activity which knows beforehand what it would be at, with obstructions that check us without notice, is needful to give us the related and simultaneous ideas of *cause within* and *cause without*. This dual conception is equivalent, we think, to the consciousness of Self as contrasted with Not-self: and we have therefore no objection to say, that self-consciousness implies the notion of causality, with the belief in external objects that *now* operate upon us. But it does not imply any belief that *our own causality has been caused*; or refer us back to any time when we ourselves began to operate as agents. Our knowledge of such a time is derived, we apprehend, from quite a different source, from testimony and the current observation of human life; and no turning of the eye within would ever reveal it to us. We therefore cannot assent to the following passage, containing our author's proof of the creation of the human race:—

“Consciousness of existence is accompanied by two corollary notions, which are inseparable from it:

“1. This consciousness of being has not always existed, it has had a beginning; if my existence had not begun, I should know it, since I know my existence. I find myself in the present; in the past I do not find myself.

“An existence unknown to him who possesses it, is not an existence, properly so called; it reckons for nothing, or, more correctly speaking, it is to be reckoned otherwise.

“2. In this existence, of which he is conscious, man feels that his will or his power has had no part: he does not preserve it, and if it is not he who maintains it, it is not he who has conferred it. He would employ for its maintenance, the power displayed to possess it. Whatever may be the cause of the existence of man it is something foreign to himself; it is apart from and without him. Life, that phenomenon which the human mind has never succeeded in defining, has not its source in life.”—(P. 2.)

If simple consciousness of existence involved a knowledge of its commencement, it would necessarily report to us the *date* of its commencement. Enabling us to compare together a present in which we find ourselves and a past in which we do not, it must detect for us, at their point of contact, our moment of nativity: and every man

could tell his own age, without resort to the parish register. As there have been years of childhood, of which our memory preserves no report, so, though other years or even centuries had been prefixed, it is quite possible that no trace of them might be found in our immediate self-knowledge.

Having alighted upon this supposed evidence of the origination of mankind, our author would seem to be on the verge of discovery as to the existence of God. He has obtained a glimpse of the hiding-place of some creative power : and by pressing another step in advance, we should expect him to apprehend the nature of that power, and to stand in the presence of the great Object of worship. He refrains however from proceeding further in this direction : and reaches his Theism by an argument which has no reference to causation, and would remain precisely the same, though the human race had no consciousness of a derivative existence. The mind, on close inspection, resolves its unity into five separate tendencies or powers—Intellect, Conscience, Affection, Sensitiveness to enjoyment, and Religiousness. Each of these inspires us with an ideal notion of something that would bring it entire content, and which secretly serves as a standard measure in every judgment that we make. Now every ideal thus employed as a rule must be more than a mental creation : it must have an objective reality answering to it. The ideal of the 5th or religious faculty is an Infinite and Perfect Mind. Such a Mind therefore exists ;—proved by our veneration, as our fellowmen are proved by our love.

There is a painful slightness and precariousness in this reasoning : and it is not without shrinking that we see the most solemn of truths thrown off, in this aeronautic way, to float in so fragile an ark through metaphysic skies. What possible reliance can be placed on the loose proposition "that the ideal cannot be a mere abstraction," "but that it is realised without us,—that it exists,—that it is a fact?" Our author himself directly contradicts this on the adjacent page, where he says, "A perfect man is *the mere abstraction* of our minds" (p. 4). And did we not join him in this contradiction, into what absurdities should we not run ? An "ideal" must be an ideal *something* : and according to the arts or studies which engage men, do they

acquire facility in improving their conceptions, and forming images of faultless objects. Within the dreams of every aspiring tailor there hang, no doubt, ideal coats,—poorly represented on the clothes-frame at his street-door: and the precincts of all livery-stables are haunted by ideal horses of most tantalizing perfection: and, in such neighbourhoods, “all appreciations are founded on the measure of the ideal.” But alas! are such garments “realized without us?” do these steeds of Diomed “exist” in “fact?” Whatever has “objective validity” dwells somewhere in space and time,—for this it is that constitutes *an object*; and until our author’s ideals can be referred to by date and position, his Realism goes for nothing. We regret the more the rashness of this reasoning, because we think it susceptible, by close limitation to our *Moral* nature, of exhibition in a valid form. If it can be shown,—as we incline to believe,—that the mind, while capable of mechanical and æsthetic, is incapable of moral invention, but must be lifted into higher conceptions by the direct influence of another and higher nature, the basis of an argument is laid for proving the reality of an invisible and Perfect Mind. We cannot pause to raise the structure now: but were unwilling to quit M. Coquerel’s discussion of this point, without thus far qualifying our expression of dissent. Nor can we dwell upon the ground of our belief in the Unity of God; any further than to confess that our author’s curt argument,—which he pronounces to be the sole possible proof,—“Since the ideal is one, God is one” (p. 20),—lies wholly beyond our comprehension.

The problem then stands thus: (1). Wanted, a Power for the creation of man: (2). Found, a Being absolute and infinite, the “ideal of *intelligence*.” The question rises, can we avail ourselves of this discovery to supply the previous want? may we say, that the perfect Being is no doubt the Causal Power? To bridge this vast chasm between the Moral entity and the Physical agency of God, is perhaps the most difficult task in the great architecture of natural religion. M. Coquerel flies across himself with enviable speed; but lends us no wing, and builds us no road, by which we can follow him. Here is his passage

from the notion of ideal Perfection to that of creative Causality:—

“Creation, in God, is a natural consequence of infinity; and this explains how the fact of creation is completely a truth of faith, and not of reasoning. And since God is one, every thing except himself is creation; without this, the ideal would neither be one nor a being; and we have seen that religiousness in man tends, not towards the ideal personified in imagination, but towards the ideal personalised. Man, an individual, aspires towards God, an individual.”—(P. 22.)

How “Creation should be a natural consequence of Infinity,” we are at a loss to imagine. Ponder as we may the relation between finite and infinite, it yields us no conception of active power. Space is infinite; but does space create? To establish the origination of man by some foreign power, our author uses an argument which would equally prove the created nature of Deity. “Man,” he says, “does not preserve his existence; and feels that he has not conferred it.”—(P. 21.) Did God confer his own existence? does he preserve it? can he extinguish it? Is it not even less at the disposal of the Will than ours? How then can the domination of Volition over Life be adopted as a test of independent existence? The truth is, M. Coquerel, like many of his predecessors on the *à priori* track, misses altogether, as it seems to us, the proof of Divine Causality; and thus leaves a fundamental unsoundness in his structure, which no subsequent ingenuity can repair.

In running over our author's catalogue of five faculties, a practised psychological eye will notice his silence respecting the *Will*: and the question will arise, why has an element, so important in the analysis of self, been altogether omitted? There is a looseness and fluctuation in the language referring to this subject, which prevents our giving a steady reply. In one place, we find the following:—

“This will, this power, this freedom of man (for freedom is only power), which cannot go so far as to rob him of the elements of his nature, does go so far as to disturb their equilibrium, to lead him to prefer and cultivate one faculty to the detriment of others, and even so far as to subject the religious to the inferior tendencies, though its province is to rule, because it is that which most nearly



approximates the infinite. It is obvious that the liberty of a being, whatever it may be, consists precisely in the free use of the faculties inherent in its nature, and of all its faculties or powers without exception. There is no question of more or less free; freedom exists or it does not. Imagine the smallest hindrance; freedom exists no more; it is only possible on condition of being complete; it is only real on condition of being absolute . . . . If I carry the slightest fragment, the smallest grain of shot, I march perhaps, but I do not march unimpeded, and wherever freedom appears suspended or violated by outward facts, if man thinks he acts, he is under the influence of an illusion; he does not perform acts; he only makes movements."—(P. 6.)

In the beginning of this paragraph, liberty is made to consist in the power of selecting some favourite from among the five tendencies for special culture and indulgence. As such a power cannot itself be any member of the five, but descends upon them *ab extra*, the list of faculties already given cannot furnish a complete account of what a man finds in himself, and the classification is at fault. At the end of the paragraph, liberty is differently described:—as the absence of hindrance from any form of activity,—an unimpeded course for a tendency towards its appropriate end. In this sense, *every* force of our nature, so long as nothing is in the way, is free, and (since our author affirms freedom and will to be the same) *voluntary*. The will therefore, on this supposition, is not an additional and omitted element in the analysis of self; but only the state or function of each faculty in its unobstructed isolation. Were we to accept this account of the matter, we must allow, that the inferior animals possess more free-will than man: for their energies of instinct or affection possess them in more absolute surrender, and proceed to their end with less embarrassment, than the balanced impulses of the human mind. As these two ideas of free-will hopelessly diverge from one another, in the following sentences is a third, which will not coalesce with either:—

"To will or to act is to choose. Every action of a free being is a choice, and every choice implies an alternative, one at least.

"Thus, each of our tendencies is, as it were, placed in the face of an alternative.

"The alternative of the intellectual power is true and false.

"The alternative of the moral power is good and evil.



"The alternative of the affections is devotedness and selfishness.

"The alternative of our sensitiveness is contentment and suffering.

"The alternative of religiousness is fervour and indifference.

"These alternatives, between which it is the province of our freedom to choose, and these directions which each of our tendencies may follow, are indefinite; nothing limits, nothing terminates them; they never say, it is enough. Our faculties are never loaded to the utmost; there is always room for something more."—(P. 30.)

Here we are brought back again to the original idea of *choice*:—a choice, however, no longer made *by* the *Will among the Tendencies*; but *by* each *Tendency between opposite directions*. This view therefore conveys a voluntary character into *all* our faculties: and the intellect in believing, the affections in loving, even sensitiveness in enjoying, perform acts no less intentional and controllable, than moral resolve springing out of a warm bed on a frosty morning. It also follows, that the adoption of a course abhorrent to the very nature of a tendency must arise from the deliberate choice of that tendency itself: and, when we meet with a wrong-headed, a selfish, a suffering man, we must say, it is his *intelligence* that elects error; his *affections* that prefer coldness; his *sensitiveness* that had rather be miserable.

Unable as we are to conciliate these varieties of phrase, we cannot expect to receive much help from our author in solving the great problem of necessity. His attempt introduces us to yet another shifting of his definition:—

"The mystery of free will," he says, "that ancient stone of stumbling in all religions, all systems of philosophy, and all schools,—lies in the point of separation of the two powers, the creating power and the power created. To ask *how man is free*, is to ask how the Creator, his work being finished, *separated himself and kept himself separate* from his creature and leaves him to himself."—(P. 24.)

If these questions be equivalent to one another, it follows that "freedom" consists in the non-intervention of God; and that all causes that are permitted a range of separate operation are *free*. But the great physical agencies of the universe, by which the motion and change of bodies are occasioned, are usually believed to be of this description,—powers commissioned to go of themselves.

Do they then repeat the difficulty of freedom? We should suppose so from the following sentences:—

“The same mystery appears again in *inactive* existences.

“We know not how the Creator’s power ceases to weigh upon free beings, raises and keeps raised the sluices of the will.

“We know no better the manner in which creative power detaches itself from matter, and leaves physical laws and secondary causes to play their part.

“The hand of God, we say, launched the planets in the tangent of their orbits, and since that time the universe rolls on alone. But how has God withdrawn his hand? That is the question.”

The withdrawal of God’s hand then leaves the planet and the will alike free. The feature which constitutes liberty is common to them both. We claim no more for the will than we find in the star: and in proportion as the latter case sits lightly on our apprehension, should we disembarass ourselves of difficulty as to the former. Is not this the way in which every reader understands M. Coquerel? Has he not established an analogy, in respect to freedom, between the will and the planet? Ought not the final inference manifestly to stand thus? ‘The question then regards not the freedom of the will exclusively, but presents itself identically in the equal freedom of the planet?’ How is it possible, then, not to be thrown aback by his own summing up of his argument?

“The question is not then respecting the freedom of the will, since it presents itself identically *where there is no freedom*.”

The frequency with which the conclusions thus administer an emetic upon the premises we have been induced to swallow, renders the study of this work an inconvenient discipline; like the tossing of Charon’s boat to Lucian’s cargo of philosophers; expecting at last, poor shades! a portion of Elysian wisdom, and doomed only to be relieved of all that they had learned above, and left shivering on Stygian banks.

In the present case, our author’s retraction was evidently necessary to save his libertarian faith. He had mounted upon an analogy that could not but run away with him straight into fatalism. What more can the advocate of necessity require than that God should be allowed

to stand at an equal distance from the products of volition and the effects of gravitation? If he is *no more separated* from our voluntary acts, than he is from the sweep of a planet, then he is as much the cause of the one as of the other; and is no less absolutely the author of our moral good and ill, than of the earth's vicissitudes of season. The prime condition of the whole doctrine of free will is the denial and demolition of the delusive analogy to which M. Coquerel has had recourse for its illustration.

Through all the indistinctness of our author's language on the subject of the will, one fixed misconception appears to us to pervade his book. He recognises *no involuntary elements* in human nature. He reverses the error of James Mill, who dissipates volition into association, and resolves the most sustained exertions of thought into a passive procession of inevitable suggestions: and he makes the will cover the whole ground of our faculties, determining what we shall believe and love, no less than what we shall do. It must be owned however that, if he had fallen into no snare here, he would have achieved an unexampled success. The precise distinction and mutual relation of the voluntary and involuntary functions of our nature constitute the critical point of all such systems. They intersect the course of every theory with a slippery passage, on which the foot of the firmest thinker seems unable to hold its place. If *all* the active phenomena be voluntary as in our author's apprehension, we are responsible for all, and may deserve well or ill for our judgments and sentiments as well as for our acts. If *none* of them are voluntary, or (what amounts to the same) if those which are so called follow in inevitable sequence from involuntary antecedents, we are responsible for nothing, and cannot deserve well or ill for our actions more than for our judgments. This is essentially the Calvinistic theory; according to which the will, *before* regeneration, is necessarily determined by corrupt inherited affections, and *after* regeneration, by super-induced divine grace: only it is inconsistently maintained, that while this second condition, not being the agent's work, carries no merit, the first, in which he is equally powerless, possesses infinite demerit. The followers of Hartley appear to us to exhibit, in different portions of their doctrine, the conflicting influences of these two extremes. The tendency of their Ethics is to claim every

thing for morality and the will,—to enforce a stern doctrine of accountability,—to carry the feeling of duty through the whole mind, to accept no excuses from the arts of the Devil, and expect no help from the spirit of God. The tendency of their Metaphysics, on the contrary, is to encroach upon and extinguish the Causality of man, to assimilate mental with physical agency, to resolve everything into mechanism, and mechanism into mere sequence; so as to retain in their conceptions no reservoir of real power save God himself. Each of these tendencies, if its demand were unimpeachable, ought to absorb the other: both however express an ineffaceable sentiment of our nature: and their continued co-existence, without any due adjustment of their boundary, attests at once the presence of an element of truth, and the inefficiency of that philosophy which cannot part with either, yet cannot reconcile the two. Only by the union within us of the freely voluntary with the involuntary can room be left for the joint presence of a human and a divine element in our spiritual life,—for obligation on the part of man and co-operation on that of God: and a theory which does not recognise and faithfully describe this union, fails to satisfy the primary conditions of a religious philosophy.

Our author's psychology conducts us directly to his moral theory. To a being entrusted with moral liberty, there is necessarily opened a career of indefinite approximation to God or alienation from him. A law of progress is imposed upon a nature thus endowed: and in case of unfaithfulness to such law, the doom of regress and degradation is its inevitable counterpart and substitute. This is no peculiarity of man in particular; but, as a direct corollary of free will, applies to all beings, in all worlds, who are susceptible of the idea of duty. There is clearly no fixed limit, at which the spiritual movement of the soul towards or away from the infinite model of Perfection suffers arrest. It is therefore interminable: and immortality necessarily belongs to all moral beings. Nor need we hesitate to descend with this high claim to a lower stage of creation. Along with man there dwell upon the earth *unprogressive* races,—the animals submitted to his power. Now in the system and arrangements of a world, it is a law that the highest term of being it contains determines all that is below: the place is accommodated to the

inhabitants: and the inferior members to the chief occupant. Hence the merely animal tribes share the human fate; the same incidents of birth, death, suffering, are entailed upon them. In this respect however they suffer an injustice: for it is the wickedness of man that has introduced suffering in the world, and brought it upon unoffending creatures. They have therefore a claim to compensation: which will be afforded, in M. Coquerel's belief, by their partnership in our immortality, as in our humiliation. No preacher of "judgments,"—no Jew inquiring 'Did this man sin or did his parents, that he was born blind,'—no Plumptre deprecating potatoe-rot or cholera by fast and humiliation,—ever proclaimed with less qualification than our author, that all physical evil is the result of moral evil. There was a time—the duration of which he does not define,—when "human progress was fulfilling its aim;" and so long, man was in Eden. The first step in a direction opposite to progress, by whomsoever taken, constituted the *Fall*: the effect of which is twofold: entailing, through the social or family relationship of mankind, a moral retardation, or *original sin*, on the whole species: and deteriorating, through the necessary correspondency between the tenant and the abode, the conditions of the globe itself, so as to create earthquakes and volcanoes, to remove the barriers from disease and decay, and for the first time annex pain to the processes of birth and death. This casual connexion between moral and physical ill, is not, moreover, a mere incident of our present phase of being. It is fixed in *rerum naturâ*,—and as activity is continuous, and human existence indefinitely prolonged, on the one hand the approach of the soul to its Creator or retreat from him may be perpetual, and, on the other, corresponding results of blessing or dismay must spring up along the endless path. Hence, rewards and punishments are alike eternal, and alike self-inflicted.—(Pp. 31. 85.)

We have endeavoured to present a faithful abstract of M. Coquerel's conceptions as to the moral history and physiognomy of the unredeemed world. Let us first ask, whether any one, simply studying the past by the lights of science and interpreted tradition, the present by the help of consciousness and observation, and content to follow the indications of evidence, could possibly arrive at such a creed? and next, whether it agrees any better with

the fair results of Biblical exegesis, so as to present a picture of the state of mind found in any one of the Scripture writers? It professes to be a deduction of purely *subjective* religion,—the report of self-consciousness respecting its contents and its surroundings; and not till it has been drawn forth whole and entire thence, is it ostensibly set up by the side of the sacred writings, in order to justify the exclamation, "See how the living spirit and the ancient letter say the same thing!" So rigidly does our author propose to adhere to his psychological method, that he expressly discountenances all appeal to chronological fact, and refuses to submit his theory to such a test. He tells us that before "the fall" there was no evil, and that all convulsions and disasters of the world will be found lower down. If we are to try this assertion at all, the first step, one should think, must be to *reach the date* of the fall, that we may compare the state of things fore and aft, and see whether we stand at the *incunabula malorum*. We are put off however with the assurance that "it is of no consequence" to search into the duration before the fall, the precise period at which the fall took place, or the number of the first authors of the introduction of moral evil."

"These questions," he adds, "are to be discarded from the sphere of dogma: they belong to the domain of history; and whether left out of view or thoroughly examined, resolved in one sense or another, declared to be doubtful or unknown, they make no change whatever on the discoveries and definitions of Christianity, as expounded in these pages."—(P. 81.)

These are lofty words: only we are perplexed to understand how, at this sublime height above history, an historical event of the first magnitude,—in fact, a revolution in terrestrial nature, comes to be known. If M. Coquerel, like less philosophical divines, referred us plainly to the book of Genesis, and said, "Here is my authority; but for this I should know nothing of the matter,"—we should understand how to deal with his positions. 'Did the Hebrew cosmogonist mean this?' and 'Was he qualified to affirm it?' would then be our questions. But our author rejects the idea of any inspiration of the Scriptures on matters of science and history: he limits it to religious truth: and all religious truth is subjective: so that nothing is appealed to as divine in the Bible, except what he can



in some way recognize in himself. But by what ingenious self-scrutiny does he discover, that the pains of childbirth are the effects of guilt; that the fires of *Ætna* are penal; that, until remorse was felt, the law of atmospheric equilibrium precluded the possibility of storms; and that our earliest progenitors found it agreeable to die? How far these things might disclose themselves to *mesmeric* introspection, we cannot say. The Poughkeepsie seer tells us of the delight with which the intelligent inhabitants of Jupiter give up the ghost; and how they walk, not arm in arm as we do, but on all fours, like Kangaroos with the short legs set on behind and the long in front; and with what ingenuous modesty they amble along, protruding foremost the tremulous snout which reveals their spiritual sentiments. These disclosures about an existing planet seem to us to have no less probable a truth, and a much more certain prudence, than the theological delineation of the Pre-adamite earth: for while nobody can contradict the one, Geology has a word to say upon the other. The causes which prepared the world for man, and which operated through a dreary immensity of ages before it became the scene of any moral good or ill, have left their record every where upon the outer shell of our planet. In the attempt to trace the course of their effects, it has usually been deemed necessary to assume the prevalence, in the ancient globe, of energies vastly more tremendous than are witnessed now. To avoid this necessity, the question has no doubt been raised, whether, by an exhaustive use, through unlimited time, of our existing stock of convulsive forces, the revolutions of sea and land might not be explained. But we have never before heard of a geological theory more tranquil even than this: and are at a loss to conceive how, with the gases in so mild a mood, the Andes were upheaved, and with the old cauldrons temperately simmering, the basalt could boil over and split the hills. The images presented in a geological museum do not help one's conception of a paradisaical state: and, notwithstanding M. Coquerel's guarantee against disease, we would forego the privileges of "the lacustrine period" in favour of the sanatory commissioners and a better drained condition of the world. Our author admits, with great fairness, that the natural history of extinct races of creatures presses against his hypothesis as to



the dependence of physical suffering on moral transgression :—

“ Science,” he says, “ has proved, that before the existence of man there had already been sufferings amongst the animals which peopled the earth, whether they were similar or not to those which now exist ; and it has proved that in these primitive times animals devoured one another, as they do now.”—(P. 43.)

Conclusive as these facts would seem, our author’s philosophy is not without resources for escape from them :—

“ It may be answered, that as we know not when our phase of progress will terminate, we know no better when it really commenced ; that the union and connexion between animals and man was established even from before the existence of man ; and, in fact, this merely amounts to saying that the servants preceded the master in their common dwelling-place.

“ Still more, the physical sciences in their actual progress begin to open up and explain the providential truth, that the geological periods, the successive organizations of our planet before the creation of the human species, have from of old been preparatory to the present condition of the globe, the productions which clothe its surface, and the atmosphere by which it is surrounded. Pre-adamite organizations, animals of all kinds, whose fossil remains are deposited and scattered in prodigious masses at different depths in the bosom of the earth, constitute an essential part of this preparation, and the phenomena of their existence have served from of old to render possible in this world the more exalted phenomena of human life. Above all, let us never forget that these notions of *before* and *after* are always without value and without application when we speak of God, the Infinite Being ; and that consequently, in the divine mind, the phenomena of geological periods are as intimately connected with the destiny of the human species as those of the present order of things.”—(P. 44.)

If we rightly apprehend this reply, it declares that “ the servants ” not merely *preceded* the master in their common dwelling place, but were *punished there* for his future sin, ages before he was in existence ; that they found their “ common dwelling-place ” already fitted up as a prison-house and furnished with the penalties of “ the fall,” while the very being who was to be put upon his trial appeared only in the far perspective of God’s designs. What is this but to say, that, although “ *no foresight can answer for mankind* ” (p. 340), the Creator presumed beforehand on the guilt of a free being yet untried?—and that the effect indefinitely preceded the cause? So that after all, that

"golden age," that "reign of the gods," when life was painless and unspoiled, and birth and death took place without a struggle, eludes us even in the guiltless era of the world. It was not worth while to set it up, when there was so little chance of its being permanently wanted. Where then are we to find it? Manifestly *nowhere* within the compass of objective reality: it is what our metaphysical neighbours strangely call a *truth of subjective religion*, disdaining the criteria of external fact; and what we should call, a fiction of the fancy, valid for nothing except the empty semblance of compromise between the geologists and Moses. It is evident indeed that in "the Fall," as represented by M. Coquerel, there is nothing peculiar to the human race; nothing limited to a particular date or occasion; nothing in fine, that does not hourly take place, wherever moral agents exist with unattained perfection. It is to be presumed that *every* race of beings endowed with free-will, must present some instances of neglected obligation, and exhibit traces therefore of "a fall." And though it is natural, in contemplating the operation of a permanent cause like moral evil, for the imagination to run back to its supposed commencement, and to fix a special interest on that moment, as representative of the whole tribe of succeeding phenomena, there is no real reason for assigning to the first case of slighted conscience effects different in kind or materially in degree, from those of present transgression. There are, alas! Adams in abundance "falling" every day;—beings not less recent to our world and fresh from God;—destined to be progenitors of families widening into races, who cannot be unaffected, more than we, by the character of their predecessors. Every incident of the great moral drama passes in daylight before our constant observation; why delude us by pushing it back into the primeval darkness? Why exalt into a crisis of romance and revolution an event, which, however disastrous, takes its place among permanent human facts. As well might you charge all the carnage on the field, to the first shot that was fired: its author, no doubt, is more likely to be named, and its effect to be marked, than any other element in the fight: but its fatal history might be told again of each component item in the thick volleys for which it gave the signal.

The attempt then to swell the results of early human

transgression, and carry them throughout animated nature, appears to us altogether unsound. Still less can we approve of the compensation offered for this extravagance,—the claim of a future life for the tribes of inferior creatures. At best, and without quitting the zoological level, the wants of man, and his carnivorous propensities in particular, present some distressing problems in relation to the brute creation. But to us there is something unspeakably shocking in the idea of being drawn in a cab by a horse that one might meet on everlasting pastures, and of permitting immortal sheep to be driven to the abattoirs. The class of conceptions thus opened would be fatal, we are convinced, to the belief in a futurity for our own race. That belief demands a reverential estimate of the human being; a lofty appreciation of his affections, reason, and conscience: a conviction that these endowments can bear the weight of so glorious a lot. On these powers it is that the real burthen of our great hope is thrown. And these are precisely the attributes which put us *in contrast* with the brutes, and represent us as of different nature. Transfer the plea for immortality from these to the qualities that make us partners with the lizard and the lobster, and who will undertake to defend so desperate a cause? Faith has enough to overcome already in the spectacle of sordid aims, of low and sensual passions, in mankind: if all the Mammalia are to crowd upon it with their petitions, it will inevitably be stifled to death.

The attention which our author bestows on the proof and illustration of the Fall, is explained as we approach his exposition of the Christian system. With him, Christianity, in its essence, is not the Impersonation of the Divine Character and of the Human Ideal in Jesus of Nazareth: it is not the miraculous disclosure of a Future Life; it is not the authoritative announcement of a system of Doctrine and Duty: but it is the accomplishment of Redemption,—the reversal of the Fall,—the arrest of mankind in their course of alienation from God, and the restoration of them to their destiny of advance towards him. It needs a personal Redeemer to achieve this task, and become “a *Stator* on the way of evil:” and as on the one hand he has to touch upon the work of God, and on the other to become the leader of men, he must be at once “the *alter ego* of the

Infinite Being," and the equal brother of mankind. He must pass through the four great *moments* of human existence,—birth, life, death, resurrection. Whilst his work is subjective,—in the heart of man,—his credentials and manifestation must be objective,—in outward facts. He must not take the world by surprise, but must be fore-announced by Prophecy. He must not be inconspicuous to contemporaries, but must be introduced to them by Miracles,—whose peculiar evidence is *essential* to eye-witnesses, but expires with them. The nature of his office determines the *period* of his coming: he must not delay, till the race is irrecoverable: he must not appear, till hope of its self-restoration is at an end: we shall therefore find him at the crisis of Society's lowest moral descent; i. e. in the reign of Tiberius. The same considerations determine his *place*. All the tribes of mankind divide themselves into progressive and stationary races, according as they practise monogamy or polygamy: the progressive races however, quickest in evil as in good, reaching their ultimate corruption first, in consequence of the more virulent action of Idolatry among them. They occupied the Mediterranean shores; and there accordingly, in the centre of the world that was in retreat from God, was it needful for the Redeemer to appear. Yet a stationary race was best fitted for the long and patient prophetic waiting for his arrival: and by presenting himself among the Hebrews, he touched, on either side, the opposite elements of ancient civilization. The "*testimony of redemption*," i. e. the *predictions*, and the *historical manifestation* of its Advent, constitute Revelation; from which we have no right to expect anything beyond this bare witness to a fact. The personal qualification for giving the testimony is *Inspiration*, a Divine communication of the requisite knowledge to the human understanding,—not verbally (for "God utters no words"), but through the medium of dreams and ecstasy, or mental states carrying with them their own subjective evidence of authority.

This scheme, unfolded in the 3rd and two following Books, ranges over many interesting topics. But they are so related and disposed, as all of them to revolve around the notion of *Redemption* as their centre. *That* is the *thing done*: to which Revelation is but the witness; which

again has Inspiration as its qualifying means. To determine therefore what this redemption is must be our main anxiety. And fortunately we must be in a favourable position for this purpose. For we have to deal here, with *un fait accompli*. Before the fact, prophecy could only say, 'It will be done:' at the time, miracle could but declare, "It begins to be done:" but now, history and experience spread samples of it before us in the minds of individuals and nations during eighteen hundred years. M. Coquerel's is not one of the ordinary systems of theology, which can evade this appeal to fact. He does not make salvation an affair of the next world only, that may give no sign in this. With him, both lapse and redemption are changes of character in the *present* phase of being,—continued indeed hereafter, but having their primary seat and manifestation here. What then is that moral revolution which reverses the Fall and is termed redemption? And has Christendom realised this change?

Our author repeatedly defines Redemption by the phrase "return towards God," and renders it evident that he denotes by it spiritual progress (p. 349). In individuals its presence declares itself by the re-entrance of the mind into its proper sphere, so as to escape from the humiliations of its fall (p. 127): in the world at large by the commencement of a new and higher civilization (p. 145). What more than this may lie concealed under the words "the sublime *secret* of redemption" (p. 352) we do not presume to conjecture: this is all that the present work communicates.

Now in proof of that aberration from his sphere which the gospel is to remedy, our author appeals to that sense of short-coming, that disproportion between aspiration and achievement, of which every thoughtful mind is conscious. But if this be proof of the need and absence of redemption, then the best Christians are the least redeemed. It seems to us strange that, in evidence of ruin should be adduced the sentiment most characteristic of healthful advance. That this consciousness is *painful* is very true; that it is *evil*, or bears witness to any *growth* of evil, cannot be allowed. Instead of regarding it as the wreck and trace of a lost perfection, must we not recognize in it a distinct provision for unlimited progress? From the mind that

treats its own higher perceptions with insult or neglect, it speedily passes away; but we know no excellence so divine,—not even that of Christ himself,—as to escape its shade. Its disappearance, here or hereafter, would dry up at the roots every immortal possibility; and, with all the fair show of joy and health, would be, like the beauty of consumption, the sentence of certain death. We should appeal to it, therefore, to prove rather that man is *in* his sphere, than that he is “out of his sphere.” Still,—whether Christianity gives it or removes it,—whether its presence or its absence indicates an “approximation to God,”—we do not see how *individual* believers can now-a-days be spoken of as “redeemed:” being born into the progressive influences, they have not undergone that change from a retrograde condition which is necessary, in M. Coquerel’s own view, to give fitness to the application of the word. The phrase is only a misleading equivalent of other and sufficient terms, by which we usually describe moral and spiritual improvement.

Redemption then must be looked for at the point of transition into Christianity, and dealt with as an historical fact. Our author states the case thus, as to the world at large:—

“It is impossible not to perceive, that, since the beginning of human annals, since the time in which, ascending through the darkness of antiquity, we see the first dawns of history, evil, error, and crime went on increasing till the advent of Jesus Christ, human activity followed its illegitimate alternative, and more and more yielded to its evil impulse; humanity retrograded; and mankind went continually further from God, by error after error, and iniquity upon iniquity; there was an increasing progression of perdition.

“With Jesus Christ, mankind stops on the fatal road and goes back; it retraces its steps towards God, towards truth and duty, towards charity and peace; it re-ascends the long untrodden paths of knowledge and virtue; it reconquers its likeness to God, and since the advent of Jesus Christ, there is an increasing progression of salvation.”—(P. 144.)

Such wide-sweeping judgments upon the past cannot well be submitted to any satisfactory test,—in itself a proof of their questionable value. Without losing ourselves in vague discussions, we will merely express our sur-



prise, that any one familiar, as our author must be, with the state of Europe and the East from the time of Caligula to that of Charlemagne, should describe that period as a "re-ascent of the long untrodden paths of knowledge and virtue;" and, in contrast with it, the equal antecedent period, as "a progress to the climax of perdition." The Advent of Christ nearly bisects the interval between the founding of the city and the crowning of the new Emperor of the West. It must be a strange historic balance, fabricated by monkish hands, or set uneven by Frankish chronicler, that can really give preponderance to the latter half; even though Christian zeal should throw into the scale, as a make-weight, the Saxon sword of Charlemagne, and the hammer with which his grandfather broke the Saracenic power. These eight centuries of ever-deepening gloom comprise the widest miseries, the most unrelieved corruption, the vastest obliteration of every acquired good, of which the annals of mankind retain any trace: yet we are called upon to prefer this moral and social disintegration,—simply because it is on this side the Christian era,—to the magnificent rise and spread of Roman civilization! We cannot even perceive (and it has always appeared to us a painful mystery) that during the process of social degradation and decline, Christianity assumed the attitude of protest and antagonism. The few gleams that burst from the clouds were thrown by the sinking orb of Pagan greatness, or the indignant flash of oriental reformation:—the virtues of the Antonines, the vigour of Diocletian, the philosophy of Julian, the learning of Boethius, on the one hand; and on the other, the transitory brilliancy of Palmyra, and the theocratic conquests that broke forth from Mecca. What counterpart to these things can be found in the morals of the Byzantine Court, the literature of the patristic schools, the theology of the Greek priesthood? Of all the objectionable elements in the Roman Catholic religion, there is not one which seems to us so mischievous, as the necessity which its theory creates of corrupting and falsifying history; of drawing forth into special veneration ages replete with puerile ignorance and revolting crimes; of covering with the gloss of a false sanctity characters in the past whose naked aspect would excite in the present only horror and disgust; and thus



of misdirecting the moral perceptions of its disciples, to save the repute of its ecclesiastical discipline. Into this very error the larger and more generous zeal for Christian evidence has betrayed our author. The language he employs would have more the appearance of truth if Jesus Christ had appeared in the tenth century instead of the first. So long as his religion operated chiefly on the South European and African races, and co-existed with the remains of Greek and Roman civilization, its favourable influence is difficult to trace: but as soon as it comes into full contact with the Teutonic tribes, and is invested with the exclusive trust of their education, its genius is rapidly unfolded, and it betrays itself divine.

On the whole, we cannot think M. Coquerel successful in his attempt to make the Advent in Galilee the centre point of world-history,—ὁμφαλὸς ἐπιβρόμιον χῆρονός. It cannot but lead to distorted views of things to force all human events and characteristics into a linear path, first dipping into an abyss of seeming hopelessness, and then suddenly rising again towards the upper light. God does not set his designs upon a railway, to run so thin a course. They must have breadth as well as length, and require dimension every way. As the physical earth proved not to be a superficies, of which the Delphic stone could claim to be the central boss, but a globe of many continents and seas clustered into several groups; so is there something spheriform in the Providence of humanity, with the nucleus of many a different system, and types of various life: and it is not by sacred boastfulness about our own in particular, but by docile comparison of all, that we can hope to compute the radius of God's plan, and circumnavigate its everlasting round. It is not in the least requisite to the authority of Christianity as a divine revelation, that it should occupy the historical position which our author assigns to it: and we regret that his conception of it as a *Redemption* should have led him to advance claims for it, which it is but too easy to refute.

But the peculiarity which most forcibly strikes us in M. Coquerel's book is the singular obscurity in which he has left the Redeeming influence itself. He demonstrates *à priori*, the necessity of a Redemption: he affirms that it has been realized: he finds the place, date, and person,

whence it is to be traced. But by what transforming efficacy a revolution so great has been wrought is not declared. Explicit about the antecedents, emphatic upon the consequents, our author is silent as to the crisis of power itself. He presents the drama of Christianity, with omission of the part of Christ: who is indeed talked about,—has his rank defined,—his relations explained, yet does not himself personally appear. We hardly know how to describe to our readers the feeling of mystification on this matter with which we closed the book; asking ourselves, ‘But what *is* this great redeeming force, ushered in by such an immense apparatus, and followed by a complete turning in the human tide?’ The work reminds us in this respect, of certain charts we used to study, showing the magnetic lines of equal variation in different latitudes, and seeking, by help of their converging directions, to discover the place of the magnetic pole. Innumerable curves, after sweeping over land and ocean with constant mutual approach, suddenly broke off, and stood unanimously pointing to a centre where they ought to meet: but the spot of mysterious attraction, secretly present on the blank paper, was not shown; or if mathematically indicated, claimed no real existence in the geography. The curious wonder that fastened the eye to that empty space,—the residence of hidden power,—is revived by our author’s way of approaching and receding from the redeeming point, laying down all its surroundings, tending thitherwards across every latitude and longitude of time; yet leaving the force itself in the waters of vacancy, and establishing for it no reality. Since it is a force upon the souls of men, it must consist in some new ideas or new emotions; it implies the discovery of truths which must be susceptible of expression, or the influence of fresh admirations whose objects may be named. We are therefore impelled to ask for a specific definition of this power. Nor have Christian writers in general any difficulty in answering the demand. They have usually considered Jesus as the medium of a new disclosure of divine truth and higher law: and have found the efficacy of his religion in belief of the doctrines and submission to the obligations. M. Coquerel, however, has cut himself off from this reply. With him, Christ is not the introducer of

a Revelation: but Revelation is the introducer of Christ: and having completed the attestation which brings him on the stage, it simply leaves him there and retires. There appears, accordingly, an enormous disproportion between means and ends. Our author's claims for all the instrumental apparatus of Christianity,—for prophecy and preliminary history,—for miracle and contemporaneous testimony,—are positive and lofty. His account of the Christianity itself to which this vast procession leads, is negative and vague. The Gospel is "not a system of instruction" (p. 281). Instead of communicating, it takes as axiomatic or admitted, "all truths concerning God, his attributes, creation, providence, free-will, and immortality," the unity of the human race and fraternity of men (p. 287, 288), as well as all moral rules respecting "the constitution of a family, that of property, individual liberty and political order, and finally, suicide" (p. 289). On the other hand, it "holds back or avoids" all truths respecting "the Divine nature of Christ," "the union of soul and body," "the relation between the living and the dead," the "end of the world," the constitution of the future life and the mutual recognition of friends there, the nature of angels and demons (p. 295—298). The only truths which it is said to determine by facts, are "the identity of man through the process of death," and "the existence of angels, good and evil" (p. 285): and even in setting these questions to rest, Revelation appears to be carried beyond its defined function of "testifying Redemption." When to this we add, that Christianity, in order to vindicate its spiritual character, must, in our author's view, free itself from disciplinary rules,—from every remnant of form,—from the letter of Scripture,—and from dogmas,—no less than from clerical influence and human authority,—some wonder may be felt at the alchemy of his philosophy, which, after ransacking the world for its ingredients, and exposing them to the white heat of its refining process, finds its crucible empty as at first, instead of heavy with its residuum of gold. For our own part, we heartily concur in M. Coquerel's negative verdicts, and are content to receive at the hands of Christianity, the pure truths of natural piety, cleared from all that oppresses and degrades

them. We receive these however through the mind of Christ, and deeply coloured by the transmission. His divine life has disclosed a fresh image and ideal of human perfection;—changed and raised the standard of aspiration;—and, above all, furnished a new type, representative of God, and determining the spirit of every heavenly hope. In this, his personal occupancy of our reverential and trustful affections, has consisted, we believe, the essential power of Christianity. Only, for the exercise of a function like this, we cannot pretend that the prophetic expectations of twenty centuries, the wonders of supernatural birth, or even the escort of a train of outward signs, appear to be indispensable: if there be but miracle enough to fix the eye, and give time for the impression to sink into the heart, and propagate itself from age to age, the ends of such an inspiration are achieved. We cannot at all feel the force of our author's emphatic assertion, that, in order to effect a redemption,—that is, a subjective change,—there *must* be objective miracles. We can understand this doctrine from those who take Christianity to be “a system of instruction,” and who deny the natural power of man to appreciate that instruction from its intrinsic character; provided they hold, at the same time, that miracles, being deviations from the laws of nature, are special acts of God; and provided further, they conceive the operation of time and distance in weakening supernatural proofs to be insignificant. But M. Coquerel denies every one of these propositions. He makes Christianity subjective, and his whole work brings it to the appeal of consciousness; yet, on behalf of prophecy and sign, he declares the insufficiency of that appeal. He pronounces miracles to be, like planetary perturbations, within the compass of natural law; yet assigns to them a demonstrative power, which requires them to lie beyond the resources of nature. He confesses that the evidence afforded by miracle exists only for eye-witnesses; yet while insisting on its necessity for *their* faith, maintains its superfluousness for all others. If the question about the *à priori* need of miraculous witness is to be opened, and a competition of want is to be set up between the prophet's contemporaries and his successors, we fear that distant times possess the more urgent claim. Surely the divine

messenger has a more interrupted and difficult contact with posterity than with his associates: and if there be any persons on behalf of whom the natural resources of persuasion require to be enlarged by extraordinary displays of power, it must be the strangers separated by ages, and deprived of the thousand lights of living proximity. Whether a religion spreads from East to West in space, or from generation to generation in time, in either case it is given to *new minds*: there is no more of simple continuity in the one instance than in the other: an agency needed as a *missionary* witness cannot be pronounced useless as a *perpetual* witness: and whoever argues the question upon this speculative ground of a presumed antecedent necessity, precludes himself from closing the plea of continued miracle against the Roman Catholic Church.

In these remarks we intend simply to express an opinion, that the questions in relation to prophecy and miracle are historical and critical, and are totally incapable of philosophical prejudgment. It is our author's *treatment* of the topic, more than his results, which fails to satisfy us. He has a favourite auxiliary in all his arguments: he declines the verb *To be* in only one form, *Must be*. We have an old-fashioned prejudice in favour of the tenses *Has been* and *Is*. We cannot profess any intimate familiarity with the numerous necessities of this universe. It is chiefly the ambition to prove too much that challenges objection to M. Coquerel's reasoning. For example, when he contends that it would be improper to grant us, in religion, more than a frugal allowance of evidence, because "too much revelation would destroy free will" (pp. 234. 301), a host of embarrassments are conjured up by the suggestion. If then Christ had a higher assurance than we, he had less free will, and suffered the very evil from which God has protected us: in proportion to his superior perception, his uncommunicated light, he lived under different moral conditions, and his example carries no obligation: and the Omniscient Being must be without free will at all. Again, our author undertakes to tell us what things it is better that we should not know, and so explains the "reserve" of Scripture, assuring us that it was "intentional." He appeals to the mischievous prophecies, often re-produced, of the end of the world,—to the

mystical attempts to establish an intercourse between the living and the dead,—to the horrors of demonology, in order to convince us that silence on these points was indispensable.

“What is the nature of angels? On this subject the Gospel is mute, to the extent of commonly designating angels by their functions and their names of honour; and even sometimes as young men. With respect to demons or bad angels, the Gospel explains itself still less positively; and it is very remarkable that its language is often much more allegorical on the subject of superior beings fallen from their holiness, than when it speaks of spirits which have remained pure. The horrible errors into which the demonology of the middle ages fell, and which are yet far from being extirpated, are sufficient proofs how necessary it was not to give any plausible pretexts to impure and unholy imaginations. Between the impossibility of saying nothing or of saying every thing, revelation has said the least possible, and guarded itself against becoming the involuntary accomplice of superstition.”—(P. 298.)

Surely this is strange argument. To establish the evil of too much knowledge of a certain subject, our author adduces the mischief of ignorance and mistake upon it; and virtually exclaims, ‘If it was so pernicious to know *next to nothing*, how dreadful it would be to know *the whole*!’ Or, if it be admitted that it was not the portion of *knowledge* allowed, that wrought the ill; then the evil must be referred either to the remaining *ignorance*,—which more revelation would therefore have blessed us by removing; or to the mere *discussion* of the subject, which Scripture has said enough to raise. In fact, who can deny that the state in which such questions as demonology are described as being left in the Bible, is precisely such as to lead the disordered imaginations of men to the very mischiefs here deprecated; which have arisen from accepting as necessarily true what the Evangelists imply in their narratives of demoniacs. And what room would have been left for such abuses, if we had been directly told, either that there are no demons, or that they are cut off by an impassable barrier from relations with our world? The principle involved in this species of reasoning appears to us most dangerous and fallacious. Once allow that there is any test for determining before hand what it is good, and what it is bad for us to know; and rules must follow for



the repression of curiosity, and the restraint of intellectual freedom. There can be no more monstrous presumption than for a being in the dark to hold forth upon the disadvantages of light. If he is ignorant of a subject, how can he anticipate what would ensue on the removal of that ignorance? While the cloud is round him, he cannot lay down the landscape which its dispersion will unveil.

It is however the piety, and by no means the timidity, of our author, that engages him for the moment in this questionable defence of reserve in Revelation. He would have been equally ready to take the other side had God seen fit to disclose to us what is now kept secret. M. Coquerel has, after all, a genuine love of light: and there is a noble tone pervading his claim for intellectual freedom within the church, indicative of a generous and high minded faith.

"Let every one guard himself from supposing that this liberty can ever be prejudicial to faith—to truth. It will, on the contrary, eminently favour the influence of Christian doctrines over the human mind, for this plain reason—that the greatest number of persons are turned away from the faith by disputes concerning its truth; what disgusts the world with dogmatising is, that even now, to enumerate dogmas is to excite strife; to enforce convictions is to rouse enmities; and, nevertheless, there is only one kind of firm, consolatory, and saving faith, which suffices as a guide and support in life and in death: that is the faith which is the result of a man's own inquiries.

"This freedom is also the only means which the Lord has conferred upon Christendom, to found and maintain religious peace between its various priesthoods and their Churches. During eighteen centuries this peace has been sought in vain, in an identity, homogeneity, complete harmony of faith and teaching. Experience, therefore, is decisive; experience which has come down to us through the tumult of so many dreadful religious wars,—through torrents of human blood, and the flames of multitudes who have suffered martyrdom at the stake. Religious peace is not to be founded by a harmony of intellects (minds) but a harmony of hearts; and this last is impossible, till we fully recognise the sacred duty of mutual respect for sincere opinions, and for the fundamental principle of the value of sincerity before God and man."—(P. 392.)

Whatever obscurity may hang around M. Coquerel's conception of Christianity, most of the definite propositions which he affirms respecting it we find to be true of our own. He does not suppose that its destinies are completed in this life; but follows it into the future phases of human



progress; and ventures to trace the influences of the "celestial gospel," upon the minds then first opened to its light. And if by "the Gospel" we understand the personal ascendancy over lower natures of the great model-soul, the divine ideal of humanity,—this essence of our religion is doubtless common to both spheres: and is so far from being arrested by death, that it then first attains its power with the transition from traditional reverence to personal discipleship. For the foreigners to Christendom, whether sage or barbarous, a glorious naturalization is there reserved.

"Undoubtedly, the great men and great geniuses of antiquity, who served the cause of truth and virtue as far as the light of their conscience and reason rendered such service possible—Socrates, Aristides and others—were astonished, the instant after death, to give up their souls with joy unspeakable to developments of which they had no anticipation, and to read, in some measure, a heavenly Gospel upon the shell of their ostracism, or the lip of their cup of hemlock. Titus rejoiced to understand, that in eternity not a single day was lost for well-doing; and Epictetus, at having discovered that true liberty of a wise man, which shall be guaranteed for ever in heaven. Undoubtedly, the unhappy savage, who has never displayed any other virtue than barbarian firmness in enduring the prolonged torments of the fatal stake, will exchange his cruel heroism for a state of perfection, of which he never could have entertained the slightest idea; here below he was hardly a man—the feelings of his humanity have been reserved for a better state."—(P. 404.)

Whether this conversion will be open even to those "whose ignorance or infidelity of the deepest dye has been only a resource of immorality," or whether the path of return to God is determinately closed with the present life, is a question on which the most rigorous theology has long begun to speak with a significant reserve, and which our author unhesitatingly resolves in favour of the merciful side of the alternative. He fully accepts the doctrine of Universal Restoration: and we can ill afford to quarrel with any process of thought which tempers the severity of ordinary creeds with so benign a hope. We do not think however that M. Coquerel, in repudiating the usual arguments in favour of his own conclusion, has succeeded in substituting any better, or in removing the question from its old ground. He relies mainly on the

assumption that a self-conscious being cannot suffer without being instructed by his sufferings, both as to their causes and as to their cure; and conceives that efforts of successful self-recovery must thus be awakened and sustained; that punishment, in short, of its own nature becomes transformed into chastisement. We fear that this argument for the self-destructive nature of evil labours under a fatal defect. It supposes that seeing clearly and feeling deeply are the sole conditions of acting wisely; that remorse must lead to exertion, and conscious knowledge stimulate recovery. It overlooks the prostration of will induced by unfaithfulness, and expects strength from the brilliant lassitude of decline. There is a point in the history of the guilty mind, at which fear provokes to flight no more,—the hands are only wrung in stationary anguish,—and the lips, too hopeless for prayer, can but curse the day of birth. And thenceforth, the finest discernment of moral cause and effect affords no security for amendment; the most “instructive” punishment is but a remedy brought when the pulse is gone. In this condition of the mind, motive, in the ordinary sense, is only thrown away: self-cure becomes impossible: but not every source of healing is yet cut off. There is an openness still to the agency of pure and loving beings; the broken pride, the conscious shame, the incapable will, are even singularly prone to lean upon a nobler nature, to take the shelter of an unreproachful affection, and become docile as a child to a loving and protecting power. Restoration therefore must resort for its hope to this spiritual *clientela*, which surely harmonises well with the conceptions of a reasonable faith. And with this supplement, our author’s argument, relieved of the most embarrassing class of cases, becomes better able to sustain the weight it is called upon to bear.

Some of the gravest considerations on his own side of this question are treated with a slight and off-hand dismissal which we cannot admire. Surely, for instance, there is a foundation in natural reason and justice for the feeling, that the transgression of a finite being cannot merit infinite penalty, and the sin of a moment incur a never-ending woe. M. Coquerel pronounces the argument “worthless:” for—

"The objection drawn from the disproportion in extent, so to speak, between time and immortality, transports the intuition\* of Time beyond the limits of this world."—(P. 408.)

It will be seen that reference is here made to the Kantian doctrine, which declares that Time has no objective existence, but is a mere form of human thought,—the subjective ground on which it is given us to represent to ourselves the phenomena within or without us. This doctrine, by shutting up Time and Space (which comes under the same category) with the human constitution, seems to forbid our carrying out into the sphere of external realities any propositions involving these representations. The systematic enforcement of such a prohibition

\* It is to be regretted that, after the example of the English Editors of Kant, and adhering to the analogy of the French, Mr. Davison has expressed the meaning of *Anschauung* by the word *Intuition*. This term, in English, is pre-engaged. It denotes the *immediate*, as opposed to the *mediate*, recognition of truth or falsehood in a proposition. The mental act to which it refers requires a *predication* for its object, and is an act of the *understanding*. The term *Anschauung*, on the other hand, denotes the *Representation* of an object, whether of perception or of imagination; a mere solitary image, without any relation involving truth or falsehood. This mental *looking at a thing* (not at a *judgment*) is referred by Kant to the faculty of *Sense*: every act of which pre-supposes, as its condition and ground, the *representations* of *Space* and *Time*.

Having touched thus far upon the Translator's task, we will add that, in general, its execution appears to us to merit the praise accorded to it by the Author in his Preface. We have noticed however a few blemishes, which, for the sake of any future Edition, it may be well to mention.

Page. Line.

- 33 — 26. 'Inaccomplissement' is rendered 'accomplishment,' instead of 'failure.'
- 84 — Title. 'Peines de l'Eternité' is rendered 'Eternal Punishments.'
- 91 — 15. 'Soulevées' is rendered 'removed,' instead of 'raised.'
- 93 — 26. 'Would' instead of 'should.'
- 100 — Title. 'Distraction' is rendered 'distraction,' instead of 'absence' or 'abstraction.'
- 129 — Last. 'Dans le courant de notre théorie' is unaccountably rendered 'in the elimination of our theory.'
- 155 — 5-7. The sentence, obscure in the original, is unintelligible in the translation. The meaning, however, is, that 'Idolatry is no more than the consolidation into instituted forms of the false, the bad,—of disordered affections and selfish practice.' 'Degenerescence' is not English; and in its spelling violates the Latin analogy.
- 302 — 27. 'Faith in human religiousness' makes 'religiousness' the *object* of faith. 'L'établissement de la foi dans la religiosité humaine' means 'the establishment of faith within the religious faculty of man.'
- 395 — 25. 'Doit resulter' is rendered 'ought to result.'

is manifestly impossible: not only would all the sciences of quantity and proportion, of antecedence and sequence, disappear; but as Space in its vanishing carries with it whatever is external, and Time, whatever is internal, the entire sphere of all reality dissolves away, and nothing remains about which an affirmation can be made. Under these circumstances, wise men will submit to the laws of their own minds; and be content to wear the spectacles which God has given them. Pull them off, and Man, Nature, God=0; keep them on, and Space and Time=Infinite, comprising or coalescing with Man, Nature, God. As no one can affirm the first equation without *ipso facto* denying it, there seems no resource but to accept the second. If any one, however, regardless of consistency, chooses to shift about from one to the other, it is evident that wonderful effects may be produced. Glasses on, the order of things is real: glasses off, the order is gone. He gains a power of annihilation *ad libitum*; can spirit away any disagreeable proposition, without the trouble of examining it,—for it is sure to have some element of time or space in it, and to vanish when they are turned out of the window. In short, he can reserve chronology and room enough for himself and his theories, and dislodge everything else into the inane. M. Coquerel is much given to the use of this enchanter's wand, and the solutions he effects by it are curiosities in philosophy. In the example adduced above, he contends, that no duration of punishment can be disproportioned to guilt, because time does not exist, and can have neither proportion nor disproportion of parts. We find also the following arguments:

God regards the longest and the shortest,—the greatest and the least,—sufferings with the same sentiment: time and degree being nothing in reality, nothing therefore to Him.—(P. 408.)

The Word might be in the beginning with God, and yet God be prior to the Word; because, as there is no Time, there can be no Priority.—(P. 461.)

There is no difficulty in the texts which, on the crucifixion day place Christ, with the thief, in Paradise; which, before the resurrection day, send Christ to Hades to the spirits in prison; and which describe his ascension into

the clouds; because, the space being unreal, all problems of place disappear.—(P. 460.)

Heaven and Hell cannot be *future* and *external*, but must be *present* and *internal*; because there is no Time or Space.—(P. 397.)

Christianity,—the attested *fact* of a Redemption,—though its records speak of a Coming of Christ and End of the World, contains no local or chronological proposition; for time and space are only its unreal frame-work.—(Pp. 395. 398.)

The Scriptures, in affirming that God exists *at all times* and *in all places*, must be understood to deny the reality of *any time* and *any space*.—(P. 105.)

The existence of animal suffering *before* the Fall is no objection to its being regarded as the *consequence* of the Fall; for as Time is nothing, priority is nothing.—(P. 44.)

Other examples, less capable of compendious statement, might be cited: but these will sufficiently illustrate the strange metamorphoses which this philosophical divining-rod can produce.

We have not space to render any account of M. Coquerel's Scriptural exegesis. Occasionally, we meet with very sound and sensible critical expositions; as of the Proem of John (p. 166); of 1 Tim. iii. 16 (p. 170); of Heb. v. 7 (p. 178); of the passages containing the word *Sheôl* (p. 117). But, in general, his style of interpretation appears to us too fanciful and ingenious; divesting the sacred writings of their distinctive hues of race and age, and throwing over them the pale light of modern philosophy. It is difficult to make the Hebrew warriors and prophets speak the language of M. Cousin. The time is past, when a divine could put down the doctrine of *à priori* ideas, by quoting Job's dictum, "We brought nothing into this world:" and when we find our author refuting "Idealism," and proving the antithesis of Self and Not-self, by the text, "Ye fools, did not he that made *that which is without*, make *that which is within* also" (Luke xi. 40), we cannot but regret the encroachments of the metaphysician upon the province of the critic. On some important points,—especially on the leading principles of the Pauline theology,—we find ourselves in imperfect

accordance with M. Coquerel: but the brevity of his notes, as well as the exhausted patience of our readers, will plead our excuse for passing these topics in silence.

In looking back upon our notice of this work, we feel conscious of having expressed a more copious dissent from the author, than our prevailing concurrence in his conclusions would seem to render natural. But the structure of his book, which professes to be a logical whole, and the express claim in the Preface, that the iron chain of demonstration shall be tested and not the golden lustre which it supports, have left us no choice; and have unhappily precluded us from dwelling on several detached parts of the treatise to which we assent with hearty admiration. Had we been at liberty to treat the work, not as "a complete system of philosophy and of religion," but as a manifesto of Protestantism in France, measuring the line to which the Reformation had advanced in that country, we should have welcomed it with no words but those of sympathy. And we cannot refrain from closing our notice with a delightful paragraph, showing how comprehensive a charity is blended, in the author's mind, with a profound and thoughtful faith:—

"There lived in our country (France) a man who believed in the real presence, in the sacrifice of the mass, in the reign and worship of the Virgin, in works of supererogation, in treasures of indulgences, and in the power of absolution; he believed in the infallibility of the Pope so thoroughly, that perhaps the only trace of affectation observable in his life, were the demonstrations of submission, publicly made, to a papal decision. Assuredly, according to the Protestant faith, this man was a very imperfect Christian, as respects his faith. He gave, however, examples of all the Christian virtues; he lived an eminently Christian life, opened his palace to all the wounded, friends or enemies, condemned all violence and persecution on the pretext of religion; he lived like an admirable Christian, in one of those periods when it was most difficult so to do—his name was *Fenelon*. Does any one imagine that there are many Protestants at the present day who refuse to admit that Fenelon was eminently Christian in everything except his faith?

"In our own days there has lived a man in our country who believed the Papacy to be a scandalous usurpation of human dominion over the kingdom of God; who believed that the bread and wine used in the Lord's Supper are merely the common product of corn and the vine; that the sacrifice of the mass is the most prodi-

gious of errors ; that every priest who absolves, usurps the prerogative of God ; that the Assumption of the Virgin is a fable, and her worship a superstition—this man, by the uninterrupted devotedness of half a century, succeeded in rescuing from misery, ignorance, immorality, and irreligion, a whole *commune*, lost in a wild and pathless district of the Vosges. In order to succeed, he had recourse to the secret of St. Paul ; he became all things to all men ; he was at once pastor and schoolmaster, judge and arbitrator, farmer, mason, road-maker, and became even a printer, in order to diffuse the holy truths of Christianity—his name was *Oberlin*. According to the Catholic faith, it would not have been easy to have met with a Christian more imperfect in respect of faith. Does any one imagine that many Catholics could be found at the present day who would hesitate to proclaim, that in all other respects it would have been difficult to have found a better Christian than Oberlin ?

“To these illustrious examples, how many more humble ones might we add ! Who does not discover on his path of life, who does not remark among his circle of friends and relations, and often in his private family sphere, minds whose faith he condemns, and whose Christian virtues he admires ?

“In a word, who has not seen the holiness, the charity, the touching humility of the Gospel extending their sweet influence over the course of life, in spite of the superstitions and errors which have taken possession of the understanding ?”—(Pp. 389—391.)



## ART. VI.—TRINITARIANISM.

*A Review of Trinitarianism, chiefly as it appears in the Writings of Pearson, Bull, Waterland, Sherlock, Howe, Newman, Coleridge, Wallis, and Wardlaw.* By John Barling. London: Chapman. 1847.

WITH a belief in the doctrine of the Trinity is externally connected, throughout Christendom, the main part of what is highest in station, greatest in learning, most refined in manners, most alluring in association, and gentlest and devoutest in religion. If the internal and necessary connexion of these things with the doctrine were equally extensive, we should be obliged to assign a deeper foundation to this formula of the schools, and anticipate a longer life for it, than our present insight into the realities of religious truth, and the workings of religious thought, prompt us to concede.

A massive structure—the work of ages—with foundations buried deep in the soil of the past, with spires and towers reaching far up into the heavens, and with amplitude that occupies no mean portion of earth's surface—ostensibly rests on the basis of this doctrine of the Trinity. In England alone the weekly and daily religious ministrations of thirty thousand houses of prayer—the occupations and livelihood of a countless multitude of persons—the system of instruction in schools, academies, colleges, and universities—the spiritual freight of every ship that sails to the distant mission-station and colony—the piety, principles, consolation, and immortal hopes of millions of human beings, are all interwoven with the web of this belief. Be its origin what it may, be its meaning and ultimate spiritual significance what they may, this fact alone, that it is here among us, in the very midst and heart of our religious condition, received, believed, rested upon by multitudes—makes many both of the best and the most able men feel anxious, or at least nervous, in the matter of its defence. Looking at what we have now indicated in the lowest point of view, it excites in us no surprise that there should have been and still be found

men of the profoundest powers of thought, and the most extensive learning, engaged in its defence as believers in it or receivers of it.

The mythologies of Greece and Rome had their advocates among the cultivated and the wise, till the world ceased to go with the mythologies, and then the great of the world ceased to go with them too. Providence thus chooses the foolish to confound the wise, and the mean to enlighten the great. In such states of opinion in every nation it is at length a welcome voice which arises from the multitude to their leaders, "You may cease to tax your ingenuity and to draw upon your learning for the defence of truth and religion in this particular form—we have ceased to receive it in that form." Thus, in national, as in individual progress, the march is toilsome and upwards: and we have long thought it a mere waste of hope to look to any but the thoroughly independent to aid in the progress. To those men who know practically the meaning of the word "competence," and are content with a moderate share of this world's goods,—to those who seek their honours in well-doing, and are satisfied to preserve the corner of the vineyard of duty allotted to them in order and fertility: to those who seek their highest society, not in the living forms of contemporaries, but in the silent companionship of books—we look, almost exclusively, for the intellectual and moral influence, which is to undo the habits of centuries and overcome the world. We would not walk from the cathedral to the palace, were it but a furlong, for the hope we should have of converting an English bishop from a belief in the Trinity; and it is singular that history does not record a single instance of a person in this capacity publicly abjuring and denying that Catholic doctrine.

We see enough to persuade us that the world, overcoming its alarm and perceiving that the essential truth and spirit of Christianity may exist apart from, as well as conjoined with, some of the contradictory and objectionable statements of doctrine which antiquity has handed down to us, is ripening for a change; and ecclesiastics, on their sunny wall, are ripening too. But there must be many more martyrdoms first. Daring Unitarianism must send forth its forlorn hope to death once and again before the victory

is gained. More dead bodies are wanted before the general and his staff can mount the breach. We trust the number of the elect will shortly be fulfilled, and we welcome every fresh comer for this hope's sake.

Mr. Barlow is one of the candidates for the crown of thorns. Originally a minister of religion, according to orthodoxy, doubts and honesty combined, led him to court the leisure and freedom which private life and its unpledged seclusion could alone afford him. This we do not collect from his book,—(but we have understood as much),—for the remotest reference to himself seems to be avoided throughout with an almost shrinking anxiety: so that the work is perfectly impersonal. The characteristics of the work before us are subtlety and acuteness. The author shows that the doctrine of the Trinity, when defined, must always be either Tritheism or Sabellianism,—when the first, it is mere Polytheism, when the last, it is only clouded Unitarianism. This he proves with a diligence of pursuit and a closeness of track which cannot be escaped; and, after a subtle analysis of every form in which the doctrine has been propounded by any important writer, from Howe and Sherlock to Conybeare and Newman, fastening firmly and irremovably each writer, as he proceeds, on the horn either of Polytheism or Unitarianism, he leaves no such thing as the assumed orthodox doctrine of the Trinity in literary existence. The logical reader, compelled to make concession after concession, allowing that the doctrine is not here and is not there, finds it at length fairly handed out of the work, and himself required by orthodoxy to receive a doctrine which is Tritheism, Unitarianism, or nothing.

We wish Mr. Barling's book a *nidus* among the logicians of Oxford. The chain of reasoning is so carefully linked together in its several parts—the exact position of each writer is so distinctly fixed—the accuracy of eye in the critic is (to coin a word) so *inescapable*—and the conclusion arrived at so irresistible—that for a *scholastic* work with a *scholastic* object the book is perfect. The attraction of the volume in this character is its comprehension of the pith of so many writers in the compass of 200 or 300 pages, and its success in bringing together in one distinct view the various confused and confusing theories, which lie

scattered in the theologians of several generations, and which are seldom brought face to face in the same court. It will be perceived from these observations that the book is not one, out of which to detach many single passages. But for the purpose of a personal introduction of the Author to our readers, before leaving them to each other, we select a passage for quotation.

"We believe neither of these writers" (Dwight and Stuart) "would dissent from this proposition" (that the essence of God with its attributes is numerically one), "or from the interpretation we put upon it, namely, that there is but one almighty will, one all-comprehensive understanding,—one Divine Agent, as one Being.

"But if this be so, it is manifest that the difficulty which presses on these men as Trinitarians, lies not in the unity, but in the plurality. So that in their perplexities, we have in fact only a re-appearance of the old scholastic puzzle: with this difference, however, that whereas the schoolmen bent every energy to expound it, these confess that it is inexplicable.

"We might, therefore, were we disposed, at once take our leave of these writers, remarking only, as in an earlier part of this essay, that provided the unity of the Divine Being be admitted in the sense of one Divine Agent, one Infinite Mind or Spirit, the Unitarian needs not concern himself greatly respecting any alleged distinctions in the nature of this Being; especially such as are confessed, by those who assert them, to be altogether unknown and inconceivable. For what practical effect can attach to the belief of such? What holy affections can they inspire? What motives can they supply to virtuous action? What doctrines can they serve to illustrate? The present Unitarianism of England has been **unsound** as a system of negations; and the idea of deriving from it any moral elevation has been ridiculed by a distinguished writer, (Hall,) as a proposal to 'gather grapes from thorns,' or 'to extract sunbeams from cucumbers.' But what a series of negations is here? There are in God certain distinctions to be called personal: but which distinctions are *not* nominal; *neither* are they modal; *neither* are they such as distinguish faculties in the human mind; *nor* anything else that can be named or thought of. What can be more thoroughly negative and barren than this? The Unitarian would be absurdly prodigal of his labour, who should endeavour to prove of such distinctions that they are self-contradictory. Neither the falsehood *nor* the truth, as Dr. Dwight rightly argues, can be perceived, of a proposition, which conveys to the mind no notion. Such a proposition is to the mind, what an invisible ob-

ject is to the eye. It is enough for the Unitarian to ask, '*Cui bono?*' How is my heart to be affected, or my will to be actuated, by a proposition of this nature? To my intelligent faculties *nihil*, how is it to act on my moral nature, or how assist me in any intellectual process? I may repeat the words of the proposition, and may believe on extraneous authority that they contain a truth: but so long as it is a truth unknown, 'what doth it profit?' A man might be taught to repeat it in a strange language, and might still believe that it meant something. But what effect could be produced either on his understanding, his heart, or his life, by a proposition enunciated in a language that he had never learned? Now the Catholic faith is this, *ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate veneremur: neque confundentes Personas, neque substantiam separantes. Alia est enim Persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti. Sed Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, una est Divinitas, æqualis Gloria, co-æterna Majestas.* Who would think of imparting to an untaught man the doctrine of the Trinity in these words? And yet wherein would it be more absurd than to teach him to repeat the same sentences in an English dress, when in that dress it is allowed they convey no idea? Latin, English, Chinese,—all are one, whether as vehicles of thought or instruments of impression, if no thought is conveyed. We recommend to these 'blind leaders of the blind,' the words of a masculine writer, whom they hold in no small esteem:—'In the Church, I had rather speak five words *with my understanding* that I might teach others also, than ten thousand words *in an unknown tongue.*' Surely the fundamental principle of a religion taught by Paul, was not a proposition which would have been as intelligible to the Greek in any barbarous language as in his own. Even Waterland may be found declaring that 'our faith and our ideas keep pace with each other;' and that by 'mysteries' are not meant 'positions altogether unintelligible, or that carry no idea at all with them.' We would admonish these men in the words of Baxter:—'The bare use of the name (person), by one that knoweth not what that word signifieth, doth prove no man orthodox; but only that he useth orthodox words. It will save no man to use a word which he understands not.'—Pp. 163—166.

## ART. VII.—REVIEW OF THE BIBLE.

*A Review of the Bible, &c.* London: Chapman. 1848.

THIS is another of the multitudinous little tracts of Mr. Barker, whose followers have bestowed on him the designation of "The Evangelical Reformer." It is to our mind one of his best: it is well-timed. The rebound of Socialism has left an *uncomfortable* impression respecting the Bible on a number of the intelligent and well-conducted working-men of England. They cannot rid themselves of the conviction that all in Genesis is not scientifically true, nor all in Kings historically trustworthy. And yet they do not wish to be without a religion, and they cannot choose but venerate many portions of the Bible. The difficulty with them is here—"Is this Book the word of God or is it not? If it is the Word of God it must be infallible, and we must receive it as absolutely and entirely true. If we cannot receive it thus, we cannot receive it at all, and it possesses over us no moral authority above any other book." Mr. Barker steps forth to tell them in their own language that the Bible may *contain* the word of God, without *being* the word of God—that he "regards the Scriptures as of infinite value, and would do his utmost to preserve them to future ages," but that he is "far from regarding them as one whole piece of unbroken or unmingled truth." He receives "the leading religious and moral principles of the Bible"—he regards them "with the utmost respect and reverence"—"he believes them to be in truth revelations from heaven. He believes the course of life which the leading precepts of the Bible inculcate, is the way to both peace on earth, and to happiness in heaven. He believes that in proportion as the great leading principles of religion and duty, unfolded and inculcated in the Bible, are understood and reduced to practice, will mankind become happy and prosperous, intelligent and godlike.

He does *not* however believe that the world was made in six days—that man was created immortal, but that the temptation of a serpent made him mortal. He does not believe in an universal deluge, or the story of the ark. He

does not believe that the conduct of Abraham was immaculate, or that all the sentiments in the Psalms are worthy. And thus he holds up the picture of a man, of pure and upright life, of sincere religious sentiment, and of a high and reverencing appreciation of the Bible, and of the good that it has done and is doing in the world—exercising nevertheless his judgment freely on the several portions of the Scripture, and refusing to receive the traditions of a remote antiquity,—the efforts of the early human mind to find out the origin of man and the origin of evil,—as absolutely infallible, and without any “mixture of error.” The little work before us is plain, convincing and popular in its character. That the exact mind of the theological student will find it loose and unsatisfactory, it is perhaps therefore needless to add. There is a confusion throughout between fable, improbability, falsehood, interpolation, tradition, symbolism, imagery, poetry, and metaphysical speculation. The various passages commented upon, and which have their distinct place under some *one* of the above heads, and not under any of the others, are roughly classed almost indifferently under any of them. Notwithstanding these faults, which always more or less (and perhaps necessarily) attach to this writer’s criticisms, there is a discriminatory vein running through the treatment of his subject which we are greatly pleased to see—a continual effort to guard against being misunderstood, and to maintain for the Scriptures their true worth, even while the writer’s usual fearlessness and courage are evinced.

The contemporaneousness of the appearance of the scholar-like work on the Hebrew Monarchy, reviewed in our present Number, and this honest, earnest, and popular little tract, is not without its instructiveness. Each in its way will be welcome, and has become necessary, to a considerable class of minds in this country: though there still exists the multitude, to which both will be painful, shocking and blasphemous.



# ART. VIII.—THE CRISIS OF 1847, AND ITS CAUSES.

1. *The Rationale of the Currency Question, or the Plea of the Merchant and the Shareholder, for an improved System of National Banking.* By Henry Booth. London.
2. *Economist.* 1847.

CONSIDERING the frequency in this country of periods of severe commercial distress, it is a remarkable fact that opinion should still be so much divided as it is, with respect to the causes of their periodical occurrence. The fact is the more remarkable that the subject does not seem to be one of any peculiar difficulty. The circumstances that precede such periodical visitations are neither hidden nor remote, and are for the most part characterised by those broad, palpable features, which render it easy to observe and appreciate them. Indeed, in some cases the causes have been so apparent as to be pretty generally admitted, and in those cases where a complication of causes has been in simultaneous operation, it is perhaps chiefly upon the question of the comparative degrees of importance to be assigned to each particular cause, that controversy has arisen. Beginning with and including 1825, and ending with 1847, we have had five periods of severe commercial pressure, all, as it seems to us, mainly produced by one or other, or both, of two great causes; first, a failure in our crops; secondly, a sudden and extensive withdrawal of capital from the ordinary reproductive branches of industry, to be embarked in undertakings immediately unproductive, although of greater or less ultimate utility. The sole inducement to such extensive transfers of capital, has been the expectation of extraordinary profits (an expectation which, by the bye, has almost invariably been disappointed), and accordingly it has been a matter of accident whether the capital has been employed in our own, or gone forth to a foreign country. The disasters of 1825, and of 1837, were mainly produced by the second of these two great causes; those of 1839, and 1841-2, principally by the first; that of 1847 by a combination of the two. In 1825 we rushed into innumerable projects, wise and foolish, with the blind impetuosity of madmen; in 1837

we had lent our capital, with a fair prospect of a safe and profitable return, for the promotion of public works in America; but the resources of America, aided by European capital, were insufficient for their completion; the works were suspended, and American credit failed us. In 1839, and 1841-2, we had to contend with the accumulated effect of four consecutive bad harvests; in proof of which it is sufficient to state that, between the end of April 1838 and the end of April 1842, the price of wheat averaged 66s. 10d. per quarter, or 22s. 10d. per quarter above the average of the two abundant seasons of 1835 and 1836. In 1845-6 we have been doing, for the promotion of Railways in our own country, precisely what we did prior to 1837 for public works in America, and our means have been still more inadequate to our ends in the latter instance than they were in the former. In both cases the result has been failure and distress, aggravated in the present instance by a general and extraordinary scarcity of food throughout Europe.

There is one most important difference, however, between these two great causes of national distress, viz. that the one arises from our own imprudence, whilst the other is absolutely inevitable by any exertion of human skill or prudence. For an ungenial season there is no remedy: and we must submit to it as best we may; but when we allow our spirit of commercial or industrial enterprise to run riot once every eight or ten years, we are indulging in a bad habit, peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon race, of which it is high time we should cure ourselves. Our fault is easily described. We attempt too much. We endeavour to perform with the spare capital of a few years, that which it would require the spare capital of many years to perform. We withdraw from our regular branches of industry enough to reduce them to a state of distress, but not enough to enable us to bring our new projects to a successful termination. We do, on a large scale, precisely what individuals of more energy than prudence so frequently do on a small scale: and we pay precisely the same penalty;—our regular business suffers, and our new project fails.

It may not be useless, at this moment, when trade is beginning slowly to recover from the extreme prostration

to which it has been brought, to bestow a few words upon each of the two great causes of commercial pressure above referred to.

If we take experience as our guide, we shall find that bad harvests have almost invariably been followed by commercial distress. The years 1835, 1836, 1843, 1844, and 1845, were all years of commercial prosperity and of cheap and abundant food. The period from 1839 to 1842 (during which wheat scarcely ever fell in price below 60s., and was repeatedly at 75s. and 76s.) was one of almost constant distress; and towards the end of that period, the manufacturing population of the North of England were driven, by long continued want of employment and suffering, into an unparalleled state of disorganisation. Again, the severe crisis of 1847 has been immediately preceded by a great and general scarcity of food. If we set aside experience, and reason *à priori* from acknowledged principles, we shall arrive at precisely the same conclusion. The loss arising from a bad harvest is certain and irremediable. The productive industry of one year has nothing to support and maintain it, but the produce of the labour of the preceding year. If that produce has been large, it is evident that the condition of the labourer and his employer will be prosperous; if it has been small, that condition will be one of privation and distress. It is true that we may fill up the vacuum by importation from abroad, but importation will operate only as an alleviation, not as a complete cure, of the evil. In a good season we have an abundant supply raised exclusively from our own soil; in a bad season not only is our whole supply smaller, but a part of that smaller supply has been purchased for a valuable consideration. The value we have given to the foreigner in exchange for his corn is a positive irredeemable loss—it is the exact measure of one part of the injury we sustain by the failure of our crops. In the case of an individual, the sequence of cause and effect would be obvious enough. Suppose that, by my own labour, I am just able to supply myself with what I require of food and clothing:—If my crop should prove deficient, it is clear that I must either submit to a reduction in my usual allowance of food, or I must give up a part of my usual supply of clothing, in order to make good the deficiency in

the food. In either case I must be a loser; I may choose between the food and the clothing, but, on one or the other, or on both, I must submit to a reduction. As it would be in the case of an individual, so must it be with a nation.—The nation must either submit to a short allowance of food, or it must increase its supply of food by parting with a portion of its manufactures. If there be no demand for our manufactures, we must relinquish a portion of that article for which there is a never-failing demand,—gold and silver. The ultimate loss to the nation is the same in either case, for either the gold and silver does not return to us, or it returns to us in exchange for our manufactures. All this will be readily admitted; but the question still remains, ‘Why does a deficient harvest press almost exclusively on the commercial and manufacturing industry of the country? If I produce clothing and my neighbour produces corn, how comes it that a failure in his harvest injures me and my operatives, more than it does him and his labourers?’ In a nation of Communists it would not be so; the corn and the clothing would be thrown into a common stock, and each party would have his fair share. But as societies are constituted (and so long as the rights of property are maintained will continue to be constituted) the process is a very different one. Every producer is the absolute owner of the fruits of his own industry, and will sell his own produce at as high a price, and buy his neighbour’s produce at as low a price, as he can. Now, in the case of a deficient harvest, the farmer will be enabled to obtain for his corn a price which will not only compensate him for the diminished quantity, but which will do much more than this;—he will be a positive gainer by the badness of the season, whilst the manufacturer will be in a corresponding degree a loser. To make this clear, let us only consider the position of any individual consumer in the case of a supply of food, which we will suppose to be deficient by one-half. Supposing the price to double, he will obtain for a given sum of money just half the usual quantity, and will have as much money as usual left to spend in clothing. But, in such a state of things, it is obvious that he will not hesitate to give up a portion of his usual supply of clothing in order to procure more food,—the more so that a certain supply of the latter

is absolutely indispensable to the mere support of existence, which is not equally true of any other article of his consumption. Every consumer being in precisely the same situation in this respect, all desirous of abandoning part of their clothing in order to get more food, of sacrificing some of their comforts in order to increase the necessaries of life, the price of food will be raised by increased competition to much more than double its usual price, whilst by diminished competition the price of clothing will be proportionably reduced. We have spoken of *clothing* merely in order to simplify the statement of the case; and it is obvious that the same reasoning will apply, in a greater or less degree, to all other articles, which are less needful than food to the support of human life.

Mr. Tooke, in his work on *High and Low Prices*, in tracing the effect of this principle at different periods, on the respective conditions of the agricultural and manufacturing bodies, refers, amongst others, to the years from 1793 to 1796. He states the produce of wheat in England in the former of those years at about 8,000,000 quarters, and in each of the years 1795 and 1796 at about 7,000,000 quarters. Now the average price of wheat in 1793 was 48s. 11d., in 1795, and 1796, it was 75s. 8d.; whereas if the price in the latter period had risen only in exact proportion to the diminished quantity, it would not have exceeded 56s. The difference between 56s. and 75s. 8d., or 19s. 8d. per quarter, amounting to a sum of nearly £7,000,000, represented the amount of benefit which the agricultural interest derived from the failure of the wheat crop in each of the years 1795 and 1796, to the detriment of the great body of consumers throughout the kingdom. The loss to the consumers was twofold. First, the quantity of wheaten bread actually eaten by them was diminished to the extent of one-eighth; and secondly, the smaller quantity cost them more by £7,000,000 than the larger quantity had done two years before; and it follows that, to the extent of £7,000,000, they must have economised in the consumption of clothing and other articles of comfort or luxury.

The effect of this state of things upon the manufacturer, in so far as he depends upon home consumption, is obvious enough. His profits must depend upon two things: 1st, upon the expenses of production; 2nd, upon the value of

his returns. We have seen in what way the latter will be diminished; the former will be increased by a rise in the price of the food on which his workmen subsist. He will in fact be a loser at both ends. The expenses of his establishment will increase; the demand for manufactured goods will fall off; prices will be reduced; production curtailed. The merchant, who supplies the raw material, will be a sufferer in a secondary degree; for in proportion as the production of the manufacturer is lessened, will the demand for the raw material diminish and its price fall. So far as the expense of production is concerned, the farmer and the manufacturer will labour under a similar disadvantage, for the enhanced price of food will affect agricultural as well as manufacturing labour; but, in the case of the former, the greater expense of production will be much more than made up by the increased value of the produce; increased, as we have shown, in a degree, much more than sufficient to compensate for the diminished quantity. It is not our object to consider in this place, in what proportions the loss and privation arising from this state of things will fall on the labourer, and on the employer of labour. That portion of it which arises from a depreciation of the article produced, would seem to fall exclusively on the latter; both will probably be sufferers to some extent from the increased price of food; but those who are acquainted with our manufacturing districts are aware, that the pressure of an adverse state of trade is generally borne in the first instance, and for a considerable length of time, by the employer of labour, and that it is only when a losing trade has lasted long enough to produce extensive embarrassments and insolvency, that the burden is necessarily shifted to the shoulders of the working man.

If, when our harvests are deficient, we could at once make good the deficiency by procuring foreign corn in exchange for our manufactures, no doubt the injury would press less severely on commercial and manufacturing interests; but painful experience has too clearly proved that this cannot be done, and that an extraordinary import of corn must be paid for in the first instance by an export of Specie, which is attended with an additional evil peculiar to itself, that of producing a temporary disturbance of the Currency of the country.



To come to the second great cause of commercial distress, it seems clear that in 1847 the Railway mania has very seriously aggravated the evils arising from a deficient harvest. It has abstracted from the merchant and manufacturer a large portion of their accustomed resources, in order to bestow them on gigantic works, destined ultimately to be of great utility, but utterly unproductive until the period of their completion. A considerable increase has thus been created in the demand for food, at the very moment when the country was deprived of a large portion of its usual supply, and the high price arising from scarcity has been raised still higher by the competition of a new class of labourers. The manufacturer has had to contend simultaneously with two circumstances, distinct in their origin, but both tending to increase his outlay and to force down the value of his returns. Nor has it been possible for him, by any ingenuity or prudence, altogether to obviate the evil. He has had it, indeed, in his power to keep every particle of his own independent capital within his own grasp; but in this country, more, perhaps, than in any other, the usual operations of productive industry are not carried on wholly by the independent capital of traders, but in great part by the contributions of that numerous class who, technically called monied men, live upon the interest of their capital without superintending its employment. Over this large portion of the capital of the country the trader has of course no control. In times of quiet prosperity it is an unfailing resource to him; in times of speculative excitement, when an exaggerated spirit of enterprise prevails, it leaves him, slowly but surely. It is subject to the unfailing law of competition; it passes to the highest bidder; and to the Railway Company, to whom the continuance or suspension of their works is a matter of life or death, scarcely any price is too high. The process by which, in the present instance, the capital of monied men has found its way into the great Railway channel, is a curious one; and if we were much in the habit of thinking over the causes of our disasters when they are past, we might greatly benefit by the useful lesson which it offers us. We are not to suppose that there has ever been a deliberate design on the part of capitalists, to throw suddenly together fifty or sixty millions of capital



for the construction of Railways. No such idea ever entered the head of any sane man. Far the greater part of these monster schemes were entered into by an enormous aggregate of persons of every age, of every calling, of every rank in life, of every variety of pecuniary means, with one single object, that of putting a sum of money into their pockets by the sale of the shares at an advanced price. Of the whole body of original subscribers, some were from the beginning hopelessly unable to fulfil the engagements into which they were entering; others were in a position to do so only by ruinous sacrifices, and by the withdrawal of capital from their legitimate business. There was a third (probably the least numerous) class, who had sufficient means to perform what they undertook. The constantly increasing pressure upon the two first classes has of course gradually thrown the shares into the hands of the third, a large portion of whose capital has thus been withdrawn from the merchant and manufacturer, to whom, through the medium of Banks, it is in ordinary times advanced; and this transfer of the shares from the weak hands to the strong, has of course been taking place on terms more and more disadvantageous to the former. Thus, at the very moment when the independent resources of the merchant and manufacturer were crippled by an exorbitant price of food, and by some direct participation in the Railway projects, and they were compelled to push their credit to the utmost, the very foundation on which all credit rests, viz., the loanable Capital of monied men, was daily becoming narrower. Whether, taking a very wide view of the effect of the great Railway campaign of 1845—1847 upon the *ultimate* condition of the country, the result will be mischievous or beneficial, we are not prepared to say. That is one question. Its *immediate* effect on the trading community, and on the condition of a vast number of individual families in all classes of life, is another and a very different question, on which we should think there could not be two opinions. A great benefit may have been conferred upon our children; but assuredly, if so, it has been purchased at a very ruinous price by the present generation.—If this be a correct view of the case, how, it may be asked, are works of great public utility, involving a large expenditure, and requiring several

years for their completion, ever to be undertaken with safety? The answer is, that we may undertake them with safety when they rest on a fair estimate of their cost, as compared with the resources at our command, but not otherwise; and there is no security that a fair estimate, or any estimate at all, will be made, so long as the original promoters are enabled to speculate upon the shares, and hand over the ultimate liability to other parties. A fair estimate involves the question of time. Our resources may be sufficient to complete a given work in five years, and utterly insufficient to complete it in two. The whole question is one of comparison between the end and the means; and we believe that the world never witnessed a more ludicrous disproportion between the magnitude of a series of projects and the means of carrying them into effect, than in the Railway mania of 1845 and 1846.

There are here surely causes sufficient to account for the commercial crisis of 1847, and for the existence of great distress amongst a large portion of the labouring class.

1st. A large rise in the price of Food,—falling partly on the employer of labour in the shape of an increase in the cost of production of the objects of his manufacture,—and partly on the labourer in the shape of a diminution of the usual necessities and comforts of life.

2ndly. A great diminution in the value of the manufacturer's returns, arising from the falling off in the demand of the great body of consumers for all articles not comprised under the head of Food.

3rdly. A withdrawal of the loanable Capital of the country, to an enormous extent, from the ordinary branches of industry, in order to be employed in the construction of Railways,—those Railways being utterly unproductive during the progress of their construction.

4thly. A consequent curtailment to a great extent, in the production of our mills and manufactories, and a corresponding diminution in the demand for the Raw material of all kinds. These results spring necessarily from the two great causes which we have been considering, a failure of our harvests, and an over application of capital to public works.

How far these disastrous consequences have been aggra-

vated by our System of Currency, or by the mismanagement of that system, is a question much less easily solved ; but we feel confident that no conceivable system could have converted the year 1847, from one of disaster and suffering, into one of average prosperity.—That our distress might not have been mitigated by a more perfect system of currency, or by a superior exercise of prudence and forethought in the regulation of our existing system, we are not prepared to say ; but we cannot consider it either philosophical, or practically useful, to endeavour to throw exclusively upon defective legislation, effects which are directly traceable, in a very great degree, partly to individual imprudence, and partly to natural causes entirely beyond human control. Accordingly, we have no sympathy with those who see, in our misfortunes, nothing but the Bank Act of 1844 ; still less with those who have thought proper to conjure up Free Trade as the cause of our calamities, and who have been so taken up with the notable discovery that, unless Foreign corn had come in, British gold would not have gone out, that they seem entirely to have lost sight of another truth of some importance, viz., that unless Foreign corn had come in, British subjects must have starved.

There seem to be two perfectly distinct questions to be considered in reference to our present system of currency, as connected with the events of 1847. First, whether the Act of 1844, administered as it has in fact been by the Bank Directors, is chargeable with any portion of the evils which have befallen us ; and secondly, whether it would have been liable to the same charge, if it had been uniformly administered according to the intentions of its authors. It is not necessary to enter into any examination of the working of the Act, in years of abundance and consequent prosperity. Its operation at such periods has never been found fault with. It is almost exclusively in years of deficient harvest that it has been charged with failure : and before we proceed further it is necessary to state, in a very few words, the principle on which it was intended to act at such times.

When an extraordinary importation of Food has taken place, it has invariably been paid for, in the first instance, by an exportation of specie. It is not, perhaps, demon-

strable, that this is an inevitable, but it certainly seems a very probable, consequence; for no reason can be alleged, why a large and sudden increase in the demand of England for foreign Food, should produce simultaneously large increase in the demand of the foreigner for English manufactures. Yet, in one or other of these two modes, it is obvious that the food must be paid for. If the manufactures are not wanted at that particular time, or rather if they are too dear to afford a reasonable prospect of profit to the foreign importer (for the price the importer can afford to pay, be it remembered, is the only real test of the degree in which they are wanted), specie must go out. The first consequence of an exportation of Specie, under our present system of currency, rightly administered, would be a co-extensive restriction of the Circulating medium. The effect of a curtailment in the Circulation is a depreciation in the value of produce of all kinds, of public Stocks, and Shares in Canal, Railway, and Banking Companies. Fall of Price is the great stimulator of demand. At twenty or thirty per cent. below their natural value, the foreign merchant will make a rush upon our goods, foreign capital will make its way to England for investment in Stocks and Shares, and English capital will be withdrawn from foreign countries and return to England for the same purpose. The exchanges will rise, Gold will flow back to us, our Circulation will again rise to its accustomed level; and thus, according to this system, the evil of a deficient harvest will, by a gradual and sure process, work its own cure.

Now, admitting for a moment that this mode of meeting the difficulty of a season of scarcity, is either the best which can be imagined, or the best which is practicable, one thing immediately suggests itself, viz. that it has never in fact been adopted or acted upon by the Bank Directors according to any uniform system; and that, although under their management the result has been the same in the end, that result has never been produced, as was intended, by a slow and gradual process, but always by one or more sudden and violent shocks, creating the utmost confusion and disturbance in every branch of trade, and an utter prostration of private Credit. But a large part of the evil of a general depreciation of Produce, Stocks, Shares, &c. at times of Crisis, seems to consist in its suddenness, in

the circumstance of its being rapid and unforeseen, and consequently not affording time for the application of measures of precaution. If restriction had gone hand in hand with the disappearance of our Gold during the early part of 1847, it may be presumed that a corresponding curtailment of their operations would have been forced upon the general body of merchants and manufacturers at a much earlier period, and that the disasters which have since occurred would to some extent have been averted. No system of restriction was in fact adopted and persevered in by the Bank, until it was too late; as a proof of which, it is only necessary to observe that, at the height of the crisis in October 1847, the Circulation of the Bank was as large, their Private Securities larger by £4,000,000, and their Reserve smaller by £6,000,000, than at the end of December 1846, when the fact of a greatly deficient supply of food first became apparent, and before any considerable export of gold had taken place. If this be so, it may be said that the fault rests with the Bank Directors and not with the Law, since the latter has not been administered in accordance with its spirit and obvious intention. But this justification of the authors of the Act of 1844 amounts to very little; for what is the value of a Law, enacted for a particular purpose, if it is wanting in the machinery necessary to effect that purpose? The intention may have been good, but, good or bad, the Law has not provided the means of realizing it. The old Law only failed in bad seasons; and the failure of the new Law, on the very first occurrence of a bad season, has been complete. The truth is, that both Laws contained one great and fundamental defect, which was this; they both depended for their successful operation, on the discretion of a body of men who had incompatible duties to perform, —first, as representatives of their own Proprietary; and secondly, as guardians of the general interests of the Public. No one pretends that, in the course they have pursued in 1846-7, the Bank Directors have not acted for the interest of the proprietors of Bank Stock. The charge against them is, that they have produced a commercial crisis; but if their own proprietors have been benefitted rather than injured by the Crisis, which we believe to be the fact, where is the mismanagement? The mismanage-

ment is in the Legislature, which placed the administration of the Law in their hands, and which did so, as we believe, under a mistaken notion (founded on the assurance of Sir Robert Peel), that the Law would be self-acting, and that no serious departure from the principle of the Act would be possible, so long as the strict letter of the Law was adhered to. If the Act, in addition to its other provisions, had made it compulsory on the Bank Directors to hold a certain proportion (say one third) of the amount of its Deposits, in Gold, it would, we believe, have been to a great extent self-acting; and the Directors would, at a much earlier period, have been compelled, by the drain of Gold, to enter upon, and follow up, that gradual course of restriction which the Act contemplates as desirable. In the absence of any such provision, there was both the power and the temptation to reduce the security for the due payment of the Deposits much below the point of safety.

This omission on the part of the framers of the Act seems to have arisen from their not having perceived that Deposits, although not forming a part of the actual Circulation, are liable at any moment to become so, quite independently of the will of the Directors, and even in spite of their utmost efforts to prevent it. It was in truth scarcely more necessary to provide for the convertibility of the Bank-notes actually circulating, than for the convertibility of those which the Depositors might bring into circulation at any moment.

A very little consideration will show how much the convertibility of the notes is affected by the circumstance of the Bank being a receiver of Deposits. Let us suppose for a moment that it were not a Bank of Deposit, and that its operations were confined to the mere issue of notes on Discount; and let us further suppose its position at a given moment to be correctly represented by the following figures:

Notes issued . . . £26,000,000.	Government Debt, &c. . . . .	£14,000,000
	Bullion . . . . .	12,000,000
		<hr/>
		£26,000,000
<hr/>		
Notes circulating £26,000,000.	Securities (against which	
	£26,000,000 of notes have	
	been issued on Discount)	£26,000,000

Admitting that which is assumed by the Act of 1844, viz., that the Circulation can never in practice, under any amount of pressure, fall below £14,000,000, it is evident that this position is perfectly unassailable, and that there is ample security for the convertibility of the notes in circulation. But introduce a new element into the calculation in the shape of a body of Depositors, and the position will be entirely changed. Let us suppose that, out of the £26,000,000 of notes circulating, £6,000,000 are paid into the Bank as Deposits, and are employed by the Bank in additional Discounts. The position will then be as follows :—

Notes issued . . . . .	£26,000,000.	Government Debt, &c. . . . .	£14,000,000
		Bullion . . . . .	12,000,000
			<hr/>
			£26,000,000
			<hr/>
Notes circulating . . . . .	£26,000,000.	Securities . . . . .	£32,000,000
Deposits . . . . .	6,000,000.		

We have here an actual Circulation of £26,000,000 of notes, to which a large addition may at any moment be made by the withdrawal of a part of the £6,000,000 of Deposits; but the entire available resources of the Bank are already mortgaged for the payment of the £26,000,000 in actual Circulation. Not the smallest fraction of those resources can be applied to the payment of the Deposits without a violation of the Law; and yet the Depositors of the £6,000,000 are in fact just as much holders of Bank-notes as the possessors of the £26,000,000 actually circulating. The only difference is, that the latter have the notes in their pockets, or in their strong boxes, whilst the former, for more convenience and security, have placed them in the hands of the Bank, on the condition that they shall be forthcoming when wanted. If the Law makes it compulsory on the Bank to make adequate provision for the payment of the former, surely it ought to make similar provision for the payment of the latter. We have purposely put an extreme case, in order to show in as simple a form as possible, in what way the operation of the Act of 1844 is affected by the circumstance of the Bank being a receiver of Deposits. We do not, of course, mean to



say that the Bank could ever practically find itself in the exact position we have supposed ; but we do mean to say, that it may approach indefinitely near to it ; and in proof of this, it is only necessary to advert to its published Accounts in October last, when Government interference was called for, and the Law was suspended.

No one can have forgotten that, at that time, there was a sum of little more than £1,000,000, wherewith to pay nearly £9,000,000 of Deposits ; in other words, to pay notes to the extent of nearly £9,000,000 which had been entrusted to the Bank by private Depositors for safe custody. If the Law has provided no security that these deposits shall be paid on demand, it cannot with any propriety be said to have secured the convertibility of Bank-notes.

So far with respect to the insufficiency of the Act of 1844, as it has been in fact administered. Whether, if administered as its authors contend it ought to have been, it would not still have been greatly defective, is a more important question, and one not quite so easily solved ; nor do we propose on the present occasion to enter into a discussion, which would lead us into a minute examination of the comparative merits of the many different systems of currency, which have been propounded, or which are in actual existence. One general observation, however, we may be permitted to make. We have seen that one of the direct consequences of a deficient harvest, is a depreciation of almost all articles not comprised under the head of Food. This is in itself a great evil, absolutely inevitable.—A further depreciation, affecting every description of produce equally, and producing a great disturbance of private credit, seems to be the natural consequence of a considerable reduction in the circulating medium ; and such a reduction is deliberately contemplated, as the gradual but proper result of our export of specie under our present system of Currency. Is this additional evil inevitable ? Under a more perfect system of Currency, might it not be avoided ? Without pretending to deliver any positive opinion on the subject, ourselves, yet we must say, that we have never seen any attempt to give a satisfactory reply to these questions. The difficulty seems to arise from the necessity under

which we labour, of keeping a stock of the precious metals for two distinct purposes ; first, to serve *at all times* as the basis of our paper money ; secondly, to serve as an article of trade on the *occasional* occurrence of a bad harvest, and the consequent necessity of importing Food from foreign countries. For *both* these purposes our stock of bullion is clearly insufficient. The Act of 1844 provides us with just enough Gold to perform one important function, and in years of scarcity it is called upon to perform two. If a larger quantity were held in ordinary times, it can scarcely be supposed that no mode could be devised of making part of it available in extraordinary emergencies, without producing a general disturbance of the circulation of the country. It is quite true, that an increase in our stock of the precious metals could not be effected, without an immediate corresponding sacrifice of capital, but if, thereby, one-tenth part of the calamities of such a year as that of 1847 could be averted, the benefit would be cheaply purchased.

But whether we hold much Gold or little, the great practical difficulty will always be to devise a set of Rules which shall be self-acting under all circumstances, and which shall not be dependent on the intelligence of Bank Directors or Commissioners. Mr. Booth, in the Pamphlet which he has recently published, seems to us, not to have entirely met this difficulty. He would place in the hands of Commissioners, certain powers, which might or might not practically be effectual for the purpose he has in view. We should still be dependent for the successful working of his system on the wisdom and sagacity of those Commissioners, with whom it would be discretionary what steps, if any, they were to take to meet the difficulty of a deficient harvest, even supposing them to have ascertained with certainty, at a sufficiently early period, the fact of that deficiency. There would, too, we think, be great inconvenience in engrafting a plan for Commissioners on the Act of 1844. On the two following points we certainly hold a very strong opinion. First, that all power over the Currency of the country, should be placed in the hands of a *single* body. Secondly, that in the exercise of those powers, there should be as little scope for discretion as possible. The System

ought to be as nearly as possible self-acting: in other words, it ought to be such that no very serious deviation from its *principle and spirit* would be possible, so long as the *letter* of the Law was adhered to. No system which depends, in any great degree, on the discretion of individuals, will be exempt from frequent failure of a very serious kind, or will give confidence to the public.